How Israel’s surveillance empire turned the UAE’s security obsession into a strategic vulnerability The enemy inside the palace

Umm Durman, al-Khartum

For three decades, Abu Dhabi has cultivated a secretive relationship with Israeli intelligence, buying surveillance technology to protect its rulers from their enemies. But allegations of compromising palace recordings, the expanding rivalry with Saudi Arabia, and an extraordinary network connecting Israeli security, Azerbaijani energy and Jared Kushner’s private investments raise a far more dangerous question: who is watching the watchers?

For more than three decades, the United Arab Emirates has pursued one of the most ambitious and secretive intelligence partnerships in the Middle East. Long before the Abraham Accords were signed in Washington in September 2020, Abu Dhabi was acquiring Israeli surveillance technology, establishing discreet channels with Israeli officials and building an internal security apparatus intended to make the ruling establishment virtually impervious to threats. The objective was straightforward: to protect the Al Nahyan dynasty, eliminate political uncertainty and turn the UAE into a state in which almost nothing could happen without the knowledge of its rulers. Yet the contradiction at the heart of this project is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.

The same foreign technology that gives Abu Dhabi the capacity to monitor its population may also create opportunities for others to penetrate its most sensitive institutions. The same intelligence relationships that strengthen the monarchy against domestic opponents may expose its internal divisions to foreign powers. And the same economic partnerships that were supposed to guarantee the political benefits of normalization have become intertwined with a far wider network of sovereign wealth, energy investments, military technology and private financial interests stretching from Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv to Baku and Washington.
At the centre of this contradiction stands Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE president, whose pursuit of security has transformed his country into a regional intelligence and financial power. But security and control are not the same thing. The Emirates has built a system designed to know everything about everyone. The uncomfortable question is whether it can guarantee that others do not know equally sensitive things about its rulers.

The security state that Sheikh Khalifa built
In September 2012, President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan established the National Electronic Security Authority, known as NESA, with responsibilities for safeguarding communications networks and information systems across the country. The official justification was cybersecurity. But the institution emerged within a political environment increasingly defined by the surveillance and suppression of dissent. Two months later, Sheikh Khalifa issued a sweeping cybercrime decree that Human Rights Watch warned could criminalize peaceful criticism of government officials and advocacy for political reform.
The Al Nahyan leadership was constructing something far more sophisticated than a conventional police state. It was building a security system in which surveillance, predictive technology, financial intelligence and centralized political authority could operate together. But these systems required expertise that the Emirates could not always supply domestically. And one of the principal sources of that expertise was Israel.

Israel was inside Abu Dhabi long before the Abraham Accords
The public presentation of the Abraham Accords as a historic diplomatic breakthrough concealed an important fact. The Israeli-Emirati relationship did not begin in 2020. By then, the foundations of intelligence and security cooperation had been laid over many years.
One of the clearest examples was Falcon Eye, the surveillance network developed for Abu Dhabi. The project was associated with AGT International, a Switzerland-based company controlled by Israeli businessman Mati Kochavi. Investigations published by Middle East Eye described how Israeli-linked companies and personnel participated in building the surveillance infrastructure despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE. The arrangement was revealing.
A company registered in Switzerland provided the commercial vehicle. Israeli technological expertise supplied important capabilities. The Emirati security establishment became the customer. The network was designed to integrate monitoring infrastructure across Abu Dhabi, giving security authorities increasingly extensive access to information about movement and activity. It was a formidable instrument of domestic control. But it also exposed the structural vulnerability of a state purchasing sensitive intelligence capabilities from foreign contractors.
A dependence on foreign expertise in sensitive security infrastructure creates risks that cannot be resolved simply by paying for the equipment. Israel, meanwhile, had reasons of its own to cultivate Abu Dhabi. The Emirates was wealthy, strategically located, hostile to many of the same regional movements opposed by Israel, and deeply concerned about Iran s influence. The relationship was never simply commercial. In November 2015, Israel established a presence linked to the International Renewable Energy Agency in Abu Dhabi. IRENA stressed that the arrangement was confined to its institutional work and did not itself constitute diplomatic relations with the UAE. The distinction was important. Normalization was not a single ceremony. It was the culmination of a gradual process in which security cooperation and practical contact preceded public diplomatic recognition.

