The Coordination Framework’s Leadership and Its Government: Power-Sharing Positions and Ministries in a Country Facing a Financial Crisis

On October 15, 2026, the Al-Zaidi government moved to appoint four deputy prime ministers, with the appointments receiving approval from the Council of Representatives. This step raises serious constitutional, political, and financial questions, particularly as Iraq is facing a severe financial crisis that calls for reducing government spending rather than expanding the number of senior government positions. The move also raises concerns that executive decision-making and parliamentary oversight are being subordinated to political bargains and partisan power-sharing arrangements rather than being guided by genuine administrative needs and the national interest.

Today, the same issue has resurfaced as plans emerge to appoint four deputy prime ministers and establish three new ministries at a time when Iraq is experiencing a severe financial and economic crisis that demands cuts in public spending, not an expansion of government positions and institutions.

Unless this approach is based on genuine administrative necessities and supported by clear financial assessments, it cannot be understood independently of the system of partisan power-sharing that has governed Iraq for years. This system has turned the formation of governments and the distribution of senior positions into mechanisms for appeasing influential political forces rather than selecting officials on the basis of competence and the state s actual needs.

What is the purpose of appointing four deputy prime ministers? What powers would they exercise? Are existing ministries and institutions incapable of performing the duties that would supposedly be assigned to them? More importantly, what constitutional and legal authority would the government rely on to create these positions and define their responsibilities?

The Iraqi Constitution establishes the structure and powers of the executive branch and does not leave the organization of government institutions outside constitutional and legislative frameworks. Article 139 of the Constitution stipulated, among its transitional provisions, the existence of two deputy prime ministers during the first electoral term. This provision was tied to a specific transitional period and cannot be interpreted as a permanent, unrestricted authorization to create any number of deputy prime minister positions.

Article 76 governs the procedures for nominating a prime minister, forming a government, and obtaining parliamentary confidence, while Article 61 addresses the Council of Representatives powers of oversight and accountability. Although the absence of explicit provisions concerning deputy prime ministers in these two articles does not, by itself, settle the question of whether their appointment is constitutional, it raises legitimate questions about the legal basis for establishing four positions at this level, the powers their holders would exercise, and the-limit-s of their accountability to the prime minister and the Council of Representatives.

Article 86 of the Constitution also requires that the structure, -function-s, responsibilities, and powers of ministries and ministers be regulated by law. Accordingly, the establishment of three new ministries requires a clear explanation of the legislative basis for creating them and defining their jurisdictions. Political agreements´-or-administrative decisions unsupported by appropriate legislation cannot serve as an adequate substitute.

Respect for the Constitution is demonstrated not through slogans but through compliance with its provisions and by preventing state institutions from becoming instruments for distributing political spoils among parties.

One of the most striking political and economic contradictions is that the government is moving to expand its executive structure while simultaneously declaring that the country faces a financial crisis requiring austerity measures and imposing additional burdens on citizens. Countries that respect their institutions and accept their responsibilities to their people respond to financial crises by reviewing public expenditures, consolidating overlapping institutions, eliminating unnecessary positions, and reducing operating costs. They do not create additional administrative and political posts.

In Iraq, however, the logic of partisan power-sharing once again appears to take precedence over economic and administrative reform.

The creation of new positions cannot be justified by claiming that their holders will serve without salaries´-or-benefits. The actual cost of a government position is not-limit-ed to the individual s salary. It also includes the offices, administrative staff, security details, vehicles, operating allowances, and financial and administrative authorities that may accompany it.

Establishing a new ministry is even more complex and costly. It requires an organizational structure, a workforce, an operating budget, and administrative and technical resources, unless the ministry results from a carefully planned restructuring of existing institutions that does not produce a net increase in spending.

Therefore, claims that creating these positions will cost the treasury nothing cannot be accepted without detailed financial data demonstrating that this is indeed the case.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this issue is the attempt to reduce it to a question of salaries and benefits, as though giving up a salary were a guarantee of integrity´-or-proof that no political interests lay behind the appointment.

