Religion, state, politics, and morality: objective paradoxes

Our central concern is understanding this system based on the duality of subject matter and analyzing its components and outcomes. We are not mistaken in considering the entirety of human history as oscillating between reason and revelation, according to the broader meanings of the concept, which we have addressed elsewhere.
It is crucial to revisit and emphasize the fundamental differences between religion, the state, and politics, in terms of the essential structure of each, and to understand the nature of their overlap, divergence, points of connection, and communication. The terms and values ​-;-​-;-under study are fundamental issues -dir-ectly related to organizing the lives of individuals, societies, and nations. As Plato states, revealing the importance of the subject of the state and politics: "We are not discussing a trivial matter-;- we are discussing how man ought to live." (The Republic). To achieve this, the subject should be approached along two axes: the first, a subjective axis, seeks essential characteristics-;- the second, an objective, axiological, and value-based axis, examines the relationship between the concepts under investigation through the criteria of truth, goodness, right, justice, beauty, and other such designations of axiology. We cannot definitively draw clear lines separating religion, politics, and the state, given their intricate and interconnected relationships across a range of political, social, human, and legal sciences. However, what is possible is to outline the paths of divergence and overlap, and to unravel these complex relationships based on the aforementioned main axes of research. Politics is primarily a social discipline, branching out into collective and individual systems, while ethics is primarily an individual system with collective implications.
Politics, by its very nature, is an intellectual methodology and an organizational framework for establishing and consolidating power. Therefore, its articles fall under the umbrella of the state, subject to scientific standards to ensure their effectiveness and productivity in achieving goals, order, and progress, striving as closely as possible to adhere to the standards of truth and empirical measures of correctness. The states that formed the League of Nations were nascent states, not historical ones, nor were they religious states, although some states, even existing republics, were associated with religion. However, the recognition of state sovereignty was never based on religious affiliation, but rather on the inclusion of the essential elements of statehood: territory, people, sovereignty, a constitution, and a system of governance. The concept of the state, indeed its very essence, is inseparable from power. Any notion of the state divorced from power, coercion, compulsion,´-or-law is merely metaphorical. Religion, in its essence, is faith and conscience, untainted by any coercive power. Here, we are referring to religion as its essence, not as a phenomenon. Thus, there is a fundamental—essential—difference between religion and politics.
Let us conduct a structural comparison of the main elements of religion, the state, and politics. We observe the initial divergence by noting that the primary essence of religion lies outside the foundational structure of politics and the state. We are focusing on the emotional, psychological, and spiritual element, while politics and the state are primarily composed of material elements. While the central element in the structure of religion is spiritual and esoteric, manifested in appearances, behaviors, and attitudes, its origin and source lie in internal feelings and sensations, detached from the physical senses by their very nature, -function-, influence, and interactions. The foundation of any religion whatsoever is the existence of transcendent, higher powers connected to and in comm-union- with a spirit residing within a body-;- there is no -dir-ect, tangible, physical encounter between the divine and the deified.
Here, we are referring to the human nature s yearning for a transcendent sublimity, separate from existence and self-sufficient.
(And when Moses came to Our appointed time and his Lord spoke to him, he said, “My Lord, show me Yourself so I may look at You.” He said, “You will not see Me, but look at the mountain-;- if it remains in its place, then you will see Me.” But when his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain, He made it crumble, and Moses fell unconscious. And when he recovered, he said, “Glory be to You! I repent to You, and I am the first of the believers.”) [Surat Al-A raf, verse 143]
And it is not for any human being that God should speak to him except by revelation´-or-from behind. (He is the Most High, the All-Wise) (Ash-Shura 42:51).
-dir-ect communication is categorically negated, except in the case of the Prophet Moses, where the nature of the communication is disputed. Perhaps the verse in Surah Ash-Shura most clearly clarifies this absolute negation. The negation and the exception are undoubtedly present, and the disagreement is fundamentally linked to the nature of the communication.
However, in the nature of states and politics, the rule is tangible, perceptible, and manifest. Even the relationship under their umbrella is a -dir-ect, material one. The absence of the state is possible, unlike God, who is present in the spirit and mind. His absence does not negate His existence. The individual is not bound to the idea of ​-;-​-;-the state as a foundation, but rather to its existence. His connection to it as an idea precedes its existence. The concept of the state is subsequent to human groups, gatherings, and societies, while the concept of religion, with its implications and purposes as a connection between the Creator and the created, existentially precedes the creation of humankind.
(And when your Lord said to the angels, “Indeed, I will make upon the earth a successor.” They said, “Will You place upon it one who causes corruption therein and sheds blood, while we exalt You with praise and declare Your
holiness?” He said, “Indeed, I know that which you do not know.”) [Quran 2:30] The second key point is authority, coercion, force, and compulsion. It is not appropriate for any religion to impose itself´-or-force people to submit to it against their will. True faith resides in the heart, and whoever outwardly professes it while concealing its opposite is a hypocrite. The reflections of faith manifest in behavior, morals, and feelings.
While the state is primarily concerned with outward appearances, namely obedience and submission to rules, laws, and regulations, the citizen is compelled to implement the state s laws even if he dislikes them, and he is not permitted to violate the laws simply because he is not convinced of them. Internal feelings and perceptions are not primary and are not taken into account, whereas religious outward expression is based on intention, that is, the psychological and emotional foundation that motivates action and behavior.
Among the famous authentic hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) is:
"God does not look at your bodies´-or-your appearances, but He looks at your hearts." (Al-Albani, Sahih Ibn Majah).
"Actions are but by intentions, and every person will have only what he intended. So whoever emigrated for the sake of God and His Messenger, then his emigration was for God and His Messenger. And whoever emigrated for worldly gain´-or-to marry a woman, then his emigration was for what he emigrated for."
The concept of the state inherently includes the concept of politics. The issue of relativity is available—in terms of its structure and the nature of its composition as a relative, temporal, and spatial formation, subject to all possibilities of alteration, change, addition, deletion,´-or-even cancellation and refutation from a principled standpoint. In contrast, the structural composition of the nature of religion, in its faith-based and metaphysical aspect, is absolute, admitting neither increase nor decrease, and there is no possibility of alteration´-or-change within it. It is absolute, neither temporal nor spatial-;- the margin of movement and maneuver is-limit-ed only to meaning, reading, understanding, and interpretation.
The concept of transcendence and sanctification lies in the very essence of religion, as it is its primary source. No belief can be considered a religion without it. For the believer, understanding, loving, and sanctifying God is an indisputable matter. There is no faith without love, glorification, and genuine inner submission. These feelings and values, which constitute the essential meaning of religion, are not subject to the considerations and standards of the state and politics. The absolute is not subject to the relative, the constant does not yield to the changing, and the spiritual cannot be measured by material standards.
Among the famous authentic hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) is
: "A -dir-ham surpassed one hundred thousand -dir-hams. A man had two -dir-hams and gave one in charity, and another man had wealth and gave one hundred thousand from his wealth in charity." (Al-Albani, Sahih al-Jami ).
“Many a fasting person gains nothing from their fast but hunger and thirst, and many a person who prays at night gains nothing from their prayer but ---sleep---lessness and exhaustion.” (Al-Albani, Sahih Ibn Majah).
Moral, ethical, and emotional standards are a primary element fundamentally linked to the concepts and values ​-;-​-;-of religion, inseparable from them and inseparable from its existence. However, these standards are not considered essential conditions for the concepts of the state and politics. In these contexts, conditions, standards, and criteria are primarily material. Taxes, fees, and penalties are determined according to specific numerical systems, regulations, and controls, upon which executive procedures are applied without regard to religious beliefs´-or-sectarian affiliations. This is not the case in the various Abrahamic religions, which are the focus of this study, as they are the very religions from which systems, governments, and forms of statehood have emerged.
To illustrate this point within one of the Abrahamic religions, the ruling on zakat (alms) is not uniform. Within Islam, and this is relevant to both current realities and history, the standard rates for calculating zakat vary significantly from one school of thought to another. For some, it is 2.5%, while for others, it is one-fifth. Regardless of the specific application, conditions, and amounts, the differences are undeniable. This implies establishing laws based on religious affiliation, a concept entirely unacceptable within the framework of modern and contemporary state values. Historically, the concept of the dhimmi (protected non-Muslim citizen) stands out. This refers to a citizen who differs from others due to their adherence to a different religion, resulting in different rulings, standards, and criteria. Despite all the justifications and mitigations of the concept of dhimmi status, it remains a fundamental and central principle within the framework of religious citizenship: "Islam exempted women, children, the poor, monks, and the disabled from paying the jizya. The jizya was not levied on a woman, a girl, a boy, a poor person, an elderly person, a blind person, a lame person, a monk,´-or-someone with a mental disability. Moreover, Islam went further, undertaking to provide for the elderly and infirm among the dhimmis."
