Sudans War of Deception..!

Since 1989, Sudan has been trapped in successive crises, the product of a governing approach known as Management by Crisis, employed by the Islamists from Bashir through Burhan and Hemedti and their associates. They manufacture crises out of thin air to divert attention from existing problems´-or-advance objectives they fear we would reject. They then propose solutions that are, in essence, the hidden objectives behind the manufactured crises. Under the crushing pressure these crises create, the public accepts those solutions and even thanks their architects for them.
Following the popular uprising of December 2018, this destructive management strategy was deployed with increasing intensity. Its manifestations include the ongoing war, which I explained from its earliest days was manufactured by Burhan and Hemedti at the ---dir---ection of the Islamists, with the assistance of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and the opportunists who capitalised on the Juba Agreements. The objective was to achieve three principal goals: the Islamists’ open return to power, the intimidation, displacement and impoverishment of the Sudanese people, and the completion of Sudan’s plunder and partition under the Islamist Hamdi Triangle scheme.
Tragically, they appear to have achieved their objectives. Regarding the Islamists’ overt return to power, one of our greatest miscalculations was believing that they had fallen simply because Bashir and his associates had disappeared from public view. We have yet to fully grasp that their disappearance was and remains a tactical manoeuvre. Consider their networks and organisational structures, which have grown stronger thanks to the betrayal and manipulation of the Sudanese people by the FFC and its role in suffocating the revolution in its infancy, as I explained in detail in previous articles.

The Second Objective: Terrorising, Displacing and Impoverishing the Sudanese People
Thousands have fled their homes as a result of repeated attacks involving missiles, aircraft and artillery. Sudanese have also fled the country en masse following the FFC’s disinformation campaigns, which presented displacement as the best available route to safety. Many ordinary people fell into this trap and now face severe financial and psychological hardship, both inside Sudan and abroad. In countless cases, returning home is further complicated by the destruction´-or-looting of their properties.
Those who remained in their homes,´-or-have recently returned, face looting, intimidation, soaring prices, the collapse of essential services, the spread of disease, environmental degradation, shortages of medicines and prohibitive drug prices.
Painfully, some Sudanese regard Burhan as a saviour, despite his responsibility, alongside Hemedti and the other parties, for bringing about this war. This contradiction illustrates how fear and devastation can drive victims and ordinary citizens to cling to one side of a crisis in the hope of finding salvation, while overlooking that side’s responsibility for creating and perpetuating the very crisis from which they seek deliverance.
In other words, the crisis itself becomes an instrument for shaping and ---dir---ecting society, compelling people to accept what they had previously rejected under the weight of desperation and fear.

The Hamdi Triangle: Completing the Partition of Sudan
The completion of the Hamdi Triangle scheme is evident in developments in Darfur: territorial control, grave violations and the displacement of populations carried out by Hemedti and his Janjaweed forces. They have established an authority and institutions purporting to represent the region, thereby entrenching division as a permanent political reality.
While the people of Darfur endure these violations, the leaders of Darfur’s armed movements enjoy comfortable lives, whether in Port Sudan´-or-in northern and central Sudan, engaging in various commercial activities with little regard for the very people whose causes they claim to champion.
One particularly revealing development is the alliance between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Abdelaziz Al-Hilu faction, and the Janjaweed. This exposes a glaring contradiction between the movement’s rhetoric on marginalised communities and their rights, and its alliance with the Janjaweed, whose widespread violations against communities are well known, including those the Al-Hilu movement claims to protect.
Added to this are the rapidly escalating armed conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, driven either by divisions within the SPLM itself´-or-by the tribal and regional polarisation fuelled by the Islamists and now exploited in ongoing conflicts.
Taken together, these developments in Darfur and the Two Areas threaten Sudan’s territorial integrity, transforming existing divisions into de facto boundaries between competing spheres of influence.

Northern Sudan: Egyptian Occupation and the Erosion of Sovereignty
In Sudan’s far north, the Egyptian occupation, which began in Halayeb, has expanded to encompass most of our Nubian lands. Argeen has effectively become a land port for Egypt, whereas our border with Egypt once lay at Qustul.
This is in addition to the one million feddans granted to the Egyptians by the Islamists in Northern State under the Kenana Project, as well as their continued interference with our territorial waters in the Red Sea.
Egyptian audacity reached its peak when Egyptian forces perpetrated a massacre against Sudanese miners inside Sudanese territory. Burhan responded not merely with silence but by openly endorsing the raids, without the slightest embarrassment. This lends further credence to circulating reports that these territories have been sold´-or-ceded. And what remains concealed is even more alarming.

