An Initiative to End the War Between the United States and Iran and Prevent the Region from Descending into Widespread Chaos

Since the outbreak of war in the region in 2023, and the successive and gradual expansion of the confrontation that followed, I have continuously followed its developments. I have read as much as I could access of the news, reports, and political and strategic analyses, and I have listened to many discussions and commentaries in both Arabic and English. Over time, I have become convinced that the most important question today is this: How can this war be stopped before the region reaches a point from which turning back becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible?

Some may believe that the problem is far too great for an initiative such as this to offer a solution to a conflict that has remained intractable for half a century. I fully agree that the problem is indeed of such magnitude. Yet I feel a profound sense of belonging to this region and to the burdens and suffering it carries, as well as a sense of belonging to humanity as a whole. I believe that harm inflicted upon a human being at the farthest reaches of the earth is also harm inflicted upon me, even if not -dir-ectly. I also wish to discharge my responsibility before Almighty God and to state my position with complete clarity. Perhaps a word, however modest, may help convey the idea that human beings, by their sound nature, incline toward peace and security. Perhaps even tyrants and war criminals may hear it, and perhaps it may contribute, however slightly, to saving even a single life.

It is clear that Israel was the party that initiated this military course and expanded it, after which the development of events drew the United States into -dir-ect involvement in the war with Iran. Regardless of the calculations that led Israel down this path, and regardless of disagreements over how the policies of Iran, Israel, and the United States should be assessed, the reality that must now be addressed is that the United States and Iran have entered into -dir-ect military confrontation. Its continuation has threatened, and continues to threaten, to reopen other fronts in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf, in addition to Gaza, and to transform a war that can still be stopped today into a regional conflict whose ultimate outcome may become impossible for anyone to control.

This initiative, therefore, does not begin by attempting to determine who is responsible for the war, nor does it assume that all the disputes of the Middle East can be resolved in a single agreement. Rather, it begins with a simpler and more realistic proposition: stop the war first, consolidate the cessation of hostilities, prevent the agreement from collapsing because of an incident´-or-the actions of a third party, and then address the remaining issues one by one on the basis of reciprocity, guarantees, and verification.

Ending the war does not require the United States and Iran to become friendly states, nor does it require either side to abandon its political outlook´-or-security doctrine. Nor does it mean defending the Iranian political system´-or-passing judgment on its domestic and foreign policies. One s position toward a political system is one matter-;- the collapse of a state is something entirely different.

Iran today is a large state with a government, institutions, armed forces, and a chain of command that can be addressed, negotiated with, and held accountable for its decisions. But if the war leads to the collapse of central authority while weapons, missiles, military forces, military institutions, and networks of influence remain without a stable state capable of controlling them, the region may enter a situation far more dangerous than the one the war is intended to change.

Preventing the collapse of the Iranian state is therefore not a gift to the Iranian regime-;- it is a regional and international interest. Over recent decades, the region has paid an enormous price when states´-or-institutions collapsed before an authority capable of managing society, weapons, and borders was in place. There is no reason to assume that the collapse of a state of Iran s size, geographic position, and capabilities would produce less severe consequences.

I therefore propose an initiative based on three interconnected stages: first, ending the war-;- second, consolidating the ceasefire and preventing its collapse-;- and third, gradually moving from managing the war to managing the dispute.

The first stage does not require a comprehensive peace agreement. Nor does it require mutual political recognition´-or-agreement on every outstanding issue. It requires only a decision by both parties that continuing the war has become more dangerous than stopping it.

1. Preliminary Undisclosed Contacts Through the Sultanate of Oman

The process would begin with intensive, undisclosed contacts conducted by the Sultanate of Oman as the principal channel between the United States and Iran. If necessary, Oman could be supported by one´-or-more states that enjoy an appropriate degree of confidence from both parties. The purpose would not be to convene a major conference´-or-to reach a comprehensive agreement from the outset, but rather to agree on a short and specific document setting out the exact hour at which military operations will cease, the commitments governing the first fourteen days, and the procedure for addressing any violation during that period.

Agreement on this document should precede the public announcement of the cessation of hostilities, so that the parties do not become trapped in public bargaining over who stops first´-or-who made a concession before the other. The principle at this stage is simple: no issue that can be postponed until after the shooting stops should be placed on the table. The objective now is not to solve every problem in the Middle East, but to return decision-making from the battlefield to politics.

2. A Single Zero Hour and a Fourteen-Day Trial Truce

The two parties would designate a single hour at which all offensive military operations between the United States and Iran cease. At that moment, the United States would stop conducting strikes against Iranian territory, facilities, and forces, while Iran would simultaneously stop targeting American forces, bases, vessels, and interests. Under this arrangement, neither party stops first and then waits to see what the other will do. Both parties obligations begin at precisely the same moment. Intermittent exchanges of strikes between the two sides do not constitute a genuine and complete truce.