It is well-known that Umar ibn al-Khattab passed by an old man begging from people and asked him, "What compels you to beg?" The man replied, "The jizya, need, and infirmity." Umar responded, "We would not have been fair to you if we exploited you in your youth and neglected you in your old age." He then allocated him a stipend from the public treasury and exempted him from the jizya. (The story is mentioned in many reliable sources-;- Ibn al-Qayyim in Ahkam al-Jizya, al-Suyuti in Jami’ al-Ahadith, and in Kitab al-Amwal by Abu Ubayd and others. It is also narrated that Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz said a statement instructing his governors to exempt the needy and elderly among the People of the Covenant from the jizya and to advise helping and caring for them.) According to the Islamweb website.
The main problem remains between the concept of citizenship in the abstract and its concept as an affiliation with a religion´-or-belief. The rules of discrimination based on belief are an integral part of the structure of the religious state, and it is a dilemma that has no solution and no existence within the crucible of the state as a vessel that equalizes everyone in rights, duties, and legal origin.
(Fight those who do not believe in Allah´-or-the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not follow the religion of truth from among those who were given the -script-ure - [fight them] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.) [Surah At-Tawbah, verse 29]
This verse is the fundamental basis for establishing the comprehensive concept of the People of the Covenant (dhimmi), encompassing Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and those considered similar, as stated in Ibn al-Qayyim s "The Rulings Concerning the People of the Covenant." There is no disagreement among the schools of Islamic jurisprudence regarding the general definition of the People of the Covenant. However, it is worth noting another verse closely related to the same topic, though books of Islamic jurisprudence have not relied on its lofty principles in dealing with and building relationships between individuals and groups, despite the clear differences in... Beliefs.
﴿-;-Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.)) Surat Al-Mumtahanah, verse 8.
Morality is a human characteristic
and an indication of the existence of reason. Animal instinct may be inclined toward good morality in an emergency´-or-exceptional situation. In the human condition, moral inclination is rooted in what is the essence of humanity. Consequently, the individual loses a part of his essence that is -dir-ectly proportional to his approach to good morality. The basis of good morality is the intellectual and behavioral development of the meanings of good values, such as justice, truthfulness, sacrifice, kindness, loyalty, love, and many others.
According to this logic, the essence of morality is not linked to beliefs in terms of its primary material. This meaning is clearly expressed in the saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him): “The best of you in the pre-Islamic era are the best of you in Islam.” It is explicitly stated in verse 8 of Surah Al-Mumtahanah: “Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.” Let us pay attention to the following moral terms mentioned in the noble verse: be righteous toward them, act justly, loves, those who act justly, does not forbid you, spreading an atmosphere of familiarity and compassion and breaking down barriers between all the children of Adam. Communicate, love one another, be kind to one another, and be just among yourselves, for God praises that behavior and loves those who possess it. Regardless of the historical narrative, the verse of Al-Mumtahanah should be interpreted and explained by the verse of At-Tawbah, and not the other way around, as is the custom and tradition of jurists and interpreters. It is consistent with the meanings of equality, honor, and justice, as long as the basis is (there is no compulsion in religion), so everyone, no matter how different their beliefs are, is equal in humanity, before the law, and in citizenship.
If the matter of intention, conscience, and inner thoughts is left to the One who truly and definitively knows them—God Almighty—then outward behavior and adherence to the rules and standards of law and citizenship must be judged accordingly. A realistic and rational reading of the situation reveals that discrimination before authority, politics, and the law based on belief is unacceptable. Otherwise, Muslims throughout the world would be treated as equal citizens with equal rights, duties, and standing before the law and political authority, just like all other citizens of the same nation. They would never accept having special provisions imposed upon them as protected subjects (dhimmis) simply because their beliefs differ from the overwhelming majority of citizens.
(Whoever wishes to be saved from Hellfire and enter Paradise, let him die believing in God and the Last Day, and let him treat people as he would like to be treated.) [Sahih Muslim 1844] In his commentary on Sahih Muslim, An-Nawawi explains the meaning of this hadith:
“His saying, ‘Let him treat people as he would like to be treated,’ is one of the Prophet’s (peace and blessings be upon him) concise and eloquent sayings, and a profound wisdom. This is an important principle that should be heeded, and it means that a person should only treat others as he would like to be treated.” This is the core of a well-established and widely known concept: Treat people as you would like to be treated. This naturally leads us to connect the meanings of righteousness, equity, mutual understanding, harmony, justice, and equality with the fundamental humanistic concept of religion. Thus, we achieve harmony between the outward manifestations of the essence of religion and the structure of the state’s institutions, despite the structural differences between them. Therefore, we operate within the realm of outward manifestations and inward intentions, which leads us to resolve the apparent contradiction between transmitted knowledge and reason, based on the outward manifestations and inward intentions of the state.
The Problem of Reason and Revelation: Unraveling the Contradiction
. Rationality is an intellectual principle and a philosophical theory that places "everything" under the guardianship of the laws of reason, its analyses, and interpretations, employing logic—logos—as a tool
. Are the laws of reason textual?
It may seem strange,´-or-even an extraneous element, to consider mysticism—or illumination—a rational state. Mysticism is embodied in the attainment of spiritual knowledge through purity and clarity, leading to connection with the spirit, elevation, and transcendence, to the point of reaching a state devoid of matter—purely spiritual—that enables the unification of the elements of original existence, the necessary and essential, with an existence emanating from the origin, an existence that is needy, not self-sufficient.
In that state, where the spirit is conscious, perceiving, and even thinking—revealing and exploring the secrets of existence—a unification occurs between two entities that share the same attributes and differ in their -function-s. In that witnessed scene, mysticism and illumination become rational phenomena. The close connection between mysticism and historical texts, according to the preceding analysis, leads us to a system of vital interdependence between reason and text. We considered the highest products´-or-revelations of the text to be a matter of rationality, so neither can be separated from the other. Our approach here might seem to restrict reason, but our conception of the idea of ​-;-​-;-thinking—through reason—necessitates relying on self-evident premises that are, in essence, the shackles of reason. It is not unfair to ascribe the quality of text to Platonic ideals as a model,´-or-to label Aristotle s logos as a text. Our aim is to deconstruct the problem and restructure the natural relationship between the two.
Are we then faced with the problem of the question: which comes first, the seeds´-or-the fruits, existence´-or-its purpose? In truth, resolving this problem here will not lead to a logically useful conclusion, as our usual phenomenological reading allows us to understand existence as it is, primarily.
In the details of this phenomenon, goodness becomes free from the shackles of self-interest and the bonds of subservience and imitation. It belongs to one of the two elements. Indeed, their convergence is inevitable if we adopt a normative principle: the ongoing interplay between text and reason.
With this understanding, we might be able to acknowledge science without deifying it. It is the primary, most important, and most capable reference, but it is not—at least not yet—the sole reference for understanding, interpretation, and discovery.
One of the advantages, and perhaps one of its problems, of historical transmission is that it is an open text despite its completeness and finality. Whenever it is subjected to new critical´-or-normative treatment, it opens up to unprecedented paths of meaning. The demonstrative debate continues regarding: Is interpretation´-or-exegesis something within the text,´-or-something about it and outside of it? Are the teleological and semantic intentions normative´-or-advisory? And finally, is the text the very essence of the self, so that the connection between it and the author is never severed,´-or-is it the very essence of the subject, separating itself from itself as soon as it is revealed?
Some philosophical schools of thought have leaned towards the-limit-ations of the human mind, implying the necessity of knowledge external to it, received from outside. Rationalists, on the other hand, have argued for the sufficiency of the mind and its capacity to attain knowledge without need for instruction´-or-revelation.
In both cases, knowledge rests on the mind. According to idealists, this-limit-ed mind is the locus of reception, capable of comprehending what is revealed. It is the transmitter, the interpreter, and the explainer.
Thus, in all cases, considering the text as a product of the mind, it is inevitable to give the mind priority, because it is the mind that determines the essence of "meaning" and also determines its-limit-s.
Perhaps the solution to the enigma between the critique of pure reason and the-limit-s of the human mind lies in the mind s capacity for discovery, for knowing what was, what is, and what could be within the-limit-s of its "limited" capacity and knowledge—that is, its susceptibility to error and truth. We are thus faced with a "quantity" of logical, chronologically sequential thought. This "quantity" possesses the potential to transform into a "kind," and the products of the mind become truths. For thought and analysis,
the authority of the interpreter is, in practice, stronger than the authority of the transmitted text.
