Ali al-Zaidi’s Break from Framework Dominance: The First Step Toward Restoring the Iraqi State

Iraq’s ruling political establishment remains incapable of grasping the scale of regional and international transformations´-or-understanding the demands of the coming phase and the need for a fundamental reassessment of the political system and the mechanisms through which the state is governed. Instead of forming a national government equipped with the competence, courage, and independence needed to rescue the country from its mounting political and economic crises, the same government model has been reproduced—one governed by the same partisan power-sharing arrangements and constrained by the political-limit-s imposed by forces that bear a substantial share of the responsibility for the deterioration of state institutions over the past several years.

Perhaps the most serious challenge facing Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is not merely the magnitude of the inherited problems, but the continued subordination of executive decision-making to the influence of the Coordination Framework leadership and its constituent parties, some of which maintain close political and ideological ties with Iran. The presence of ministers aligned with forces that have external affiliations raises serious questions about the prime minister’s ability to exercise his constitutional powers independently and make sovereign decisions that run counter to the interests of those who helped bring him to power.

In our assessment, Iranian influence in Iraq is no longer merely a contentious issue among political factions. It has become a structural problem in which partisan, economic, and security interests intersect with state institutions. Through a network of political alliances, armed groups, and economic interests, Tehran has managed to consolidate extensive influence that has undermined the independence of Iraq’s national decision-making and weakened successive governments’ ability to build independent institutions governed by the Constitution and the law.

This influence did not emerge overnight´-or-as the product of a passing political phase. Rather, it is the result of years of accumulated political developments during which sectarian divisions and partisan power-sharing arrangements were exploited to weaken a unifying national identity and elevate cross-border political and ideological loyalties above the requirements of citizenship and Iraq’s supreme national interests.

It is essential here to distinguish between members of Iraq’s Shiite community, who are an integral part of the Iraqi people and state, and political forces that use sectarian identity as a cover for their partisan agendas and foreign affiliations. The problem lies not in a citizen’s sectarian identity, but in its political exploitation to justify subordination and perpetuate foreign influence.

This reality has weakened the concept of the nation-state and created centers of influence that operate alongside—and sometimes outside—the country’s constitutional institutions. As a result, Iraqi decision-making on key issues has become vulnerable to external agendas and narrow partisan interests. This can be described as a form of in-dir-ect domination exercised through local instruments and Iraqi political proxies, without the need for a conventional military occupation.

The result is that Iraq, despite its human resources, economic wealth, and strategic geographic location, has failed to harness its strengths to build a stable and prosperous state. Instead, in some aspects of its regional relations, it has become an arena for settling scores and exchanging political and security messages—at the expense of its people s interests and the future of generations to come.

Under these circumstances, calls for partial reforms´-or-limited administrative remedies are insufficient to bring about genuine change. Iraq’s crisis is not simply a matter of government performance. It is a crisis rooted in a political system built on sectarian and partisan power-sharing, the division of influence and interests, and the entanglement of official authority with partisan and armed centers of power.

This is where Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s responsibility comes into focus. He must recognize that the office of prime minister is not an executive position intended to manage understandings among the Coordination Framework leadership, nor is it a tool for implementing the decisions of the parties that helped form his government. Rather, it is a constitutional office that requires him to exercise executive authority in accordance with the law, assume -dir-ect responsibility for protecting national sovereignty, managing state institutions, and safeguarding public funds.

Possessing constitutional powers is not enough unless those powers are matched by the political will to exercise them independently. There is little value in talking about combating corruption if partisan power centers continue to control public institutions and resources. There is no meaning to the slogan of placing all weapons under state control if armed groups operating outside the official chain of command continue to influence security and political decisions. Nor can genuine economic reform be achieved as long as appointments, public offices, and government contracts remain subject to power-sharing arrangements and partisan loyalties.

Accordingly, al-Zaidi’s break from the dominance of the Coordination Framework must not amount to a mere political stance´-or-a temporary dispute with some of its leaders. It must represent a genuine transformation in the way the state is governed. That transformation should begin with bringing all institutions under constitutional authority, selecting officials on the basis of competence and integrity, confronting corruption without partisan exceptions, and preventing foreign interference in sovereign decision-making.

The prime minister’s independence also does not mean engaging in an ill-considered political confrontation with parliamentary forces. Rather, it means managing relations with them on the basis of the Constitution and the separation of powers, while refusing to allow political agreements to become constraints that undermine the government’s authority´-or-prevent it from fulfilling its national responsibilities.

Public confidence in Iraq’s ruling political forces has declined across broad segments of society as a result of accumulated failures, corruption, and the continued practice of power-sharing politics. Government promises are no longer enough to -restore- that confidence. Iraqi citizens want tangible improvements in their daily lives. They want a state that protects their security and rights, provides public services and employment opportunities, safeguards the country’s wealth, and places the national interest above partisan and foreign interests.

Al-Zaidi therefore has a political opportunity to demonstrate whether he can move from being the head of a government formed through agreements among powerful political factions to becoming the head of an executive branch that exercises its authority independently and derives the legitimacy of its performance from the Constitution and the confidence of the people—not from the approval of party leaders.

Iraq’s real battle today is not about replacing individuals, redistributing government positions,´-or-holding another electoral contest among parties that divide power among themselves. It is a battle to reclaim the state, -restore- its national identity and sovereignty, and ensure that its decisions are made independently.

Iraq must either move toward building a modern, civilian state that holds an exclusive monopoly on legitimate authority, the use of force, and sovereign decision-making—a state founded on citizenship, competence, and the rule of law—or remain trapped in a political system that continually reproduces its own crises and allows foreign influence to shape the country’s future.

From this perspective, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s break from the dominance of the Coordination Framework represents a necessary first step toward restoring Iraq’s independent decision-making. However, it will not be sufficient unless it translates into concrete measures to safeguard sovereignty and genuine institutional reforms.

What is required of al-Zaidi is not to declare his independence from the Coordination Framework in words, but to demonstrate it through actions and decisions, fulfilling the obligations imposed on him by the Constitution and the responsibilities of his office, free from pressure exerted by partisan forces and their foreign affiliations. Winning the trust of the Iraqi people by protecting their interests and restoring their rights is more important—and has a more lasting impact—than winning the approval of political leaders whose alliances shift according to their own interests.

The truth the prime minister must understand is that Iraq will not regain its sovereignty as long as executive decision-making remains subject to partisan forces tied to external interests. The independence of the prime minister is neither a personal goal nor a political prize. It is a necessary prerequisite for reclaiming the Iraqi state from the grip of sectarian power-sharing, subordination, and corruption.

We recognize that freeing Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi from the dominance of the Coordination Framework will not be easy, given the nature of a political system built on power-sharing arrangements and partisan agreements, as well as the constraints that powerful political forces impose on independent executive decision-making. But the difficulty of this task does not absolve the prime minister of his constitutional and national responsibilities, nor does it provide him with a perpetual excuse to accept dictates that run counter to the public interest.

Political history judges prime ministers not only by the extent of the pressure they faced, but also by the positions they took and the decisions they made in confronting it. If al-Zaidi wants to leave a positive mark on Iraq’s history, he must understand that independence in decision-making is not a favor granted by the Coordination Framework leadership. It is a constitutional responsibility that he must strive to fulfill, even if doing so requires rethinking his relationship with the forces that brought him to power.

He must choose between being the prime minister of an independent state and remaining the head of a government -dir-ected by the very forces that brought him to office. That choice will determine his political future—and, with it, Iraq’s prospects for escaping its historic crisis.

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