The experience of successive Iraqi governments has demonstrated that the risks of corruption are not-limit-ed to salaries. They also arise from the potential misuse of influence, official powers, and political connections to gain access to public funds, government contracts, appointments, and economic resources.

In a political environment lacking effective oversight, a government position can become a source of money and influence even if its holder receives no salary at all.

This is precisely where the danger lies in expanding the number of senior government positions without strict safeguards for transparency, accountability, and the prevention of conflicts of interest.

How many officials would be willing to serve without pay if their positions gave them the power to influence decisions, contracts, and appointments? How many political forces view executive positions as opportunities to expand their influence within state institutions?

The fight against corruption does not begin by reducing´-or-eliminating an official s salary. It begins by preventing the abuse of power, ensuring that all officials are subject to the law, and disclosing the financial and political interests associated with their positions.

Appointing four deputy prime ministers does not necessarily mean that government performance will improve. It could instead complicate decision-making, particularly if the appointments are based on partisan power balances rather than competence and administrative experience.

When each deputy prime minister is affiliated with a political bloc´-or-an influential faction, conflicts of interest and overlapping authorities become real possibilities. The Prime Minister s Office could turn into an arena for political competition within the executive branch itself.

Instead of having a clear executive center that is accountable to Parliament and the public, Iraq could end up with multiple centers of influence whose jurisdictions overlap and whose priorities differ.

The fundamental problem in Iraq is not a shortage of government positions´-or-officials. It is weak institutional administration, partisan interference in executive decision-making, and the erosion of accountability and responsibility.

Genuine reform must therefore begin by strengthening the independence of government decision-making, not by distributing executive authority among representatives of competing political forces.

This expansion of government comes amid economic and financial failures that call for a comprehensive review of the Al-Zaidi government s policies, particularly measures affecting citizens purchasing power and living standards.

In a previous article titled Iraq s Financial Crisis: Al-Zaidi Has Many Options—Why Did He Choose to Make Citizens Bear the Cost?, we discussed alternatives the government could have considered and adopted before resorting to measures that affect the value of the national currency and increase the cost-of-living burden on citizens.

It makes little sense for the government to demand that citizens bear the consequences of the financial crisis while failing to present a convincing plan to reduce its own expenditures, eliminate unnecessary positions, and combat waste and corruption.

As for the fight against corruption, the central problem remains the focus on certain tools and manifestations of corruption without addressing the political and economic structures that allow it to persist, particularly networks of influence and economic offices affiliated with political parties and armed factions.

How can the government speak of genuine financial reform without addressing the sources of waste and corruption within state institutions? How can it convince citizens of the need for austerity while continuing to expand senior political and administrative positions?

The contradiction between government rhetoric and actual practice undermines public confidence in the executive branch and reduces economic reform to a series of promises that produce no meaningful change on the ground.

Iraq needs a competent national government with independent decision-making authority, capable of managing public resources, combating corruption, rationalizing spending, and achieving economic development far more than it needs four deputy prime ministers and three additional ministries.

The government must publicly explain the constitutional and legal basis for these positions and ministries, specify their powers and financial costs, and demonstrate the practical benefits of establishing them. These measures must also be subject to parliamentary and judicial oversight within the-limit-s of their respective constitutional powers.

Government positions do not make a state strong. Having more officials does not necessarily mean better administration, and giving up a salary does not prevent the abuse of influence.

Iraq s future requires freeing government decision-making from the dominance of powerful political parties and external dictates. It also requires undertaking political and constitutional reforms that strengthen national sovereignty and state unity, uphold the rule of law, separate religion from politics, and make competence and integrity the foundations of public service.

A state governed to satisfy political parties cannot fulfill the aspirations of its people. And a government that expands its senior positions in the midst of a financial crisis only reinforces the perception that the priorities of political forces continue to take precedence over the needs of ordinary citizens

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