When a text takes its course to become a behavior, it is usually controlled by shared intuition´-or-collective imagination,´-or-by historical readings and interpretations. In all cases, the authority of the text—the transmission—as an original influence recedes and transfers to its products and guardians. Free—rational—thinking -restore-s the text to its rightful place and allows for a reading that differs from the common and sometimes biased. Stereotypical thinking, restricted by ideology´-or-even methodology, provides a qualified and specific path to understanding and is usually a threshold for the ability to think freely, provided that one is freed from the constraints of the mechanisms, means, and patterns of thinking imposed by ideology and methodology. This is the logical context for beginning the process of producing "thoughts"—that is, products of thought—that are new, neutral, and more objective. In that case, the structure of the text—the transmission—is deconstructed in order to understand and interpret it in a way that is more capable of comprehending what is available, existing, with the same text and its subject. Through this mechanism, it will be possible to produce new texts and obtain a degree and an open horizon of those that enjoy historical, logical, and even scientific standing. Perhaps we should begin here, and in all references, with the production of a new methodology, doctrine,´-or-school within the context of the methodology´-or-doctrine.
The pressing question remains: to what extent can a text—any text—be considered a product of the mind? Defining the parameters of rationality is very useful in our current context. In line with our analysis above, we find, albeit with some difficulty, that many irrationalities—myth, science fiction, sacrifice and redemption, surrealism, etc.—are issues at the heart of reason. The concept´-or-term, open, revealed,´-or-existing within the context of an infinite horizon of -function-s, mechanisms, and tools of thought, signals the understanding of that positive contradiction that generates meaning.
Between the Prophet and the Ruler:
In the case of the Prophetic state in Medina, which would later form the basis for civil governance and a constitutional system, despite lacking at that time a fully established set of state elements such as law and constitution, borders, sovereignty, authority and institutions, and the definition of powers and jurisdictions, it possessed other elements such as the people, the land, and the overarching intellectual framework of monotheism. While the values ​-;-​-;-of faith were fully established and complete, the laws governing life and worldly affairs were still being established and completed with the final revelation and explanation of the Holy Quran by the Prophet. This was a formative stage, awaiting the complete revelation and promulgation of the foundational text. During that period, a blurring and overlap occurred between the ruler and the spiritual and emotional symbol—the Prophet—resulting in an overlap between spiritual and worldly authority. This overlap manifested itself in the formation of the ruler s -function-al and symbolic structure, resulting in a conceptual, -function-al, and symbolic overlap between the concepts of religion and state. By -dir-ectly examining the phenomenon of the “Prophetic State” in Medina, many pieces of evidence clearly show the separation of status, that is, the status of the religious spiritual figure, from the status of the civil´-or-military ruler.
The Battle of Badr: The Prophet (peace be upon him) addressed his men and advisors, -dir-ecting his words towards the Muhajireen and Ansar to ensure their support and their participation in the war against the Quraysh. He secured the Muhajireen s support after presenting the matter to them. Abu Bakr, Umar, and Miqdad ibn Amr spoke, and he said, addressing the Ansar: 1. "Advise me, O people." He specifically addressed the Ansar because when they pledged allegiance to him at Aqaba, they said, "O Messenger of God, we are innocent of this (i.e., fighting) until you reach our lands. When you reach us, you are under our protection-;- we will defend you as we defend our women and children." The Prophet, as a leader, feared that the Ansar might only consider supporting him against an enemy who attacked him in Medina, and that they would not be obligated to lead them against an enemy in their own land. 2.
The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah: "Advise me, O people." This was the Prophet s statement to those with him at the time of Hudaybiyyah. 3. After learning of the Quraysh s forces gathering to prevent him, the Prophet listened to Abu Bakr al-Siddiq s opinion. Abu Bakr said, "O Messenger of God, you set out intentionally for this House (the Kaaba) not..." If you want to kill someone but not wage war against someone, then go to him. Whoever prevents us from fighting him, we will fight him. He—the Messenger of God—said, “Proceed in the name of God.” The commander-in-chief of the Muslim pilgrimage—the noble Messenger—acted in his worldly capacity and consulted those around him, quite naturally. The Messenger refrained from performing the pilgrimage that year and concluded the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah with the Quraysh.
Umar ibn al-Khattab took a different stance regarding that peace treaty and discussed the matter from several angles, mostly religious. Umar said: “I went to the Prophet of God (peace and blessings be upon him) and said: ‘Are you not truly the Prophet of God?’ He said: ‘Yes.’ I said: ‘Are we not on the side of truth and our enemy on the side of falsehood?’ He said: ‘Yes.’ I said: ‘Then why should we accept humiliation in our religion?’ He said: ‘I am the Messenger of God and I will not disobey him, and he is my Helper.’ I said: ‘Did you not tell us that we Will we come to the House and circumambulate it? He said: Yes. I told you that we will come to it this year? He said: I said: No. He said: Then you will come to it and circumambulate it. He said: So I went to Abu Bakr and said: O Abu Bakr, is this not truly the Prophet of God? He said: Yes. I said: Are we not on the truth and our enemy on falsehood? He said: Yes. I said: Then why should we accept humiliation in our religion? He said: “O man, he is the Messenger of God (peace and blessings be upon him), and he does not disobey his Lord, and He is his Helper. So hold fast to his guidance, for by God, he is on the truth.” (4)
Let us observe the dialogue and its context. We find the details unfolding between a general commander and someone of lesser rank, and we observe the viewpoints. Despite the invocation of the Prophet’s prophethood and truthfulness, matters proceeded in a normal political course, as could occur between any two leaders of varying rank. This is indicated by the event and the details of its sequence: The Messenger of God (peace and blessings be upon him) said to his companions: “Get up and slaughter the sacrificial animals, then shave your heads.” He said: “By God, he did not get up.” One of them was a man, and he repeated this three times. When none of them stood up, he went to Umm Salamah and told her what he had encountered from the people. Umm Salamah said, "O Prophet of God, do you desire that? Go out and do not speak a word to any of them until you slaughter your sacrificial animal and call your barber to shave your head." So he went out and did not speak to any of them until he had done so-;- he slaughtered his sacrificial animal and called... He shaved his head, and when they saw that, they stood up and slaughtered their sacrificial animals, and some of them began shaving each other s heads until some of them almost killed each other in their grief. (5)
As is known, the Pledge of Ridwan took place before the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, and the following verses of the Holy Quran were revealed concerning it: “Indeed, those who pledge allegiance to you, [O Muhammad] - they are actually pledging allegiance to Allah. The hand of Allah is over their hands. So whoever breaks his pledge only breaks it to the detriment of himself. And whoever fulfills his pledge to Allah…” (So ​-;-​-;-He will grant him a great reward) [Al-Fath 48:10].
Al-Qurtubi says in his commentary on this verse: God Almighty says: “Those who pledge allegiance to you at Hudaybiyyah, O Muhammad, are in fact pledging allegiance to God.” He clarifies that their pledge to His Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) is in fact a pledge to God, as God Almighty says: “Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed God.” This pledge is the Pledge of Ridwan. The Companions pledged allegiance to the Prophet Muhammad to fight the Quraysh and not to flee. No fighting took place at that time, but rather the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah was concluded, which was called a victory. God Almighty says: “Indeed, We have granted you a clear victory.” [Al-Fath 48:1]
Al-Qurtubi, in his commentary on the verse, said: There is disagreement regarding the nature of this victory. In Bukhari, it is narrated that Muhammad ibn Bashar told him that Ghundar told him that Shu bah told him that he heard Qatadah narrating from Anas: "Indeed, We have granted you a clear victory," and he said: "It refers to Hudaybiyyah." Jabir said: "We did not consider the conquest of Mecca to be anything other than the day of Hudaybiyyah." Al-Farra said: "You consider the conquest of Mecca to be the conquest, and indeed the conquest of Mecca was a victory, but we consider the Pledge of Ridwan on the day of Hudaybiyyah to be the true victory."
Reflecting on the event and its narrative reveals a very natural progression and political context for what transpired between the Prophet, as the general leader of the Muslims, and the group of leaders and individuals who were with him. The number of Companions who attended the Pledge of Ridwan is estimated to have exceeded fourteen hundred.
The Pledge of Ridwan preceded the signing of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. The pledge of allegiance between the Prophet and his noble companions included fighting the Quraysh and not fleeing from battle. The reason for this pledge was the news the Prophet received that the Quraysh had killed Uthman ibn Affan, who had gone to negotiate with them. He had conveyed the Prophet s desire to circumambulate the Kaaba and to be left alone with the people to deliver his message. The Quraysh detained Uthman for three days, and then the Prophet received a rumor that they had killed him.
