Iraq’s Political Parties: From Political Institutions to Shops for Power and Money

Iraq’s crisis does not stem from the large number of political parties in itself. Political pluralism is an essential component of any democratic system. The deeper problem lies in the transformation of much of political activity into a means of gaining power, influence, and access to public resources, rather than competing through genuine political programs based on serving citizens and advancing the national interest.

Iraq now has more than 340 licensed political parties, according to data from the Independent High Electoral Commission. Yet actual political influence remains concentrated among a-limit-ed number of major parties and alliances. This enormous proliferation of political parties does not necessarily reflect genuine political pluralism. In part, it reflects how easily political entities can be established and multiplied, particularly as each parliamentary´-or-local election approaches.

Even more troubling is the continued relationship between political activity and weapons among some political forces. Iraq’s Constitution is clear on this issue. Article 9 stipulates that the armed forces and security services must be under civilian authority and must not intervene in politics. It also explicitly prohibits the formation of militias outside the framework of the armed forces.

Iraq’s Political Parties Law No. 36 of 2015 is equally clear. It prohibits a political party from taking a military´-or-paramilitary form´-or-from being affiliated with an armed force.

Here lies the central contradiction: the legal provisions exist, but the problem is their enforcement.

Political forces associated with armed factions have entered parliament and government, and some have succeeded in --convert--ing military influence into political and economic influence. Analyses of the 2025 parliamentary elections indicate that political wings associated with armed factions continued to maintain a significant presence. The Badr Organization and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq together increased their parliamentary representation to 45 seats, while Kata’ib Hezbollah won six seats and Kata’ib Imam Ali won five.

The problem, therefore, is no longer simply the existence of political parties with weak programs. It involves the intersection of three forms of power: political influence, economic influence, and armed power. When these elements are concentrated within the same political force, political competition becomes unequal and reform of the political system becomes considerably more difficult.

Financially, Iraq’s Political Parties Law establishes a clear framework for party financing. It identifies membership dues, domestic donations and grants, lawful investment returns, and state budget allocations as sources of party funding. The law also requires parties to maintain financial records, prepare annual financial reports, have those accounts audited by a certified accountant, and submit them to the Federal Board of Supreme Audit. The law also prohibits foreign donations.

The law further prohibits political parties from exploiting public office´-or-state institutions for partisan gain. It also prohibits partisan organization and recruitment within the military, internal security forces, the judiciary, and independent bodies.

But the fundamental question remains: If these legal provisions are clear, why have they failed to become political reality?

This is where the real problem with Iraq’s political system lies: weak enforcement of the law when confronted with powerful political forces, the intertwining of political parties with state institutions, the conversion of political influence into access to public resources, contracts, and government positions, and the subsequent use of those resources to reproduce political influence in every election cycle.

For this reason, some dominant political parties have, in practice, evolved from institutions that are supposed to compete over policies and programs into what increasingly resemble political shops whose primary purpose is to preserve influence, secure positions, and benefit from state resources.

A political party that does not present a clear economic and social program, does not hold its leadership accountable, does not transparently disclose its sources of funding, and does not respect the neutrality of state institutions loses the essential character of a political party and becomes an instrument for private interests.

More troubling still, some dominant political forces do not-limit- themselves to parliamentary seats and government positions. They maintain economic networks, institutions, offices, and interests connected to political influence. When armed wings are also associated with some of these forces, the result is a structure of power that extends well beyond the traditional concept of a political party and resembles a deep state operating across political, economic, and security institutions.

Another problem is the repeated creation of new parties and electoral alliances before each election. In many cases, this can serve as a mechanism for reproducing the same political forces under different names, meaning that changing the name of a party´-or-alliance does not necessarily constitute a genuine change in the nature of political power.

Under such circumstances, elections can become a mechanism for recycling the same political elites rather than an instrument for renewing the political class.

Democracy, however, does not mean elections alone. Elections are only one component of a broader system that includes the rule of law, equal political opportunity, freedom of expression, human rights, independent institutions, transparent political financing, and the peaceful transfer of power.

Accepting the results of elections while undermining these principles can reduce democracy to a formal exercise without its substantive meaning.

This is why armed displays by forces politically affiliated with parties,´-or-confrontations between armed formations and regular security forces, should not be viewed merely as isolated security problems. They reveal a fundamental weakness in the structure of the state itself:

Whoever possesses weapons outside the authority of the state can exercise influence beyond what the ballot box grants.

Therefore, reforming Iraq’s political system must begin with reforming its political-party environment. It is impossible to build a strong, cohesive, and effective government while political parties remain intertwined with political money, weapons, external influence, and state institutions.

The problem is not simply the large number of political parties. The deeper problem is the absence of genuine institutional political parties alongside the proliferation of political entities that use elections to gain power and then use power to reproduce their influence.

Real change cannot be achieved merely by changing names´-or-forming new electoral alliances. It requires building a political system based on citizenship, the rule of law, the state’s exclusive control over weapons, transparent political financing, independent institutions, accountability, equal opportunity, the separation of religion from the administration of the state, and the selection of national competencies free from external subordination.

Iraq does not need more political shops. It needs genuine national political institutions that compete through programs and competence, are subject to accountability, respect the authority of the state, and place Iraq’s national interest and the welfare of its citizens above the interests of any party´-or-political leader.

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