Beginning at zero hour, a fourteen-day trial truce would take effect. During this period, both parties would refrain from carrying out any -dir-ect´-or-covert attack against the other-;- increasing offensive forces´-or-weaponry in the region for the purpose of altering the military balance during the truce-;- laying mines´-or-conducting operations that threaten civilian navigation-;- launching cyber operations that -dir-ectly disrupt essential civilian infrastructure´-or-cause loss of life-;-´-or-using groups´-or-other actors to carry out attacks that can, in practical terms, be attributed to either party.

During this period, official rhetoric containing -dir-ect threats to resume the war at a specified time should also cease. A truce accompanied by daily threats and provocative statements—particularly from Trump and his administration—would remain vulnerable to collapse through miscalculation. These fourteen days are not intended to constitute a final peace-;- they are a test period to determine whether the two parties can genuinely stop the war and exercise control over the forces under their authority.

3. A Guarantee Against Reopening the Israeli Front

Israel should not be a party to the U.S.-Iranian negotiations proposed by this initiative. The confrontation to be stopped at this stage is the -dir-ect military confrontation between the United States and Iran. Expanding the negotiating table to include additional parties and issues could make agreement more difficult rather than more durable.

Excluding Israel from the negotiating table, however, does not mean ignoring the Israeli factor. A truce would be meaningless if the United States stopped attacking Iran only for Iran to face another Israeli attack hours´-or-days later, thereby restarting the war from the beginning. The United States should therefore provide Iran, as part of the agreement ending the war, with a written guarantee that the truce will not be used to clear the way for a new Israeli attack and that Washington will work to prevent such an attack for the duration of the agreement. In return, Iran would undertake not to attack Israel for as long as the other side continues to refrain from attacking it.

Iran and Israel would thus need neither -dir-ect negotiations nor mutual political recognition, because this arrangement would not constitute a peace agreement between them. It would instead serve as a safety mechanism preventing a third party from destroying the U.S.-Iranian cessation of hostilities. If an Israeli attack against Iran,´-or-an Iranian attack against Israel, were to occur, the agreement would not automatically be considered terminated before the nature of the incident and the responsible party had been determined and the investigative mechanism established by this initiative had been activated.

4. A Permanent Communications and Investigation Center in Muscat

Beginning at zero hour, a communications and investigation cell operating around the clock would be established in Muscat. It would include authorized representatives of the United States, Iran, and the Sultanate of Oman. Each party would have access to -dir-ect military and political communication channels capable of being activated within minutes of an incident. Experts from the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency,´-or-neutral technical bodies could be consulted when appropriate, depending on the nature of the alleged violation.

The purpose of this mechanism would not be to write reports after war has resumed, but to prevent an incident from becoming a war. The agreement should therefore establish a new principle: a single incident´-or-an unverified allegation must not trigger the resumption of the entire war.

If a violation occurs, the mechanism would determine within hours what happened, who carried it out, whether it was deliberate´-or-accidental, whether it was committed by the state itself´-or-by an actor not fully subject to its authority, whether the attack is continuing, and what action is necessary to -restore- the situation to its previous state.

Where there is no ongoing attack -dir-ectly threatening human life, the party alleging a violation would allow the mechanism an initial period of no more than six hours to verify the incident. If, however, an active and continuing military attack is underway, neither party would lose its right to immediate self-defense. Any response should be proportionate to the objective of stopping the attack and should not become a pretext for returning to open war. This distinction is essential, because the fate of millions of people should not be determined by a radar error, faulty intelligence,´-or-a missile launched by an actor seeking to destroy the agreement.

5. Three Categories of Violations Instead of the Agreement Collapsing at Once

One of the greatest weaknesses of many ceasefire agreements is that every violation can become a justification for abandoning the entire agreement. This initiative therefore proposes classifying violations into three categories.

A Category One violation would consist of a-limit-ed´-or-unintended incident that does not -alter-the overall military situation. It would be addressed through communication, investigation, and restoration of the status quo.

A Category Two violation would consist of a deliberate but-limit-ed breach. It would be met with a-limit-ed and reversible political, economic,´-or-military measure while the ceasefire itself remains in force.

A Category Three violation would consist of a large-scale and deliberate attack that the verification mechanism determines constitutes an actual return to war. Only in this case would the other party be entitled to regard the ceasefire as fundamentally endangered and to take whatever measures it considers necessary for its defense.

In this way, a small incident would not be allowed to destroy a major agreement.

6. Maritime Security and the Strait of Hormuz

Maritime security should be among the first tangible results of ending the war. Iran would undertake not to attack civilian commercial vessels, lay mines,´-or-use the Strait of Hormuz as an instrument for prolonging the war for the duration of the agreement. In return, military operations, blockades, and war-related measures targeting Iranian shipping and civilian trade would cease.