(Muhammad ibn Ishaq said in his biography: Then the Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, called Umar ibn al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, to send him to Mecca to convey his message to the leaders of the Quraysh. Umar said: "O Messenger of God, I fear the Quraysh for myself, and there is no one in Mecca from the Banu Adi ibn Ka b to protect me. The Quraysh know my enmity towards them and my harshness towards them. But I can show you a man who is more respected among them than I am: Uthman ibn Affan, may God be pleased with him. We will send him to Abu Sufyan and the leaders of the Quraysh to tell them that he did not come to fight, and that he only came to...") Visiting this House and showing reverence for its sanctity, Uthman, may God be pleased with him, went out to Mecca, and Aban bin Saeed bin Al-Aas met him. (6)
[The rumor of Uthman’s murder]
Ibn Ishaq said: Uthman went out to Mecca, and Aban bin Saeed bin Al-Aas met him when he entered Mecca,´-or-before he entered it, and he carried him in his presence and then gave him protection until he delivered the message of the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace. Uthman went until he came to Abu Sufyan and the great men of Quraysh, and he informed them of what the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, had sent him with. They said to Uthman when he finished with the message of the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, to them: If you wish to circumambulate the House, then circumambulate it. He said: I would not do so until the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, circumambulates it. The Quraysh detained him, and the news reached the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, and the Muslims that Uthman ibn Affan had been killed. - 7 -
Ibn Ishaq said: Abdullah ibn Abi Bakr told me that when the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, heard that Uthman had been killed, he said, “We will not leave until we fight the people.” So the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, called the people to pledge allegiance, and that was the Pledge of Ridwan under the tree. - 8 -
Thus, it becomes clear that the reason for the Pledge of Ridwan was the rumor of Uthman s assassination, which was not true but merely a speculative´-or-false report. Those who pledged allegiance to him hold a high position in Islamic history. Following this came the peace treaty known as the "Manifest Victory," as mentioned in the Wise Quran: "Indeed, We have granted you a manifest victory" (1) Surah Al-Fath. Al-Qurtubi, in his commentary on this verse, suggests that the Manifest Victory refers to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. Az-Zuhri said: "Hudaybiyyah was the greatest of victories, for the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) came to it with 1,400 men. When the treaty was concluded, people spread the word and learned about God. No one who desired Islam was prevented from embracing it. Before those two years had passed, the Muslims had come to Mecca with 10,000 men." Here, too, we observe that the Manifest Victory was linked to the peace treaty, making the treaty itself a victory, indeed the greatest victory. This highlights the importance of peace and its priority over warfare.
Ibn Hisham, in his biography, recounts the following under the heading: Umar s Rejection of the Prophet s Peace Treaty: When the matter was settled and only the written agreement remained, Umar ibn al-Khattab jumped up and went to Abu Bakr [p. 317] and said, "O Abu Bakr, is he not the Messenger of God?" He replied, "Yes." Umar said, "Are we not Muslims?" He replied, "Yes." Umar said, "Are they not polytheists?" He replied, "Yes." Umar said, "Then why should we accept humiliation in our religion?" Abu Bakr said, "O Umar, hold fast to his position, for I bear witness that he is the Messenger of God." Umar said, "And I bear witness that he is the Messenger of God." Then he went to the Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, and said, "O Messenger of God, are you not the Messenger of God?" He replied, "Yes." Umar said, "Are we not Muslims?" He replied, "Yes." Umar said, "Are they not polytheists?" He replied, "Yes." Umar said, "Then why should we accept humiliation in our religion?" He replied, "I am the servant of God and His Messenger. I will not disobey His command, and He will not forsake me." He said, and Umar used to say, “I continued to give charity, fast, pray, and free slaves because of what I did that day, fearing the consequences of what I said, until I hoped it would be for the best.” (9)
Umar ibn al-Khattab saw the peace treaty as a disgrace to the Muslims and informed the Prophet of his opinion. The Prophet replied that he would not go back on the peace treaty, which was a command from God. Here we witness the Prophet acting as a divinely inspired messenger, considering the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah a divine command, while events unfolded with consultations between the Prophet and his companions, as narrated in detail. It becomes clear here that the purpose of that command—signing the treaty—was to uphold the covenant, not the peace agreement itself. This is the closest understanding to the context of the event and its developments. The companions would not have had an opinion against the divine command if the peace agreement itself had been a divine command and not a political and military decision made by the Prophet according to the necessities of the interest and based on unforeseen developments that unfolded without prior planning, as is clearly evident. This explains the companions —including Umar ibn al-Khattab s—evaluation of the situation as a matter of politics and war, not a matter of… And a divine command that must be obeyed completely without hesitation´-or-choice. So they initially took the position of the reluctant responder to the command to sign the peace treaty and begin implementing its terms by postponing the Hajj to the following year. They began to comply with the Prophet’s action of shaving their heads. A state of distress prevailed over them, as mentioned in the narration of the event: “It is not for a believing man´-or-a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, that they should [thereafter] have any choice about their affair. And whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger has certainly strayed into clear error.” (Surat Al-Ahzab, verse 36).
So the command of God intended in the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah is the value of fulfilling the covenant, not the “covenant” itself, the peace treaty. (And fulfill the covenant. Indeed, the covenant will be questioned.) [Surat Al-Isra: Verse 34]
Let us now look at the covenant document itself and see how the Prophet exercised his powers as a political and military leader in the details of the event:
Ali writes the terms of peace.
He said: Then the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, called Ali bin Abi Talib, may God be pleased with him, and said: Write: In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. He said: Suhayl said: I do not know this, but write: In Your name, O God. So the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, said: Write: In Your name, O God. So he wrote it. Then he said: Write: This is what Muhammad, the Messenger of God, made peace with Suhayl bin Amr on. He said: Suhayl said: If I had witnessed that you were the Messenger of God, I would not have fought you, but write your name and the name of your father. He said: The Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, said: Write this down: Muhammad bin Abdullah and Suhayl bin Amr have agreed to cease hostilities for ten years, during which people will be safe and refrain from harming one another. Whoever comes to Muhammad from Quraysh without the permission of his guardian will be returned to them, and whoever comes to Quraysh from among those with Muhammad will not be returned to him. There is a sealed covenant between us, and there will be no treachery´-or-deceit. Whoever wishes to enter into Muhammad’s covenant and pledge may do so, and whoever wishes to enter into Quraysh’s covenant and pledge may do so. (10)
Suhayl bin Amr, the second party in the peace treaty, objected to Muhammad being called the Messenger of God, so the Prophet agreed to his request. Suhayl also objected to the treaty’s heading, “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful,” because it was not found in the literature of Quraysh, but rather it was from the texts of Islam, and they had not yet -convert-ed to Islam. So the Prophet agreed and replaced it with “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful,” as Suhayl bin Amr, the delegate on behalf of Quraysh, had requested.
Let us look at that flexibility and that normal, natural context between two negotiating parties, one of whom responds to the other, in an unambiguous indication of the worldly context of the noble Prophet Muhammad exercising his powers as a political and military leader with -dir-ect worldly tasks. The inference here supports what we have said, that the divine command in the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah was a command for the covenant and for all-encompassing and inclusiveness, every covenant, and not for the covenant itself, the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah.
“And consult with them in the matter” (Surah Al Imran 159-11).
Consultation in public affairs and matters concerning the interests of the people and the state is a political matter. Therefore, the Prophet did not consult with his companions in his capacity as ruler, not as messenger.
We note here the attention of Muhammad Rashid Rida, author of Tafsir al-Manar, in distinguishing between politics and religion. In his interpretation of the verse, he says, “And consult with them in the matter: compelling people to enter their religion by force. This issue is more closely related to politics than to religion because faith—which is the foundation and essence of religion—is a submission of the soul, and it is impossible for submission to be achieved through coercion and compulsion. Rather, it is achieved through explanation and proof.” (12)
These indications and evidence leave no room for doubt regarding the de-script-ive distinction between the Prophet’s position as a messenger carrying a divinely revealed message and his position as ruler of the nascent state. The difference is clear by nature-;- that is, the human nature of Muhammad as a prophet differs from his nature as a ruler. This is
despite the unity of his personality. If the issue were religious, i.e., the issue of governance, the most important and simplest decision the noble Prophet would have made would have been to appoint his successor. The least that could be determined was a mechanism for transferring power, and it was obvious that there would be a bloody dispute over power after the Prophet (PBUH). It was necessary to specify whether the matter was religious, in order to avoid that conflict and killing for power. The only justification for the Prophet (PBUH) not using his worldly authority to clearly and explicitly determine his successor is that the Prophet died in his spiritual and faith-based capacity, that is, as a messenger and prophet carrying the message of religion, which is the most important and dominant characteristic of his noble person.
It is worth noting here that the idea of ​-;-​-;-dismantling the -function-al relationship between the ruler and the religious symbol, even if they are embodied in a single figure, applies to all religions—that is, every religion—due to the essential difference and distinction we have established. This applies even more so to every sect´-or-denomination, whether separate´-or-derived from a religion.