Pegasus and the destruction of private life
In August 2016, Emirati human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor received suspicious text messages promising information about detainees allegedly tortured in UAE prisons. Rather than opening the links, Mansoor passed them to researchers at Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto. Their investigation uncovered an attempted attack using sophisticated exploits linked to Pegasus, the spyware developed by Israel s NSO Group. Citizen Lab identified evidence pointing towards the UAE government as the operator behind the attempted attack.
This was not the interception of an enemy military communication, it was an attempted intrusion against a human rights activist. The significance of Pegasus became even clearer in October 2021, when England s High Court concluded that Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai, had authorized surveillance involving Pegasus against his estranged wife. The court described the surveillance as an abuse of power.
Here was a technology developed by an Israeli company being used in one of the most sensitive disputes involving a Gulf ruling family. Its deployment demonstrated that the boundary between state intelligence and personal conflict could collapse when enormous surveillance powers were concentrated in the hands of rulers, and it raised a question that extends beyond Dubai.

The accusation involving Sheikh Khalifa and Dr. Osama Al-Shuaibi
An accusation attributed to a Saudi diplomat by the name of Dr. Osama Al-Shaibi involves not only the murder of the late UAE president by his brother, the current president, but also  a footage of Sheikh Khalifa being secretly recorded during a problematic intimate encounter with another person­-;- planted to expedite the process. Israeli actors obtained the compromising data among others concerning the Emirati ruling establishment and subsequently shared some of this material with Saudi Arabia.
The question such account raises is of unmistakable political significance. The issue of public concern would be the clandestine recording of such activity, the unauthorized acquisition of the material and its possible exploitation by intelligence services. If authenticated, such an operation would represent a grave security failure at the highest level of the Emirati state. It would mean that the intimate affairs of a president had potentially become intelligence material in the possession of foreign actors. Saudi Arabia and the UAE may share political and security interests, but they are also competitors. They compete for regional leadership, investment, energy influence and diplomatic access.
An intelligence service possessing compromising information about a rival ruling establishment would potentially hold a powerful political asset. This is not to mention the Al Nahyan rivalries and the palace coup plot in 2011. 

An intelligence alliance with two sides
The UAE s growing dependence on Israeli technology also creates a problem of strategic trust. Israeli intelligence and commercial surveillance companies operate in an environment shaped by Israel s national security priorities. Emirati authorities, by contrast, are supposed to operate exclusively in accordance with the security interests of the UAE, those interests may overlap´-or-not be aligned.  Both governments have reasons to cooperate against common threats. But cooperation does not eliminate the possibility of future disagreement.
There is also a political dimension. The Emirati leadership has presented technological modernization as evidence of national progress. Artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities and sophisticated surveillance have become central to the country s identity as an advanced state. Yet the more heavily national security depends on technologies supplied from abroad, the more important it becomes to determine who actually controls them.
The UAE s recruitment of foreign cyber specialists illustrates this tension. The country s cybersecurity ecosystem has drawn expertise from overseas, including former American intelligence and Mossad personnel. The most notorious example was Project Raven, in which former US intelligence employees carried out cyber operations on behalf of the UAE. 