Once compliance has been demonstrated during the first fourteen days, an initial phase would begin involving the release of frozen Iranian funds and the facilitation of imports of essential goods and civilian exports according to a timetable known to both parties. These benefits would neither be granted all at once nor remain merely political promises. The agreed funds´-or-facilities would be divided into stages, with each stage implemented after the intermediary verifies fulfillment of the corresponding commitment.

In this way, security in the Strait of Hormuz would become a shared benefit. Iran would gradually recover part of its ability to trade and access its funds, while the United States, the countries of the region, and the wider world would regain a safer route for energy supplies and commerce. The Strait would no longer remain hostage to the continuation of the war.

7. A Mutual Commitment Against Forcible Regime Change and Military Exploitation of the Truce

As part of the agreement, the United States would declare that the purpose of ending the war and entering negotiations is not to overthrow Iran s political system by force, dismantle the institutions of the state,´-or-create a political and security vacuum inside Iran. This does not amount to defending the regime´-or-passing judgment on its policies. It simply recognizes a basic reality: a state with a leadership and a -function-ing chain of command can be negotiated with, deterred, and held accountable. No one knows who ultimately makes decisions in a condition of armed chaos.

In return, the Iranian government would assume responsibility for controlling the forces and institutions under its authority and for not exploiting the truce to open new fronts´-or-conduct operations through other actors. Both parties would also undertake not to exploit the ceasefire to secretly prepare a large-scale surprise attack against the other. Each side would retain its defensive capabilities and the right to take ordinary measures to protect its territory and forces, but neither would be permitted to use the truce to construct a new offensive posture intended to resume the war later under more favorable conditions.

8. Separating the Cessation of Hostilities from a Final Resolution of the Nuclear Issue

A final nuclear agreement should not be a prerequisite for a ceasefire. The war should stop first. Once the truce has proven stable, separate nuclear negotiations sponsored by the Sultanate of Oman would begin, with the International Atomic Energy Agency participating in the technical aspects of monitoring and verification.

The first stage would rest on a specific formula: Iran would provide practical and verifiable guarantees that its nuclear program will not move toward the production of a nuclear weapon and would permit the agreed technical monitoring. In return, the United States would undertake not to attack Iranian nuclear facilities for as long as Iran remains in compliance with the agreement and would begin specific steps to ease sanctions -dir-ectly related to the nuclear issue.

The exchange would thus be clear: measurable nuclear verification in return for measurable security guarantees and economic relief. Neither party would obtain everything it wants on the first day, and nuclear negotiations would not be used as a back door for introducing every other dispute between the United States and Iran.

9. The Missile Program Should Remain Outside the Conditions for Ending the War

Reducing the number, range,´-or-capabilities of Iranian missiles should not be made a condition for ending the war. Iran regards its missile capabilities as an essential part of its national deterrence system and an important foundation of its national security. After having been subjected to -dir-ect, repeated, unlawful, and indeed unethical attacks, it would be unrealistic to imagine that Iran would agree to end the war on the condition that it surrender its principal means of deterrence. There is, however, a fundamental distinction between possessing a weapon and using it.

The ceasefire would require Iran not to use missiles against the United States´-or-Israel for as long as the guarantees remain in force and Iran is not subjected to another attack. Negotiations over the nature of the region s long-term military balance, should the parties wish to pursue them in the future, should constitute a separate and reciprocal process addressing the security concerns of all parties. They should not be imposed as a precondition for ending the current war.

10. The Principle of Step-for-Step Reciprocity and a Formal Record of Commitments

The agreement should not rely on goodwill alone, nor should either party be asked to surrender all its bargaining leverage and then wait to see what the other will do. From the outset, a written list should specify what action is required from Iran, what corresponding action is required from the United States, when each action is to be implemented, who will verify it, and what happens if it is not implemented. The Omani mediator would maintain an official document known as the Record of Reciprocal Commitments.

For example, the cessation of U.S. attacks would be matched by the cessation of Iranian attacks. A commitment not to attack Iran would be matched by a commitment not to use U.S. territory´-or-forces to facilitate a new attack against Iran. Nuclear verification would be matched by a security guarantee and specified economic relief. Maritime security would be matched by an end to war-related measures affecting navigation and by agreed, gradual economic relief. Iran s commitment not to attack Israel would be matched by an effective U.S. guarantee that Iran would not be subjected to an Israeli attack.

These commitments should not take the form of general promises. Every step should have a deadline and a verification procedure. After many years of conflict, a serious agreement cannot be built on personal trust. It can, however, be built on a system that makes compliance possible even in the presence of mistrust.

11. Transitioning from a Fourteen-Day Truce to a Ninety-Day Ceasefire

If the first fourteen days pass without a Category Three violation, the truce would automatically become a ninety-day ceasefire. The ninety-day period would begin on the fifteenth day following zero hour, eliminating any ambiguity over the timetable.