All coercion is outside the established concept of religion:
the essential value of religion is faith, a matter of inner feeling that only arises through internal, subjective acceptance. Hence, the emotional foundation for accepting a belief is the absence of coercion: "There is no compulsion in religion." Here, the definite article "al-" in "religion" is used for totality, referring to the present and established meaning of religion in the mind. It also indicates the generic sense of religion, encompassing all its connotations and meanings, which should be free from coercion. Coercion automatically negates religion-;- hence, we conclude that all coercion is outside the established concept of religion. Therefore, the legislation of laws, punishments, and penalties is a non-religious matter, even if exercised by a religious figure in their capacity as ruler´-or-head of state. The claim of a religious state to rule in the name of religion is invalid. The same applies to the concept of implementing Sharia, that is, codifying´-or-regulating religious rulings and obligations. Once a religious matter, in whatever form´-or-shape, is placed under the authority of worldly coercion, it becomes outside the realm of religion. We have demonstrated the separation of the state from religion due to a fundamental difference in their -function-s and essence: coercion is inherent to the nature of the state, while it is entirely separate from religion, which is an essential, intuitive essence. The exercise of power by a religious figure is a practice separate from the religious question. Political authority is a secular, positive authority, and it is one of the pillars of the state. The authority of conscience—if we may use this term—is an internal, self-restraining authority, devoid of external coercion. You refrain from acting on your instinctual desires through intellectual restraint of those desires, even in a state where you are deprived of any worldly authority. This should not be interpreted as negating the role of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and his life as a model and example for all people, especially Muslims. Such a claim would be a gross misrepresentation and a deviation. The Prophet is indeed a role model and example in all his actions, words, and conduct. However, the appreciation here lies in understanding what pertains to the ruler and what pertains to the Prophet. There is also the practical and personal aspect, which is worthy of emulation and following. Yet, a distinction remains between the rule of law, which applies to all citizens of the state regardless of their religious, ethnic,´-or-historical affiliations, and following the Prophet Muhammad as a historical example and role model worthy of emulation and guidance.
The perfection of faith is a -dir-ect result of love. The believer loves God first and foremost: "And [yet], among the people are those who take other than Allah as equals [to Him]. They love them as they [should] love Allah. But those who believe are stronger in love for Allah." (Quran 2:165)
Is it conceivable that love can be forced? It is an emotional and psychological issue that entails mental convictions and behavior. In contrast, we find the situation completely different in politics. As a citizen, you are not obligated to love the ruler, but you are forced to abide by the law and the decisions that emanate from it, where coercion is a structural element of the state. But this is not the case with love. In politics, the law is applied, and one is compelled to abide by the government s decisions, even against one s will. One works through constitutional and institutional channels to change what one deems unsuitable´-or-unjust. As for religion, which is the essence of faith, there is no compulsion´-or-coercion in it. It is impossible to belong to a religion´-or-a heartfelt belief against one s will´-or-by force. Belief in anything requires love, even if the affiliation seems to defy logic´-or-rational judgment. Those who adhere to a religion are not particularly concerned with rational justifications for their beliefs. In fact, they may become even more attached to what is in their hearts and minds after being presented with a rational argument that might dismantle the foundations of the belief. This perhaps explains the extreme diversity in people s beliefs and the significant variations even within a single system. However, in politics and the state, interests, benefits, and pretexts stand alongside principles, foundations, and even values. There is no stability´-or-absoluteness here-;- rather, change is a structural characteristic of the logic of politics, unlike the emotional and spiritual aspects of beliefs and religions.
"And if He willed..." Your Lord would have made all those on earth believe. So will you compel the people to become believers? (99) Surah Yunus - 13 -
This verse informs us of a final report concerning the matter of faith-;- He who possesses the power to compel all of humanity to believe has no will to do so-;- rather, His will is manifested in their diversity, and it is for this diversity that He created them: “And if your Lord had willed, He could have made mankind one community-;- but they will not cease to
differ, except those on whom your Lord has bestowed His mercy. And for that He created them. And the word of your Lord has been fulfilled: ‘I will surely fill Hell with jinn and men all together.’” (Hud 11:118-119). As for the filling of Hell with humans and others, this is a matter of scholarly debate. I do not believe it is necessary to separate God’s supreme attributes, such as all-encompassing mercy, the will to remove hardship and burden, the establishment of equality and justice among humankind, and the elevation of humanity’s status as the builders and vicegerents on Earth, from the meanings of attributes of compulsion. And as for tyranny and other attributes, the broader attribute is the more prevalent. Mercy is for trees, humans, and stones, for humankind and nature, both living and inanimate. This is because it is closer to the nature of the relationship of faith, which is fundamentally linked to love and the prohibition of coercion.
“What would God gain by punishing you if you were grateful and believed? And God is ever Appreciative and Knowing.” (Quran 4:147). The goal is not punishment at all, and it is inconceivable that the purpose of creation, stewardship, and development could be revenge, torment, and burning in Hell. God is self-sufficient and independent of His creation, and the relationship of faith is fundamentally one of love. This is a rhetorical question through which God clarifies that He does not punish any of His servants out of spite´-or-revenge in the sense that people understand revenge according to their usage of it among themselves. – 14 –
Values ​-;-​-;-of Religion and Values ​-;-​-;-of Politics:
The transformation of religion into a tool of power inevitably breeds a tyranny cloaked in sanctity. Religion thus abandons its fundamental ethical -function- of liberating the individual from all forms of servitude, elevating them to an existential freedom that ennobles their spirit and intellect, free from the shackles of subservience to any human being, symbol,´-or-possession. The divergence between the values ​-;-​-;-of politics and religion is fundamental-;- it is not merely a linguistic disagreement´-or-a difference in terminology. While
it is true that language expresses a community s understanding of its relationship with the world and others, and that the responses of consciousness to phenomena vary, leading to their intellectual representation and subsequent expression through sound, letters, words, formulations, and terminology—language—I delve deeper than the literal meanings and connotations to arrive at a definition of the essence without which religion is not religion, just as politics is not politics.
The eagerness of religious scholasticism – whatever it may be – to mix religion with politics is nothing but an attempt to legitimize guardianship over man, and to grant sanctity to the rule of men over one another, on behalf of´-or-as successors to God. No man´-or-institution has the right to decide the fates of men on behalf of God by claiming to be acting on God’s command. The essence of religion is liberation from any kind of servitude. Let us note the reprehensible meaning of servitude associated with the application of the concept of religious politics´-or-religious rule. The individual´-or-institution that imposes on people what is permissible and forbidden, in the name of the religious text, is enslaving people by claiming religious guardianship and deciding what is God’s command and prohibition.
They have taken their scholars and monks as lords besides Allah, and [also] the Messiah, the son of Mary. And they were not commanded except to worship one God-;- there is no deity except Him. Exalted is He above what they associate with Him. (Verse 31 of Surah At-Tawbah) Let us be guided by the authentic Prophetic tradition in interpreting the verse: Adi ibn Hatim came to the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, while he was a Christian, and heard him reciting this verse: “They have taken their rabbis and monks as lords besides Allah, and [also] the Messiah, the son of Mary. And they were not commanded except to worship one God-;- there is no deity except Him. Exalted is He above what they associate with Him.” He said: “I said to him: ‘We do not worship them.’ He said: ‘Do they not forbid what Allah has permitted, and you forbid it, and permit what Allah has forbidden, and you permit it?’ I said: ‘Yes.’ He said: ‘That is their worship.’” (15)
Thus we understand The matter here is entirely different from the objective analysis that concludes from the verse and hadith that people should be declared infidels and that fighting them, perhaps even killing them, is obligatory on the grounds that they adhere to legislation that contradicts what certain jurists and scholars have stipulated, and not others. This restriction is not mentioned at all in the structure of the hadith and the noble verse. Moreover, differences in matters of jurisprudence are broad and clear, so how can disagreeing with them be considered disbelief? Let us examine the words arranged in the verse to see that they are closely related to servitude to other than God. By analogy, whatever leads to servitude to other than God contradicts the core of the religion. This is an indisputable fact. However, the issue is not in the action but in the principle, and this meaning is evident in the words of the Prophet (peace be upon him). The reprehensible act of declaring something permissible´-or-forbidden is that which contradicts what God has specifically decreed—that is, the principle—and no one else. Therefore, the concept of Lordship must be linked to avoiding what establishes servitude, not merely legislating according to benefit, interest,´-or-the suitability of time and place.