Eastern Sudan: Ethiopian Encroachment, Foreign Land Deals and the Militarisation of Citizenship
In eastern Sudan, the Ethiopian occupation, which began in Al-Fashaga, has expanded to include the establishment of entire villages in the Din---dir--- area, while Ethiopian militias continue to loot and kill Sudanese citizens.
Reports have also emerged of Ethiopian incursions into Blue Nile State, allegedly facilitated and supported by Hemedti, his Janjaweed forces and their FFC allies.
Then there are the lands sold to Emirati, Saudi and Turkish interests, including our principal seaports, Port Sudan and Sawakin, as well as the reported arrangements concerning Abu Amama Port, the Russian naval base, mining areas and other strategic assets.
The most dangerous issue in the east, however, is the naturalisation of thousands of Eritreans, the expansion of their influence within state institutions and their links to armed formations whose loyalties extend beyond Sudan’s borders.
In previous articles, I examined how the Islamists exploited naturalised Eritreans to seize control of the country and suppress the Sudanese people. Burhan is now following the same path, and worse. He has permitted naturalised Eritreans to enter the country after receiving training and weapons in Eritrea, ostensibly to support the army against the Janjaweed, despite their publicly expressed hostility and threats against everything Sudanese, including the army and Burhan himself.
Moreover, the majority of these individuals are already affiliated with the Janjaweed. This leaves us with one inescapable conclusion: Burhan is seeking to ignite a conflict in eastern Sudan as part of the Islamist Hamdi Triangle scheme.

The War Is Not Merely a Struggle for Power
This war cannot be reduced to a mere dispute between military commanders and the Janjaweed,´-or-to a contest among political factions for power. It is the culmination of accumulated crises, deliberately engineered to plunder and dismantle Sudan and forcibly displace its people.
Accordingly, any serious initiative must establish the responsibility of all parties for the violations committed, beginning with Bashir and his associates, including Burhan and Hemedti, and extending to every political force´-or-armed movement found to have been involved. The rights of victims and the interests of ordinary citizens must take precedence.
Ending the war must not become a means of consolidating the outcomes of the conflict´-or-granting political legitimacy to those who seized power through armed force. Genuine peace cannot be built by disregarding the will of the people and the rights of victims, overlooking crimes´-or-dividing spheres of influence among the warring parties.

Saving What Remains of Sudan: A National Framework for Action
Saving what remains of Sudan requires rational thinking, sound planning and disciplined organisation. We must begin by uniting our efforts within an independent civilian entity, free from partisan, tribal and regional power-sharing arrangements. We must then work across multiple fronts simultaneously to save time and maximise our impact, through the following seven working groups:
1. Strategic Planning Group: Develop an overarching strategy for the transitional period, defining governance priorities and structures, rebuilding state institutions, reforming the economy and addressing the consequences of war. The strategy must include clear timelines and precise performance indicators.
2. Implementation Planning and Costing Group: Prepare detailed sectoral action plans, identify the human and financial resources required, determine funding sources, and establish implementation, monitoring and follow-up mechanisms.
3. Popular Mobilisation and Civilian Organisation Group: Coordinate peaceful civic action, broaden popular participation, build nationwide communication networks and strengthen public awareness.
4. Protection of National Resources and Assets Group: Monitor agreements and transactions involving land, ports, minerals, water and other strategic resources---;--- collect and verify relevant information---;--- and prepare comprehensive, well-organised legal and technical dossiers.
5. Documentation and Accountability Group: Preserve evidence relating to naturalisation-related offences, human rights violations, financial misconduct and administrative abuses, with a view to submitting the evidence to the competent judicial authorities.
6. Foreign Relations Group: Establish the principles and guidelines governing Sudan’s foreign relations on the basis of mutual interests, the protection of national sovereignty, the diversification of partnerships and the prevention of external dependency.
7. Community Reconciliation Group: Address tribal and regional polarisation, support the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and rebuild trust among indigenous local communities.

Beyond Empty Promises: A Practical Programme for Change
We do not need illusory and unattainable promises of investigation and verification. What we need is a scientific, practical and actionable vision that answers the essential questions: What will happen from the very first day after genuine change is completed? What must be accomplished? What will we do, how and when will we do it, and with what resources? Who will be responsible for implementation? How will performance be monitored, and how will those who fail in their duties be held accountable?
The Islamists, their proxies Burhan and Hemedti the FFC under its proliferating labels, and the so-called armed movements all bear responsibility for creating and perpetuating our recent crises, including the ongoing war. It is naive to rely on these same actors to resolve the crises they helped create merely because they cloak themselves in the rhetoric of peace and change.
We must break out of this vicious cycle and move beyond all political forces whose records have already been tested. At the same time, we must critically assess the positions and policies of foreign powers and refuse to be deceived by hollow expressions such as good neighbourliness and brotherhood.
International relations are governed by interests, obligations and agreements not sentimental slogans. A true brother does not build his interests at his brother’s expense, nor exploit his weakness and suffering to seize his land and resources.
I am absolutely confident that genuine national alternatives exist within the Sudanese people themselves. Sudan does not lack the intellect, competence´-or-experience required to lead the country towards a better future. We must give these capable individuals the opportunity to serve within an inclusive national framework founded on integrity, competence and accountability not narrow loyalties´-or-personal interests.

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