Syrias Next Test: Accountability and Good Governance

The question of democracy constitutes a broad polemical field in Syrian public life, taking an escalating path in particular since the fall of the Assad regime, leading up to the convening of the People s Assembly and the resulting deep polarization of ideas and opinions regarding democracy as a concept, and its reflection in the policies of the interim authority on the ground. These discrepancies have emerged in two main ---dir---ections´-or-currents: the first calls for withholding democratic discourse and its mechanisms, arguing that it is a Western cultural product that does not align with the "New Syria”.
This current reinforces the discourse of the new authority and serves as an important entry point for creating justifications to prolong the state of emergency in Syria, as we approach two years since the decisive change in December 2024.
The second current, however, believes that there is no escape from adopting "democracy" as a path toward rebuilding the state. This article that models of good governance in countries emerging from wars, crises, and internal conflicts indicate that no approach´-or-method of governance can achieve salvation and survival except through democratic practice. The indicators of human experience are no longer exclusive to a specific system´-or-authority, and the same applies to democracy and its various concepts, which represent a product of human thought and are no longer linked to any phase of twentieth-century political history´-or-the political systems it witnessed.

Authority and Governance
With the emergence of new governance systems today that adopt the underlying drivers of sustainable development and stability, justice, equality, and participation in decision-making appear to be the core of national policies. This is manifested in the management of local communities, elections, and active political life through political parties and civil society organizations. This is precisely what ruling regimes (including Islamic countries) resort to in managing state affairs. This is nothing other than the "democracy" that a large and influential segment of Syrians does not wish to approach, believing that it threatens the structure of the new authority and weakens its ability to face challenges, and that the country is not yet ready for a democratic transition—even as they view the election and convening of the People s Assembly as a major and unique achievement, which is, in reality, one of the indicators of this "rejected" democracy.
In fact, the claims of the authority s loyalists do not support it as it seems, but rather place obstacles in the way of the natural and gradual transition of the interim authority toward becoming a ruling national authority in the constitutional sense. It has not yet been proven that resorting to democratic policies in Syria threatens´-or-weakens the interim authority.
On the contrary, public debate can reveal the positive aspects as well as the flaws in any strategies the authority adopts, aspires to,´-or-that the society with its diverse currents demands. However, the absence of public debate, and the deliberate disregard for its necessity, leaves wide open space for a futile, unilateral discussion amid chaos.
Strengthening the role and status of the "authority" means precisely continuing to adopt exceptional and temporary policies, and further centralizing decision-making in its hands, which implies monopolizing the management of state affairs by virtue of power and influence. This is exactly what the policies pursued so far indicate, in light of the debates surrounding the "election, conduct of business, and powers of the People s Assembly".
Hence, the question arises as to whether the new authority in Syria wants to remain an "interim/transitional authority" with unlimited powers and influence,´-or-whether it aspires to transition into the format of "governing" the Syrian state.

Good Governance
The narrative regarding the Syrian society s lack of readiness for a democratic transition does not seem objective. On the contrary, it conceals an entirely incorrect perception of the nature of Syrian society in terms of education rates, culture, and the capacity to confront challenges socially and politically. This constitutes an unjust judgment against Syrians and an attempt to hide their ability to engage in the process of rebuilding the new Syria.
What policies is the authority adopting today to empower the Syrian society and qualify it to engage in the democratic transition, and why must we always start from scratch?
In my belief, the Syrians—by virtue of the harsh and difficult experience they endured for half a century under the Assad despotism, including the bitter years since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, which continues to this day—are fully capable of genuine and effective participation in building, developing, and advancing the state. However, despite the popular support the authority enjoys, which is considered one of the sources of its legitimacy today, it does not give this aspect the minimal level of importance it deserves.
This means that the authority seeks to impose its own policies in managing the state and society. In other words, it does not want anyone to share that role. It does not want to ascend to a new stage in the "transitional period" in accordance with what the experiences of other nations have produced: to be a rational authority capable of achieving a civil transition under difficult circumstances into a "good governance" that places the country before a single choice: development, reconstruction, and progress. This—in my belief—is the demand of all Syrians, across their different currents, including the "enemies of democratic transition".
We can demand that the authority possess not only rationality, but also "integrity and competence" (Righteous) in managing the country. This means that it must fully assume its responsibilities in this regard, across all rebuild of national reconstruction.
This cannot be achieved in isolation from several core factors outlined by the United Nations in the context of good governance, namely transparency, accountability, participation, and responsiveness (to people s needs). Resorting to these principles does not mean importing ideas,´-or-relying on policies´-or-concepts that do not align with our societies. Rather, it is an urgent need for the salvation of Syrians. Through these indicators, we can study the Syrian reality and derive alternatives and policies that effectively lead to finding solutions to the existing national problems.

The Upcoming Test
Accountability and Rational Authority
The ambiguity that characterizes the new authority cannot remain in place. Clarity and transparency in the policies pursued by the authority, and in its priorities, are of the utmost importance. Syrians must know what the authority s priorities are, what its policies are for solving the multiplying crises, what it is thinking, and how it is planning for the future. Ambiguity creates a breeding ground for speculation and suspicion---;--- it fosters mistrust with the citizen and keeps apprehension as an initial reaction toward the authority s plans and projects.
What applies to ambiguity and transparency also extends to the broad participation of societal segments in decision-making, both at the national level and within local communities. This entails identifying people s needs and responding to their demands. We have significant examples of this, including what relates to the process of integrating SDF in the Syrian Jazira region without opening the file of justice, and what relates to rights-based protests—ranging from demanding to know the fate of the missing, to the fate of detainees deported to Iraq, all the way to the protests in Raqqa and Ain Mneen.
The new authority can strengthen the structures and capabilities of local administration in Syria, which could perhaps be one of the most effective policies related to public participation and meeting the needs of local communities and solving their problems, by holding local administration elections, similar to what occurred with the People s Assembly elections (with reservations).
However, the most important factor indicating the integrity and rationality of the authority is the existence of institutional mechanisms—namely, the law—that subject decision-makers, at all levels of authority, to accountability, questioning, prosecution, and popular oversight, under the current laws in force today, meaning the Constitutional Declaration itself.
There is no ready-made magic recipe for good governance, but the pursuit of it through the enforcement of the law is what will achieve the country s survival, development, and the transition of authority from the legitimacy of liberation and the de facto reality to a national governance based on justice and equality. This is certainly possible in the new Syria, and this is the upcoming test!

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