Manifestations of religious fascism:
When the supreme guide is God s representative on earth in terms of legislation and the obligation to obey, in the -dir-ect sense´-or-as a result, this means that all humans are subordinate to him and have no intrinsic value - divine - outside of that authority because obeying him is obeying God. In the religious state, the attribute of governance is mixed and merged with the attribute of the guardian ruling by God s command, so the guardian becomes the one who establishes, implements, and controls the people with divine power, which requires their submission and compliance with his commands and prohibitions without criticism´-or-hesitation. This is contrary to the concept of divine servitude and to the concepts of positive democracy and the separation of powers, because the individual guardian here is above all the institutions of the state by virtue of the divine right of veto, and this is the most serious manifestation of religious fascism. Therefore, we said that the Islamic state in Medina was a constitutional state. The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) was a source of legislation in himself, as he received various forms of revelation—the Quran and the Sunnah. However, the structure of the existing state was constitutional. The ruler after the Prophet was not a legislator but rather an enforcer of the constitution, especially in matters of faith and belief, and a significant portion of the laws governing transactions. Beyond that, the existing systems were governed by the nature of the existing order, according to interest, benefit, need, and knowledge. The hadith, "You are more knowledgeable about the affairs of your world," is a fundamental principle in this context.
If every law, constitution,´-or-agreement that appears to contradict the sacred text is considered rejected and nullified, then it is necessary to go beyond the literal meaning of the text and reach the ultimate goal, purpose, and wisdom. It is not permissible to be swayed by the literal meaning unless it is supported by a clear intentional indication,´-or-unless the apparent meaning is consistent with higher religious principles and values. From this, it becomes clear that any legal´-or-political legislation that enslaves a person to anything other than God must be rejected, regardless of the justifications offered, such as loyalty, obedience,´-or-disavowal.
If the ultimate goal of public policies is to gain the favor of the ruler, irrespective of any moral, ethical, religious,´-or-legal considerations, and if salvation in this life and the hereafter is attained through this favor, then we are witnessing a departure from the concept of a constitutional state, as we mentioned earlier, as was the case in Medina. This is the very essence of the exception to the fundamental principles of religion, for the ultimate goal of religion is the liberation of people and the establishment of integrity in human interactions.
A person s status is not tied to their religious affiliation above all other affiliations, because the concept of the state is parallel to the concept of humanism and antithetical to the concept of servitude.
The ends do not justify the means. Consultation (shura), for example, is invalidated from the perspective of a rigid, closed-minded fundamentalist view because it implies the rule of the people—all the people, any people. However, in the concept of the state, it is fundamental and essential. The ruler is a human being, with the same rights and responsibilities as everyone else. Did not Abu Bakr and Umar ibn al-Khattab say this at the beginning of their rule? Did not Ali ibn Abi Talib say, when he assumed the caliphate: “I am but a man from among you-;- I have the same rights and responsibilities as you”? In the fundamentalist view advocating for a religious state, the ruler and the one in charge attains a status that even the Rightly Guided Caliphs in Medina did not possess. At its highest level, consultation is the rule of the nation over itself, meaning the nation s rule over itself. This allows any individual from the nation to be included, considering the state as a nation in its own right, even if it is part of a larger, broader, and more comprehensive nation. But to use consultation as a vehicle to achieve power and then abandon it is inconsistent with the concept of the state as it aligns with the principles, lessons, and wisdom derived from the development of the Prophetic and Rightly Guided Caliphate.
It is not right for all wars, invasions, calamities, and disregard for human life to be justified as long as they serve the fundamentalist ideology and enable religious rule, which contradicts the essence of religion, as we explained above. As the renowned scholar and founder of sociology and historical criticism, Ibn Khaldun, said: “The ultimate purpose of the imamate—governance—is that it is a worldly matter.” This automatically implies the end of religious rule in all its various forms. That is, governance is not an integral part of religion. Let us consider again Ibn Taymiyyah’s statement: “God establishes a just state even if it is infidel, and does not establish an unjust state even if it is Muslim. For justice endures with infidelity, while injustice does not endure with Islam.” Here, the concept of the state appears to diverge from the logic of dogmatists who link the establishment of the state to religious values. Let us reflect once more on God’s words: “Why then were there not among the generations before you those of sound understanding forbidding corruption on earth, except for a few of those whom We saved from among them? But those who wronged followed what they had not yet learned.” They were given luxury therein, and they were criminals. (116) And your Lord would not destroy the towns unjustly while their people were righteous. (117) From Surah Hud. Here, the concept of injustice should be taken in its general sense, as is its primary meaning. The same applies to the concept of corruption, which is the opposite of righteousness, and also to the meanings of the affluent and the criminals. It is not correct to restrict these lofty and unique meanings to the interpretations-limit-ed by the requirements of legal and jurisprudential rulings. Rather, they should be taken in their general sense and not confined´-or-restricted by interpretations-limit-ed by subsequent conditions. Perhaps some of them arose under special´-or-exceptional circumstances. The general principle remains indisputable: the principle that "the lesson is in the generality of the wording, not the specificity of the reason." The Sharia is general, and so is legislation. This is a civil rights principle that is not-limit-ed to the principles of jurisprudence. Any event´-or-occurrence that leads to legislation does not negate that. Legislation is not exclusive to him, but has become acceptable, available, and enacted for all those subject to its text by virtue of the constitution. Here, we refer to the civil concepts of religious texts, which, in their practical and civil aspects—that is, those non-religious and doctrinal—are matters common to all people. What is suitable for one group, society,´-or-nation can be suitable for others, with the difference being in matters of doctrinal belief.
The Essence of Morality: Logic and Morality . Morality
as an ontological concept:
As we mentioned, morality is a human semiotic, linked to the existence of reason. Piety is not a natural´-or-physical science-;- it is pure reason and conscious intention. Logical rules are a tool of piety. The objective contradiction between a bad moral value, for example, disobedience to parents, contradicts the natural course of existence. Instinct—animalistic, natural—is inclined toward good morality in a normal´-or-biological state, an exceptional case. The relationship between humans and domestic animals, in the human condition linked to consciousness and sensory perception, is transformed through experience into intuition. Moral inclination is rooted in its logical essence, and thus it ascends The individual is humane in his moral excellence, and consequently, the individual loses a part of his human essence in -dir-ect proportion to his approach to bad morals. The basis of good morals is the intellectual and behavioral development of “applied” meanings of good values, such as justice, honesty, sacrifice, kindness, loyalty, love, and many others, acquired through individual subjective experiences, through -dir-ect introspection with the historicity of society’s experience.
The normative dialectic of ethics necessitates an objective presentation, positioning itself far removed from coercion and authority. Thus, ethics is not normative, meaning it is not bound by external rules and restrictions, but rather a free and rational choice, devoid of self-interest and utilitarianism, as in the Kantian conception—that is, a consistency with existential consciousness. Here, the following question arises: Is adherence to positive laws, social customs and traditions,´-or-religious boundaries a moral act? In other words, freedom becomes a moral construct. The free and rational choice is a natural consequence of moral consciousness. To paraphrase Heidegger s assertion that freedom is the essence of humanity, ethics is reduced to an innate choice, without linking the concept of innateness to the will. The concept s connection to conscience and its alignment with emotion logically remove it from the realm of external determinism and place it within the sphere of intuition, reflection, and -dir-ect, spontaneous intention. Here, it automatically connects with the positioning of social and religious ethics, the environment, culture, and surrounding context. Herein lies the value of ethical action liberated from guardianship and subservience, unbiased by pragmatic´-or-utilitarian behavior. The possibility of a transcendental, a priori, idealistic, individualistic ethics—born of free reason—remains very close to the concept of epistemology. This allows us to consider the epistemological act—the act of knowing—as an ethical issue. With this logical structure and sequence, the idea of ​-;-​-;-ethics becomes one of the predicates of ontology.
According to this logic, the essence of ethics is not linked to doctrines in terms of its primary material. This meaning is clearly exemplified by the saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him): “The Messenger of God (peace be upon him) was asked: ‘Who is the most honorable of people?’ He replied: ‘The most honorable among them in the sight of God is the most pious.’” They said: We are not asking you about this. He said: The most honorable of people, and in another narration: He is the honorable son of the honorable, Joseph, the Prophet of God, the son of the Prophet of God, the son of the Prophet of God, the son of the Friend of God. They said: We are not asking you about that. He said: Are you asking me about the origins of the Arabs? They said: Yes. He said: The best of you in the pre-Islamic era are the best of you in Islam if they understand it. - 16 - This is explicitly stated in verse 8 of Surat Al-Mumtahanah: “Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.” Individual rights and justice are religious values ​-;-​-;-established by agreement, and homes are an inherent right and justice is a binding duty. Let us turn to the following ethical terms mentioned in the noble verse: be kind to them, be just, He loves, those who are just, He does not forbid you. We find that they spread an atmosphere of familiarity, compassion, and breaking down barriers between all human beings: communicate, exchange, love one another, be kind to one another, and be just among yourselves. God—the ultimate good as an ideal mind—praises this behavior and loves those who possess it. And setting aside the narrative of the exchange of the text, the verse of Al-Mumtahanah should be interpreted and explained by the verse of At-Tawbah—the verse of the sword—and not the other way around, as has been the custom and as has been known by jurists and interpreters. It, that is, the verse of Al-Mumtahanah, is consistent with the values ​-;-​-;-of equality, honor, and justice, as long as the basis is the spectrum of “there is no compulsion in religion.” Everyone, no matter how different their beliefs, is equal in humanity and under the receptive mind, and from it in the concept of the natural society. Even logically speaking, the act of creation is related to the subject of reflection and, consequently, existence.
