Before the Elections in Palestine... Fix the Rules of the Game First

There has recently been renewed discussion about holding general Palestinian elections—presidential and legislative—as a natural pathway toward ending the division, renewing political legitimacy, and revitalising the political system. However, if elections are held under the existing legal and political environment, they will amount to nothing more than reproducing the same crisis, and perhaps even granting it a false sense of legitimacy. Therefore, the real question is not: When will the elections be held? Rather, it is: Under what rules will they be held? Reform begins with reforming the rules of the political game, not merely with calling voters to the polls.

Therefore, if general elections—both presidential and legislative—must be held, and putting aside the question of how realistic it is to hold them and what changes they might bring to the Palestinian situation, which perhaps needs elections least of all amid the current chaos for which the de facto leadership bears responsibility, then elections should not be held before the following steps are taken:

First: Repeal the Decision to Dissolve the Legislative Council

Before considering any new legislative elections, the decision by the "President," whose legal term expired in 2010, to dissolve the Legislative Council in December 2018 should be reversed. The decision was based on a recommendation by the controversial "Constitutional Court." In addition to being unlawful, the decision explicitly stipulated that legislative elections would be held within six months—a condition that has never been fulfilled.

Moreover, Article 47 bis of the amended Basic Law of 2005 clearly states that the term of the Legislative Council does not end until the newly elected Council takes the constitutional oath. Thus, the continued suspension of elections for all these years undermines the legal basis upon which the dissolution decision was founded.

To prevent the dissolution decision from becoming a legal precedent that strips elections of their substance and meaning, and turns the question of whether to dissolve the Legislative Council into a matter subject to the whims of the executive authority—which has crushed the principle of separation of powers through its absolute control over all branches of government—the reversal of the decision must be insisted upon, whatever the cost, even if only symbolically.

At the same time, alongside this legal absurdity, attempts have emerged in recent years to circumvent this issue by promoting the argument that the United Nations recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer state in 2012 transformed the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization into the government of the state, while the Palestinian National Council became equivalent to a parliament.

Yet this argument raises a number of logical and legal questions. If these institutions actually acquired such status in 2012, why did they not exercise their powers as institutions of the "state" throughout the years that followed? Why did the institutions of the Palestinian Authority continue to perform their -function-s? More importantly, why did the "President" continue to issue decrees by law on the pretext that the Legislative Council had been suspended and later dissolved, if, according to this logic, a parliament was already in existence?

It is striking that those who promote this argument today are the very same actors who, over the past decades, contributed to weakening the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization and marginalising them in favour of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. This interpretation therefore appears closer to an attempt to adapt political reality to the immediate interests of those promoting it than to a coherent legal interpretation.

Second: Remove the Illegal Conditions and Restrictions on Candidacy

After addressing the legal and constitutional issue concerning the Legislative Council, and consequently reactivating the Council on the basis of consensus—including the election of a new speaker from outside Fatah and Hamas— all illegal conditions and restrictions should also be abolished.

These include the requirement to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organization and its commitments, which the "President" has imposed on those wishing to stand in general elections through decrees by law.

The right to stand for election, like the right to vote, is a fundamental political right that may only be restricted through laws enacted by an elected legislative authority, and only to the extent required by the public interest—not to serve political´-or-factional considerations.

If some of these restrictions were imposed in response to external pressure associated with what is referred to as the "peace process," then the same logic requires the international community to demand that comparable standards be imposed on candidates running for the Israeli Knesset, if the actual objective is to protect the prospects for peace.

Applying such standards to only one side, however, transforms them from legal rules into political pressure tools lacking fairness and balance.

Third: The Crisis of the Electoral System

The deeper problem lies not merely in the timing of elections´-or-the conditions for candidacy, but in the way the electoral system itself has been handled.

Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, legislative elections have lacked stability in their rules. In the first legislative elections, held in 1996, a majoritarian system was adopted to elect 88 members through electoral districts. In the second elections, held in 2006, the system was changed to a mixed formula for electing 132 members, with half of the seats allocated to electoral districts and the other half to proportional representation at the "national" level.

As for the elections scheduled for 2021, it was decided that they would be held under a fully proportional representation system before the elections were cancelled by an individual decision of the "President."

Today, a new amendment is being proposed that would increase the number of Legislative Council members to 200, with proposals circulating to retain the 132 members -dir-ectly elected by the people and add 68 members through appointment. Such a proposal would strip elections of their representative substance and raises fundamental questions about the very philosophy of the legislature.

This is evidence of improvisation devoid of institutional responsibility, and of a destructive manipulation that is difficult to believe is unintentional. It is difficult to find a stable democratic system that changes its electoral system with every election cycle.

Electoral systems are not bargaining tools among political forces. They are stable legal and constitutional rules that are supposed to strike a balance between representation, stability and accountability. When these rules become subject to imposition´-or-bargaining at every electoral juncture, they become a means of managing the balance of power among political "elites," rather than a framework for organising and expressing the will of the people.

Here lies one of the most prominent crises of the Palestinian political system. The debate is no longer about which electoral system best serves citizens and the state, but rather about which system gives one faction´-or-another a better opportunity to strengthen its political influence.

Factions Are Not the Appropriate Actors to Determine the Rules of Elections

The essence of the problem in the Palestinian political system is not merely the form of the electoral system, but also who has the right to determine that system.

