Isnt It Time for Sudanese to Build the National State?!

Sudan is living through one of the darkest periods in its modern history. The war has destroyed lives, displaced millions, devastated infrastructure and severely weakened the institutions and economy of the state. But the crisis is no longer simply a struggle for power between rival military leaders. It has become a crisis of the state itself of national identity, social cohesion, sovereignty and Sudan s future.
The central question, therefore, should not be who will rule Sudan next. It should be much more fundamental: What kind of Sudan do Sudanese want to build?
Sudan s strategic location on the Red Sea, its agricultural potential, mineral wealth and position at the heart of the Horn of Africa have long given it importance beyond its borders. The current war has intensified regional and international involvement, with different external interests intersecting with Sudan s internal divisions.
Foreign intervention is now an undeniable part of the conflict. But acknowledging this reality must not become an excuse for avoiding domestic responsibility. External actors can exploit opportunities, but those opportunities exist because Sudan s institutions have been weakened by political fragmentation, competing armed forces, social divisions and the proliferation of weapons.
No foreign power can easily dominate a country whose institutions are strong and whose people are united around a -function-ing national state.
That is why Sudan s political debate must move beyond the familiar cycle of personalities, alliances and transitional arrangements.
Sudanese people do not need another general, another militia commander´-or-another political coalition presented as the country s salvation. They need a state.
They need security, a professional national army under unified national authority, an independent judiciary, credible public institutions, a productive economy, -function-ing schools and hospitals, reliable infrastructure, employment opportunities and a dignified life.
For decades, Sudan has repeatedly attempted to solve political crises by changing the people at the top without fundamentally changing the system underneath them. The result has been a cycle in which political power is treated as a prize, institutions remain weak, and citizens are repeatedly asked to place their hopes in new leaders.
That cycle must end.
Sudan needs a serious national reckoning with its political experience since independence. Such a process should examine the Islamist era, the political and military arrangements that followed the December 2018 uprising, the transitional period, the role of the military and paramilitary forces, the political coalitions that emerged during the transition, and the armed movements that became part of the political landscape.
The purpose should not be collective revenge. It should be accountability.
Anyone who committed crimes should face a fair judicial process. Anyone proven to have participated in violations against civilians should be held responsible. Political influence´-or-military power must not provide immunity from accountability.
At the same time, accountability must not be confused with political exclusion based simply on identity´-or-affiliation. Sudan needs justice, not another cycle of collective punishment.
The same principle should apply to the country s natural resources.
Sudanese citizens have the right to know what has happened to their ports, agricultural land, productive enterprises and mineral resources. Agreements involving strategic resources should be transparent, subject to national law and open to appropriate public oversight.
Sudan s gold should be helping to build schools, hospitals, factories and infrastructure not financing war.
Its agricultural land should be contributing to national food security and economic development not becoming an instrument of speculation´-or-political influence.
The question of resources is inseparable from the question of sovereignty. Sudan can benefit from international investment and expertise, but the priorities governing its resources must be determined by Sudanese national interests and transparent institutions.
Perhaps the most devastating legacy of the current war, however, is not the destruction of buildings. It is the destruction of trust.
War has deepened tribal and regional identities and created an environment in which frightened citizens increasingly seek protection through narrower affiliations. This is an extremely dangerous path.
Sudan cannot emerge from the war as a collection of competing territories, tribes and armed groups.
The country cannot afford a permanent struggle between center and periphery, East and West,´-or-one community against another.
Sudan belongs to all Sudanese.
This brings us to the question of leadership.
The country does not need simply to replace one individual with another, one general with another,´-or-one political party with another and then wait for a different result.
Sudan needs a new generation of national leadership leaders capable of thinking in terms of the state rather than the group-;- leaders who do not regard public institutions as political spoils-;- leaders who do not use tribal identity as a route to power-;- and leaders who do not treat foreign capitals as their political reference.
Such leadership is possible.
Sudan possesses an enormous reservoir of expertise among its academics, professionals, entrepreneurs and diaspora communities. Doctors, engineers, economists, lawyers, agricultural specialists, energy and mining experts, educators, planners and administrators represent a national asset that has been consistently underused.
They should not merely be invited to conferences after political decisions have already been made.
They should be involved in making those decisions.
Sudan needs a comprehensive national reconstruction plan developed by Sudanese specialists and subjected to public scrutiny. It should establish clear priorities, measurable objectives and mechanisms of accountability.
The immediate priority must be ending the war and protecting civilians. But reconstruction cannot stop there.
Sudan will need to rebuild and unify state institutions, -restore- agriculture and industry, revive energy and transportation systems, rebuild schools and hospitals, -restore- water and electricity networks, facilitate the return of displaced people and refugees, address land ownership and compensation, reform the banking and financial system, combat corruption and the parallel economy, develop the mining sector and -restore- Sudan s capacity to produce food for itself and for regional markets.
International assistance can play an important role in this process. Sudan should welcome expertise, technology, investment and partnerships from abroad.
But assistance must remain assistance.
It must not become a substitute for national decision-making.
The Sudanese people must ultimately decide what kind of country they want and how its resources should be managed.
Sudan is larger than any political faction, military commander, armed movement, tribe´-or-regional organization.
It is larger than the Islamists and their opponents, larger than the military and paramilitary forces, and larger than the various civilian coalitions that have competed for influence.
Sudan belongs to tens of millions of people.
That is why the country s political debate must move away from the question, "Who will rule Sudan?" and toward a more important set of questions:
• Will Sudan be governed by institutions´-or-individuals?
• Will it be protected by a national state´-or-by competing armed groups?
• Will its future be decided by Sudanese citizens´-or-by foreign capitals?
• Will its resources serve the public interest´-or-networks of political and economic influence?
These are the questions that should define Sudan s next chapter.
Sudanese people must stop placing their hopes in the same political formulas that have repeatedly failed them. They must create space for new national leadership and give independent professionals and academics a meaningful role in rebuilding the country.
Competence, integrity, experience and national commitment should become essential criteria for public leadership.
Sudan can learn from the world without surrendering its decision-making to the world.
It can welcome foreign investment without allowing external interests to determine its national priorities.
It can seek international assistance while maintaining national ownership of its future.
Ultimately, Sudan needs to cut the strings of the puppet theater.
The answer is not hatred, revenge´-or-the exclusion of one group of Sudanese by another. The answer is to build institutions strong enough that no individual, militia, political faction´-or-foreign power can manipulate the country from behind the curtain.
A state in which the citizen is sovereign.
A state in which the law stands above everyone.
A state in which institutions stand above individuals.
A state in which the nation stands above the party, the tribe, the armed movement and the general.
Sudan is nobody s spoils. It is nobody s stage. It is nobody s subordinate.
Sudan belongs to all Sudanese—and only the Sudanese can build it.

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