Let s take a practical example that illustrates the relationship between ethics and laws and boundaries.
A wealthy, religious man living in an Islamic country, married to three women and treating them justly and equitably to the best of his ability, desires to recapture his youth. He divorces his first two wives and keeps the youngest, obligated only to pay the deferred dowry and maintenance for the four-month waiting period. The two divorced women, after decades of service, are at an age that no longer guarantees them the ability to continue their lives as women with the status to remarry and resume normal life. The man has the right to replace his two divorced wives with two young girls who have never been touched by a man before. The legal and religious situation described is perfectly sound, but the moral assessment places the husband in the depths of injustice, oppression, and denial. This is because the exercise of individual rights, by moral standards, presupposes that it does not cause injustice´-or-harm to others unless justified. This, in reality, contradicts the essence of servitude to God alone, which is the principle of liberation from all forms of -dir-ect and in-dir-ect servitude. Giving in to lust´-or-instinct is a type of servitude. This is practical morality based on rational and logical assessments, free from social and legal norms.
Ethics and Politics:
This is a fundamental issue that has been addressed since ancient times and continues to be researched. Perhaps the first to begin discussing it was Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Tarkhan ibn Awzalagh, Abu Nasr al-Farabi, known as the Second Teacher (d. 339 AH), one of the Arab philosophers, in his book *Majmu fi al-Siyasa* (A Collection on Politics). Another famous work is the book *Al
-Mu allim al-Awwal* (The First Teacher) by Aristotle (384-322 BCE) on politics. For this discussion, we will rely primarily on the comprehensive book *Ethics and Politics* by Dr. Imam Abd al-Fattah Imam.
"Man is a moral animal," as Kant argued (April 22, 1724 – February 12, 1804), expressing the idea that morality is unique to human behavior. Man is the only being capable of possessing moral values, as Hartmann (1882 – 1990) stated.
Hegel (August 27, 1770 – November 14, 1831) said, "Morality is a second nature to man, because his first nature is his immediate animal existence."
"The rules of morality emanate from conscience and are -dir-ected towards the individual with the intention of purifying the soul and elevating it to the heights of human excellence and perfection."
The difference between ethics and politics:
1. Ethics is based on achieving high personal values, while political laws are based on achieving specific utilitarian social values.
2. Ethics subjects the individual to his conscience in his constant aspiration towards excellence,
while law subjects the individual to the community striving to achieve its interests and establish order and stability.
3. Thus, law´-or-political organization is a coercive system, while ethics is an individual´-or-personal system. 17.
Here, the question arises: Is morality a purely personal matter,´-or-is it a responsibility, thus establishing its place at the heart of political, legal, and social organization? Is it a free act and a will governed by sound, logical reasoning?
A free act is an act that the agent could have chosen differently.
A moral act is a free act, and if an act is not free, it falls outside the realm of morality. 18.
Here, we address the concept of intention in moral terms, which we can call the will to good, as Kant termed it. We consider whether an act remains moral if it stems from a good´-or-benevolent intention.
The value of a moral act does not depend on the results it achieves´-or-attempts to achieve, but rather on the principle´-or-rule by which a person fulfills their duty.
"A moral act presupposes the individual s ability to know and distinguish between good and evil, and then to choose one through a deceptive act aimed at achieving a specific moral goal pursued by the actor s will." -19-
- The Source of Morality and Politics:
According to Dr. Imam, moral law derives its existence from ideas firmly established in the feelings of individuals and the conscience of the nation, whether their source is religion´-or-philosophy. These are general rules and laws without executive controls.
Politics, as an end, primarily targets the group s benefits and interests.
It does not aim for perfection, but rather for achieving security and order within the group. Opinions are diverse and competitive. One of the shortcomings of politics is transforming political rules into moral values. For example, the New Party and the Contemporary Party: one who belongs to the New Party is virtuous, and one who belongs to the Contemporary Party is corrupt,´-or-vice versa. This logic has nothing to do with politics, nor with morality.
- Politics is strongly linked to reality. The -dir-ect source of politics is the legislative authority, which adopts specific rules and has executive controls. “The common source is living in a community.” –20-
Politics seeks to interfere with morality through an ideology upon which the political intellectual structure is based. Here, political values, such as belonging, loyalty, and the fundamental principles of political bodies, become intertwined with moral values. The former then become the foundation of the latter, portraying the political as taking precedence over the ethical. This contradicts the natural order, where the branch becomes the origin of the root. For example, utilitarian theory makes utility the origin and the standard, meaning that determining right and wrong, good and bad, is linked to the degree of utility it brings. In contrast, idealist theory sees the origin as the principle that free, rational, and pure will towards the good, understood as purely logical and rational thought, should be free from all self-interest and utility.
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (April 5, 1588 – 1679) argues in his treatise "Principles of Natural and Political Law" (in this naturalistic moral doctrine, self-interest and moral duty are one and the same).
The first principle of natural law is that people should "seek and pursue peace-;- people should keep the contracts they make," without which contracts are, of course, meaningless. The laws of nature are constant and eternal because injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, oppression, favoritism, and the like can never be legitimate´-or-legal. It cannot be said that war can preserve life,´-or-that peace destroys it.
Hobbes is criticized for his belief in the absolute rule of law as indispensable for social order and national unity. This is a paradox that diminishes the value of thought, freedom, and natural will in humankind.
The renowned Greek philosopher Aristotle had a comprehensive theory of politics, governance, and ethics, completing the intellectual journey begun by his teacher Plato. In his book *The Ideal City*, he built upon its structure his discussions and even his pronouncements, elaborating on a critical vision of what was contained therein and establishing a complete thesis that combined theoretical and practical thought. (22
) Aristotle does not see a fundamental difference between ethics and politics. Thus, Aristotle sees politics as a science that deals with an entire moral society striving for the perfect good, which can only be achieved through collective action. It is ethics in its highest form, for it is a science that examines the duty of the whole human being: the duty of the human being in his environment and the perfection of his actions and relationships.
Aristotle believed that there is a unity between political science and moral philosophy because the moral law of the state is the same as the true´-or-right law. Furthermore, there is no distinction between the theory of civil law and the theory of moral law. Thus, "political science" is threefold: a theory of the state, a theory of ethics, and a theory of law.
For Plato, politics and ethics are inseparable.
The ideal city is one in which the four virtues are realized: 1. Wisdom, 2. Courage, 3. Temperance, and 4. Justice.
"The state is this soul in magnified form," Plato said.
"The -function- of a thing is what it does best," Plato also stated.
The virtue of the eye is clear vision, the virtue of the ear is hearing, and the soul s -function- is life-;- its virtue and privilege is a good´-or-virtuous life.
Plato believed that "all social phenomena are effects of the soul,"
and said, "The state does not arise from oak trees, but from the personalities of the men who live in it."
Socrates said, "Giving everyone their due-;- it is never just to harm anyone." (The Republic, p. 26, translated by Hanna Khabbaz).
The German philosopher Kant, author of the most important theory of moral idealism, argued that violence is not justified by counter-violence. He answered the question, "Can state violence be countered with violence?" by stating that "preventing all forms of opposition is a legitimate act."
Locke believed that the state derives its legitimacy from its ability to provide civil rights for individuals. That is, the state must establish the means and legislate the ways for members of society to exercise their rights and freedoms. Respecting the legitimacy of the state is not only unavoidable but also a duty. However, this legitimacy is not sacred´-or-absolute-;- it is temporal and moral. This is based on the premise that the role of states is to protect life, property, and freedoms, and to achieve security, peace, and coexistence. Locke placed the natural laws established by God for humankind and the resulting circumstances within this framework. Regarding the natural human inclination inherent in humans as an instinct, it is itself a set of laws that restrict human will and the individual, meaning it constitutes individual and social constraints. Humans can access, understand, and deal with these laws through a degree of reflection. For example, human freedom may not grant the right to commit suicide. 25.
The Social Contract Theory: John Locke attributed the possibility of the state to the existence of shared governance among individuals and their agreement to establish a political community, a "state."