During this stage, all military guarantees would remain in force, agreed sanctions-relief measures would begin, nuclear verification procedures would become regular, maritime traffic would stabilize, the Muscat cell would operate continuously, and formal political contacts between the two parties would begin.

The ninety-day period would not mean that the agreement expires on the ninetieth day. Rather, it would constitute a transition from a temporary cessation of hostilities to a more stable arrangement. If this stage succeeds, the ceasefire would be automatically extended unless one party informs the other party and the mediator that a fundamental violation has occurred and remains unresolved.

12. Beginning Settlement Negotiations Thirty Days After Zero Hour

Thirty full days after zero hour—that is, after the initial truce has been completed and the parties have entered the extended ceasefire phase—longer-term political negotiations would begin. This would resolve any ambiguity arising from the different time periods involved: the thirty days would be calculated from zero hour itself.

These negotiations should not attempt to place every problem in the Middle East on a single table. They should initially focus on the issues capable of transforming the ceasefire into a stable and manageable relationship. These would include guaranteeing the peaceful nature of Iran s nuclear program-;- ending the state of -dir-ect military confrontation between the United States and Iran-;- gradually lifting economic sanctions in accordance with implementation-;- guaranteeing freedom of navigation and energy flows-;- establishing a permanent military channel to prevent unintended confrontations-;- and creating rules preventing the territory´-or-forces of a third party from being used to restart the war.

Other issues could later be addressed through separate tracks if the appropriate conditions emerge, but they should not be allowed to become preconditions for maintaining the ceasefire.

What Makes This Initiative Different?

This initiative does not assume that trust exists between the United States and Iran. It begins from precisely the opposite premise: trust is almost nonexistent. An agreement must therefore be designed to -function- even in its absence.

It does not require the nuclear issue to be resolved before the weapons fall silent. It does not require Iran to abandon its missile program in order to obtain an end to the war. It does not bring Israel to the U.S.-Iranian negotiating table, while at the same time recognizing the reality that any new Israeli attack against Iran could destroy the entire agreement.

Nor does it make sanctions relief a free reward,´-or-Iranian commitments free concessions. Instead, it links every action to a corresponding action defined in advance. It does not treat every incident as a reason to return to war, but establishes a system for investigation, classification, and proportionate responses to violations. And it does not attempt to turn adversaries into allies within a matter of weeks.

The objective is more modest, and perhaps for that very reason more achievable: to transform the dispute from a war for which everyone pays the price into a conflict that can be managed through politics.

Disagreements between the United States and Iran may continue for many years. The two countries may remain unable to agree on numerous issues. But the continuation of disagreement does not require the continuation of bombardment.

Recognizing that Israel was the party that initiated the course of this war, expanded it, and drew the United States into -dir-ect involvement does not mean that the path toward ending it must pass through Iranian-Israeli negotiations. Under present circumstances, the United States is the party capable of providing the guarantee Iran needs in order to halt its operations without fearing that the truce will become an opportunity for another Israeli attack. In return, Washington can obtain a clear Iranian commitment not to use the cessation of hostilities as an opportunity to launch attacks against Israel. Both objectives can therefore be achieved without expanding the negotiating table and making it more complicated than it can bear.

Preventing the collapse of the Iranian state should likewise be in everyone s interest—not because all parties approve of the nature of the existing political system,´-or-because they do not, but because the possible alternative may be the fragmentation of political authority while weapons, missiles, armed forces, and networks of influence remain intact. An existing state has an address that can be contacted, a leadership that can be negotiated with, and a chain of command that can be held accountable. When decision-making authority fragments while weapons remain, finding an actor capable of implementing an agreement may become more difficult than reaching the agreement itself.

Conversely, protecting American forces and interests does not mean granting the United States the right to impose all of its conditions by force. Nor does protecting Iran from attack mean granting Iran the freedom to use the ceasefire to expand its operations throughout the region.

The initiative rests on a simpler balance: no U.S. attack against Iran-;- no Iranian attack against the United States-;- no new Israeli attack against Iran for as long as the guarantee remains in force-;- no Iranian attack against Israel for as long as that guarantee remains in force-;- no exploitation of the truce to prepare for a new attack-;- and no collapse of the agreement because of an incident before that incident has been investigated. Every commitment is matched by a corresponding commitment, and every successful stage leads to the next.

This may not yet be peace in the fullest sense of the word, but it may represent a realistic path from war to peace.

The question that should precede all others is this: If it is possible today to stop the war while preserving the parties essential security interests, why wait until the region descends into a chaos from which the cost of recovery will be greater than the cost of reaching an agreement itself?

Written in Arabic & translated by Jassim Mohammed Ali Almamori

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