Azerbaijan: The Caspian connection
Azerbaijan has emerged as an increasingly significant partner in a regional network connecting Gulf capital, Israeli strategic interests and international energy markets. It maintains a longstanding security relationship with Israel and increasingly close investment ties with the UAE. Abu Dhabi s interests extend across oil and gas, renewable energy and urban infrastructure. Masdar has invested in Azerbaijan s renewable energy development, including the Garadagh solar project and further planned solar capacity.
On September 26, 2026, TotalEnergies, Azerbaijan s state oil company SOCAR and Abu Dhabi s XRG announced a final investment decision for the full-field development of the Absheron gas and condensate field. XRG holds 30 percent of the project, alongside 35 percent each for SOCAR and TotalEnergies. This is more than a routine investment. It ties an Emirati energy company to one of the strategically significant gas developments in the Caspian region, linking Abu Dhabi s financial ambitions with Azerbaijan s effort to expand its role in supplying energy to Turkey and beyond. The Israeli connection is equally striking. In June 2025, SOCAR completed a transaction involving Israeli businessman Aaron Frenkel that gave the Azerbaijani state energy company a 10 percent interest in Israel s offshore Tamar gas field. The transaction was valued at approximately -$-1.25 billion.
Abu Dhabi invests in Azerbaijani energy, Azerbaijan invests in Israeli energy, Israeli technological and security relationships overlap with an expanding system of regional economic cooperation. These connections create enduring economic interests that do not depend on public declarations of friendship. A government may -alter-its rhetoric. A long-term energy investment is more difficult to abandon. There are no guarantees Israel would not share sensitive material about the UAE with Azerbaijan, which location would inevitably introduce Turkish interest. 

Jared Kushner and the financial architecture of normalization
No individual better illustrates the convergence of diplomacy and private capital in this emerging regional order than Jared Kushner. As a senior adviser during Donald Trump s first presidency, Kushner played a central role in the negotiations that produced the Abraham Accords. He cultivated relationships with Saudi and Emirati leaders and helped advance an American approach to the Middle East that emphasized economic cooperation between Israel and Arab states.
Kushner founded Affinity Partners. His firm subsequently attracted billions of dollars from Gulf sovereign investors. In June 2024, Senator Ron Wyden reported that approximately 99 percent of the capital managed by Affinity came from foreign sources. Wyden s investigation raised questions about the firm s fees, transparency and potential relationships between investment capital and political influence. The issue has become more pressing since Kushner s return to a prominent diplomatic role during Trump s second presidency. 
A diplomatic negotiator may hold substantial private financial interests in businesses and jurisdictions -dir-ectly affected by the negotiations he helps conduct. These concerns intensified in October 2026 following a CNN investigation into Affinity s investment in Phoenix Financial, an Israeli financial company with investments in businesses supplying the Israeli military.
The importance of this finding is political as well as financial. Kushner has simultaneously occupied a position of influence in negotiations concerning Israel s regional conflicts while maintaining substantial private investment exposure to the Israeli economy. Critics argue that such financial relationships undermine the separation between public responsibility and private gain. For Gulf governments, these networks offer another route to influence in Washington with -$-712 million dollars going -dir-ectly to Kushner’s account.  For American democracy, these networks present difficult questions about disclosure, conflicts of interest and accountability. And for the broader Middle East, they suggest that normalization is increasingly being institutionalized through private capital. Payments routed through Azerbaijan as well as transfers to Kushner and financing related to arms transactions in Libya essentially change the scene in the region.

The wealth of the palace and the vulnerability of the dynasty
The intelligence dimension of the Gulf s changing political order is inseparable from its financial dimension. The ruling establishments of the region hold extensive international assets through private companies, sovereign investment vehicles, offshore structures and family-controlled enterprises. These arrangements provide financial diversification and political influence. They can also make personal wealth and state interests extraordinarily difficult to separate.
The overseas property and asset holdings associated with Sheikh Khalifa, including luxury real estate and prominent maritime assets, illustrate the international reach of wealth linked to the Emirati ruling establishment with disputes over ownership, succession and the control of family assets following Sheikh Khalifa s death in 2022. But the broader vulnerability is clear. Overseas assets operate under foreign legal systems. They involve lawyers, trustees, corporate administrators, financial institutions and advisers who may operate outside the -dir-ect authority of the ruling family. Disputes over inheritance, beneficial ownership´-or-control can generate information of considerable sensitivity.