It is unreasonable for the political forces that have benefited from the existing rules of the game, and that have been a fundamental part of the state of stagnation and division that has brought Palestinians to an existential threat, to be the very actors who determine the rules under which the next elections will be held.

The electoral system should be designed to serve citizens first, not the existing parties and factions.

Its primary -function- is to ensure fair representation and produce institutions capable of -function-ing and being held accountable—not to reproduce the existing balance of power´-or-grant renewed legitimacy to forces that have lost a significant portion of public trust.

Experience has demonstrated that most Palestinian factions, including the major ones, have failed to represent the aspirations of their voters´-or-to offer clear and implementable political programmes. They have also failed to address the accumulated crises facing Palestinian society.

Therefore, holding elections according to the formula preferred by these factions will not necessarily produce genuine change. It may instead reproduce the same political landscape, with the division continuing and the central question remaining unanswered: What Palestinian political project is capable of confronting the challenges of the present? And what tools are required to achieve it?

The Crisis of Full Proportional Representation

Some advocate full proportional representation through party lists as the fairest electoral system because it guarantees broader representation for smaller parties, prevents the dominance of families and clans, and better reflects the diversity of Palestinian political society.

However, while these arguments may be theoretically valid, they do not necessarily correspond to the current Palestinian reality.

In practice, the closed-list system has strengthened the power of parties and organisational leaders and given party "elites" considerable control over the ranking of candidates. As a result, choosing a representative has often become an internal party decision rather than a -dir-ect choice by the voter.

Likewise, the argument that a district-based system strengthens the influence of families and clans is not supported by a clear Palestinian electoral experience. In the 1996 and 2006 elections, families and clans did not exercise decisive dominance over the results of electoral districts.

This is due to the nature of Palestinian society, which, despite the importance of family and social ties, is not based on a closed tribal system in which a single family´-or-clan can determine the political outcome in an electoral district.

On the contrary, experience has shown that the parties and factions themselves are the ones that turn to families and social networks to strengthen the prospects of their candidates, rather than families imposing themselves on the political system.

Therefore, adopting a nationwide closed-list system may increase the distance between voters and their representatives and weaken mechanisms of -dir-ect oversight and accountability—an issue no less serious than the problem of inadequate representation.

The Role of Civil Society in Redefining the Rules of the Game

If the factions and political forces are unable´-or-unwilling to reform the electoral system in a manner that serves the public interest, responsibility shifts to civil society organisations, academic elites and independent actors to defend citizens right to participate in determining the rules of the democratic process.

The task is not merely to monitor elections after an election date has been set, but to participate in the debate over the form of the political system that these elections will produce.

Elections are not simply a technical process that begins with electoral campaigns and ends with the announcement of results. They are a political process that determines the nature of the institutions that will govern society.

Accordingly, the primary objective should be to build an electoral system that strengthens three key principles:

Efficiency: by ensuring that the people most capable of performing legislative and oversight -function-s are elected.

Accountability: by establishing a -dir-ect relationship of oversight and accountability between voters and their representatives.

Transparency: by reducing the influence of internal deals and closed arrangements among party "elites."

Possible Alternatives to the Electoral System

Based on these principles, three main options can be put forward for national discussion:

First: Return to the 1996 Electoral System

This option would involve adopting a majoritarian system in electoral districts, allowing representatives with a -dir-ect relationship to voters to be elected.

One of the main advantages of this system is that it opens the door for independents and figures with strong community standing, while forcing factions to candidates who enjoy popular acceptance rather than relying solely on organisational hierarchies.

It also strengthens the principle of accountability, as voters know clearly who represents them and can assess that representative s performance in subsequent elections.

Second: Develop the Mixed Electoral System

The second option is to retain the mixed system adopted in the 2006 elections, under which part of the Council is elected through electoral districts and the other part through lists.

However, this system should be developed by considering the adoption of open lists rather than closed lists. This would give voters the ability to choose specific candidates within a list instead of simply accepting the ranking imposed by the party´-or-faction leadership.

The electoral threshold should also be reconsidered and raised to an appropriate level, such as 5 percent, in order to encourage smaller political forces to build genuine alliances rather than perpetuating the political fragmentation that has weakened Palestinian political life.

Third: Adopt a District-Based List System

The third option is to adopt a list-based system—whether open´-or-closed—but at the level of electoral districts rather than treating the entire country as a single electoral district.

This option could combine some of the advantages of list-based and district-based systems by maintaining proportional representation while strengthening the relationship between the representative and the constituency they represent.

Conclusion

The real debate over Palestinian elections should not begin with the date of the vote, but with the more important question: What kind of political system do we want these elections to produce?

Elections held according to rules designed to serve the existing political forces will be nothing more than a reproduction of the same crisis. Elections based on fair and transparent rules, on the other hand, and which give citizens a genuine role in choosing and holding their representatives accountable, could be the beginning of rebuilding the Palestinian political system.

Experience has demonstrated that changing individuals alone is not enough. Changing faces without changing the rules will lead to the same results.

Therefore, the priority today is not simply to hold elections, but to ensure that these elections become an instrument of democratic change rather than a means of granting false legitimacy to a political reality that has lost its ability to respond to the aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Before we go to the ballot boxes, we must first agree on the rules of the game.

Rate the article
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Very good
Result : 100%							Participated in the vote : 1