We can observe the close connection between ethics, as natural rules and as an independent science, and the content of the concepts of politics, the state, and human societies. We conclude that deconstructing these connections outside the framework of religions is not about excluding them, but rather an attempt to reconcile disparate essences that are capable of interconnection and entanglement through parameters that grant each of them a suitable place as human, secular, and religious value-based starting points that constitute the historical narrative of humankind. The principle of integration takes precedence over the principle of differentiation. In other words, it is more appropriate, indeed imperative, to achieve reconciliation, participation, and deliberation when considering and examining the meanings and concepts of ethics, religion, and politics. And the state.
Dr. Imam Muhammad Imam says: I don t know why the Muslim thinker doesn t write what he writes in his own name, rather than in the name of Islam, so that the naive are not deceived into believing that what he says is "the opinion of Islam," and that discussing it is therefore heresy and misguidance. - 26 -
Ultimately, we present viewpoints and perspectives, offering what we deem most plausible and correct. These interpretations are primarily the personal opinions of their authors. They may align with existing methodologies, schools of thought, and theories,´-or-they may introduce entirely new propositions´-or-theories. There is no benefit in simply repeating information unless it adds genuine value to the content through classification, scrutiny, investigation, and critique, on the one hand, and by clarifying the meaning and intent, on the other. Otherwise, it becomes a pointless exercise in redundancy and an unnecessary exercise.

References and Citations:
1- The Prophet s consultation with his companions during the Battle of Badr is a well-known event, and his consultation is documented in Sahih Muslim, in Imam al-Nawawi s commentary on Sahih Muslim, in the Book of Jihad and Expeditions, Chapter on the Battle of Badr, Hadith No. 1779, narrated by Anas: When the Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, learned of Abu Sufyan s approach, he consulted with his companions. Abu Bakr spoke, but the Prophet turned away from him (p. 1404). Then Umar spoke, but the Prophet turned away from him as well. Sa d ibn Ubadah stood up and said, "O Messenger of God, are you referring to us? By Him in Whose Hand is my soul, if you were to command us to plunge into the sea, we would plunge into it, and if you were to command us to march to the ends of the earth, we would do so." This is also mentioned in Ibn Hisham s biography in more than one place. Furthermore, a narration in Bukhari supports the hadith of the Ansar and the words of Miqdad ibn Amr.
2. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) set out in the year of Hudaybiyyah with a few hundred of his companions. When he reached Dhu al-Hulayfah, he marked the sacrificial animals and entered into the state of ihram for Umrah. He sent a scout from Khuza ah (p. 1532) and continued until he reached Gha-dir- al-Ashtat. The scout came to him and said, "The Quraysh have gathered forces against you, and they have also gathered the Ahbish against you. They will fight you and prevent you from reaching the House (the Kaaba)." The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said, "Advise me, O people. Do you think I should attack their families and children, those who want to prevent us from reaching the House? If they come to us, then Allah, the Exalted, will have cut off a spy from the polytheists. Otherwise, we will leave them defeated." Abu Bakr said, "O Messenger of Allah, you set out intentionally for this House, not wanting to kill´-or-fight anyone. So proceed towards it, and whoever prevents us from reaching it, we will fight him." He said, "Proceed in the name of Allah." (Al-Bukhari 3944)
3. As narrated by Imam al-Bukhari in his Sahih, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said, "Advise me, O people. Do you think I should attack their families and children?" Their children and offspring are those who want to prevent us from reaching the House (the Kaaba). If they come to us, then God Almighty will have cut off an eye from the polytheists. Otherwise, we will leave them defeated. Abu Bakr, may God be pleased with him, said: O Messenger of God, you set out intentionally for this House, not intending to kill anyone´-or-fight anyone. So proceed towards it, and whoever prevents us from reaching it, we will fight him. He said: “Proceed in the name of God.” (
Book of Military Expeditions, Chapter on the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, 67-5)
3 - Al-Bukhari in his Sahih and others, on the authority of Urwah ibn al-Zubayr, on the authority of al-Miswar ibn Makhramah and Marwan, each of whom confirms the other’s narration. The story of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah.
4 - The previous source
. 5 - Ibn Hisham’s Biography (2/314) PDF version.
6 - The previous source (2/315).
7 - The previous source (2/315). 8 )
Previous source (2/ 316-317)
9) Ibn Hisham’s biography [2 p. 318]

10 - It was narrated by Imam Muslim in his Sahih (Book of Jihad and Expeditions) (Chapter on the Battle of Badr) Hadith 3336: Abu Bakr ibn Abi Shaybah narrated to us, Affan narrated to us, Hammad ibn Salamah narrated to us, on the authority of Thabit, on the authority of Anas: “The Messenger of Allah, may God bless him and grant him peace, consulted when he was informed of Abu Sufyan’s approach. He said: Abu Bakr spoke, so he turned away from him. Then Umar spoke, so he turned away from him.” Then Sa`d ibn `Ubadah stood up and said, “Is it us you mean, O Messenger of Allah? By Him in Whose Hand is my soul, if you were to command us to plunge into the sea, we would plunge into it, and if you were to command us to march to the ends of the earth, we would
do so.” [11 - Al-Qurtubi’s commentary: The Almighty’s statement, “And consult with them in the matter,” indicates the permissibility of independent reasoning in matters and acting upon conjecture even when revelation is possible, for God permitted His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) to do so. The scholars of interpretation differed regarding the meaning of the command God gave His Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) to consult with his companions. One group said: This refers to the strategies of war and the encounters The enemy, and to appease them, elevate their status, and win them over to their religion, even though God Almighty had made him independent of their opinion through His revelation. This was narrated from Qatadah, al-Rabi’, Ibn Ishaq, and al-Shafi’i. Al-Shafi’i said: It is like His saying, “And the virgin is consulted,” to appease her heart, not because it is obligatory. Muqatil, Qatadah, and al-Rabi’ said: The leaders of the Arabs, if they were not consulted in a matter, it was difficult for them. So God Almighty commanded His Prophet, peace be upon him, to consult them in the matter, for that would make them more inclined towards him, remove their resentment, and appease their hearts. So when he consulted them, they would recognize his honoring them. Others said: This applies to matters for which no revelation had come to him. This was narrated from al-Hasan al-Basri and al-Dahhak, who said: God Almighty did not command His Prophet to consult because He needed their opinion, but rather He wanted to teach them the virtue of consultation, so that his nation would follow his example after him. In the reading of Ibn Abbas: “And consult them in some matters.”
12 – Muhammad Rashid Rida says In Al-Manar Commentary, Volume 4, interpretation of verse 256 of Surah Al-Baqarah: “And consult them in the general matter,” which is the policy of the nation in war and peace, fear and security, and other worldly interests. That is, be persistent in consultation and continue it, as you did before the battle in this incident (the Battle of Uhud). Even if they erred in their opinion, all good lies in training them to act through consultation rather than acting solely on the opinion of the leader, even if it is correct. This is because of the benefit it brings them in the future of their government if they establish this great pillar (consultation). The majority is less prone to error than the individual in most cases, and the danger to the nation in entrusting its affairs to one man is greater and more severe.
13 - And in this sense is the Almighty’s saying: “And if Allah had willed, they would not have associated anything with Him” (6:107) and His saying: “And if your Lord had willed, He would have made mankind one community” (11:118). The comprehensive meaning in these verses is that if God had willed not to create this species called humankind, which is predisposed by its nature to belief and disbelief, Good and evil, which one of the possible and attainable things prefers over its opposite and contrary by His will and choice, would not have been possible, and humankind would not have existed on Earth. However, His wisdom dictated that He create this wondrous species and make it His vicegerent on Earth. (Previous source).
14 - Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tafsir al-Manar, Surah An-Nisa, verse 147, electronic version.
15 - A similar narration was reported by At-Tirmidhi, and its chain of transmission was authenticated by Al-Albani in Sahih At-Tirmidhi, and this narration was deemed good by Ibn Taymiyyah. (Source: Ad-Durar As-Sunniyyah).
16. Narrator: Abu Hurairah | Narrator s Status: Sahih (Authentic) | Source: Sahih al-Adab al-Mufrad | Page´-or-Number: 96 | Narrator s Ruling: Authentic. Previous source.
17. Imam Abd al-Fattah Imam: Ethics and Politics, A Study in the Philosophy of Governance,
Supreme Council of Culture, Cairo, 2020, pp. 72-73
. 18. Ibid., p. 74.
19. Ibid., p. 78.
20. Ibid., p. 91. 21. Ibid., p.
153.
22. Politics, Aristotle, translated by Lutfi al-Sayyid Ahmad, al-Jamal Publications, Baghdad, Beirut, 2009.
23. Imam, Ethics and Politics, p. 145 and following.
24. Summary from pp. 160-165. Previous source.
25. Two Treatises on the State, John Locke: A Conceptual Formulation.
26. Imam, Ethics and Politics, p. 44.

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