 Saudi Arabia is not a subordinate
The alleged transmission of sensitive Emirati recordings to Saudi Arabia would have to be understood against the changing relationship between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The two governments have often been treated by outsiders as interchangeable pillars of the same regional alliance, they are not. Saudi Arabia is the largest Arab economy in the Gulf and has enormous religious, political and demographic significance. The UAE has built its own influence through finance, technology, trade, logistics and military intervention. Both seek foreign investment, both want to dominate strategically important commercial sectors, and both seek leverage over regional political developments. This generates competition even where their policies overlap.
For Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia is therefore a state whose ambitions may conflict with its own. The significance of potential intelligence penetration becomes clearer in this context. If an external intelligence service could acquire sensitive material concerning the Emirati leadership and make it available to another Gulf government, the consequences would be serious.  

The Palestine question that normalization cannot erase
There is another contradiction running through this network of security and financial relationships. The Abraham Accords were promoted as a breakthrough towards a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East. But their central achievement was normalization between governments, not a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
For the UAE, normalization offered access to technology, investment opportunities, defense cooperation and influence in Washington. For Israel, it offered diplomatic recognition and growing economic integration without requiring a comprehensive resolution of the Palestinian question.
Kushner s model of regional diplomacy reflected a belief that trade, investment and commercial incentives could transform relationships once dominated by conflict. But economic relationships do not automatically resolve questions of sovereignty, occupation and political rights. The continuing consequences of the war in Gaza have exposed the-limit-s of the assumption that regional prosperity can simply bypass Palestine.

Who really controls the system?
The Emirates has invested extraordinary resources in the ambition to become one of the most secure, technologically advanced and politically influential states in the region. It has done so by concentrating power, acquiring sophisticated surveillance technology, developing ambitious intelligence capabilities and cultivating powerful international relationships.
These policies have given Abu Dhabi considerable influence. But they have not abolished the fundamental risks of intelligence dependency. The Israeli connection is important not because cooperation with Israel necessarily constitutes a surrender of sovereignty, but because any foreign relationship involving sensitive intelligence systems requires independent scrutiny.
The Pegasus cases demonstrate the dangers of unchecked surveillance. The development of Falcon Eye demonstrates how foreign commercial structures can become deeply involved in national security infrastructure. And the financial activities of Kushner s Affinity Partners show how diplomatic influence and private investment can become closely intertwined.
The allegations concerning Sheikh Khalifa add a further, unresolved dimension. They concern the possibility that surveillance reached into the most private spaces of the ruling establishment itself. The question they raise deserves attention precisely because of the documented history of surveillance -dir-ected against sensitive political targets.
If a state enters strategic partnerships with states possessing powerful intelligence capabilities, it must recognize that shared interests today do not guarantee identical interests tomorrow.
 
The final irony of the surveillance state
The deepest irony of Abu Dhabi s security project is that it was built on the promise of absolute control. The authorities sought to eliminate uncertainty, they developed increasingly sophisticated methods of monitoring communication, movement and dissent. They recruited foreign experts, acquired advanced technologies and constructed a state in which political opposition could be detected before it became a significant public force.
Yet security systems do not operate outside politics. They reflect the interests of those who create them, maintain them and possess access to the information they produce. For decades, the Gulf monarchies worried about external enemies infiltrating their borders. Their contemporary vulnerabilities may reside less in armies crossing those borders than in technologies, financial structures and intelligence relationships already operating within them. The danger of a surveillance state is not simply that it watches too many people. It is that the immense concentration of information creates an equally immense concentration of potential power for anyone able to gain access to it.
Abu Dhabi s leadership has invested billions in the ability to see inside its society. But the measure of its sovereignty may ultimately be whether it can prevent others from seeing inside its ruling establishment. The question that Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed must confront is not how much his intelligence services know about his people. It is how much his foreign partners know about him, his family, his palaces and the state he governs. And if the answer is more than he can control, the greatest threat to the Emirati rule may no longer be outside the palace gates.
It may already be inside the system built to defend them.

Rate the article
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Very good
Result : 100%							Participated in the vote : 2