I am conscious, therefore I am aware of existence - The New Cogito

Ihsan Taleb
2026 / 7 / 7

Our new formulation aligns with the essence of ontological phenomenology and falls under the category of generative reasoning. If we begin with the premise that consciousness is awareness of something, then objective existence has no meaning without its manifestation in our consciousness. There is necessarily a primary giver of latent meaning, which must be unveiled and revealed to become manifest and existing, rather than merely hallucinations´-or-vague, tangled mental murmurs that suggest depth but remain lost within themselves, unable to manifest in a specific external way.
Human consciousness is not merely a transient state-;- it is the sole instrument through which we perceive the world. We cannot prove the existence around us except through our perception and awareness of it. Descartes proved the existence of the self through thought, a serious formulation as an additional value that goes a step further to prove the existence of the external world within the totality of existence through consciousness. His famous statement also sparked skepticism, while our new formulation offers a vision liberated from the necessary certainty that Descartes sought to establish.
The new formulation (I am conscious, therefore I am aware of existence) offers a vision liberated from the absolute necessary certainty that René Descartes sought to correct, as a certainty prior to thought, in other words, a coercive certainty that we should not discuss but rather reach and know. Through the new cogito, the transition was made from the certainty of the closed self to the fluidity of open consciousness. This epistemological and ontological liberation was achieved through the application of epochalism-;- by transcending the fixed-limit-ing certainty, Descartes wanted to reach a fixed, unchanging “Archimedean certainty” point (I think) on which to establish the world. While we viewed the coherent world through an existential mechanism that guided us toward certainty as a dynamic process of consciousness, consciousness here is not a final destination but a continuous movement to explore meaning between the realms of doubt and certainty. We are aware that there is a hidden certainty, but we recognize it as an abstract intuition and an inherent essence.
The transition from "physical existence" to "consciousness of existence": In Descartes cogito, the result is the affirmation of the self s existence as a "thinking thing" (therefore, I exist), whereas the phrase "I am conscious of existence" propels consciousness into a broader ontological space. Consciousness does not merely affirm its possessor s existence-;- it is liberated to intertwine with existence as a whole and give it meaning.
Liberation from the necessity of duality of essence: Descartes imprisoned reason within his skepticism and was forced to invoke divine guarantee to prove that the external world is real and not an illusion. In contrast, the phrase "I am conscious" liberates reason from this predicament, adopting the path of "phenomenological intentionality." Consciousness and existence appear together as a single structure, thus eliminating the necessity of doubt. With a "prior certainty" whose proof requires establishing the existence of a universal, thinking substance as opposed to a material substance, the dualism of body´-or-matter and spirit is demonstrated from within (from the outside). We will expand on this argument during our discussion of substance and essence.

We have replaced the "rigorous mathematical certainty" sought by Descartes with "meaning," and meaning, by its very nature, is flexible, relative, multifaceted, and organized by the interaction of human consciousness with its historical and existential environment. This grants philosophy greater flexibility in accepting difference and plurality. The new approach does not seek a safe haven, immune to doubt, as Descartes did, but rather makes consciousness a courageous instrument for engaging with existence by producing renewed meanings without resorting to rigid, definitive answers that are not subject to criticism and deconstruction.
The cogito, in its Latin origin, means foundational logic´-or-cornerstone. Descartes based his argument on a rigorous mechanism of thought to establish the thinking self,´-or-the thinking substance, as the basis of existence. The proposed alternative, however, is based on a flexible horizon of consciousness open to existence. From confining humanity within itself in opposition to a world whose existence is questionable, to a self that is conscious of existence, the concept of interdependence between meaning and thing, and between self and world, is realized. Consciousness is not realized without something to which it refers-;- the world exists and is intended by consciousness. Descartes aspired to the stability of the "thinking substance" as a material, physical entity existing independently. The new cogito, however, seeks the production of meaning. Humanity is not merely a manifestation of the thinking self, but also a giver of value, a revealer of meaning, and a bestower of meaning.
The new proposition is not an empty intellectual luxury, but a structure that merges with the other, a partner in the world, and intertwines with the living world. Consciousness reveals existence while being contained within it, and the self discovers itself as a "merological part" of the whole.
We do not refute Descartes from the outside, but rather re-establish the foundation upon which he stands. We have moved beyond Descartes without falling into his negation, and this is the technique of ideological transcendence in the phenomenological method, shifting the center of gravity from thought as a subjective act to consciousness as an open, intentional structure.
"Intentional intuition precedes the linguistic act." The example of "olive" is an applied demonstration: the ideal meaning "olive fruit" is present in consciousness before any sound is uttered. The sound reveals what is already given. When we make "look" the basis, the order is reversed: the visual linguistic act becomes the condition for the emergence of meaning, while the ideal meaning becomes the condition for the cognitive possibility of looking itself.
The "first experiencer" is an impersonal epistemological concept-;- it is neither Adam, nor a saint, nor a specific philosopher, but rather a -function-al position. It is every human being who has experienced "raw encounter" with the thing, sifted through it, and stored its first meaning in the accumulation of lived experience. Its sole criterion is the possibility of intuitively re-experiencing it by others.
In classical phenomenology, the "transcendental self" is neither an external inspiration nor an amorphous entity. It is a historical embodiment of the chain of early experiencers who established primary, reproducible meanings. This is not a special mystical revelation, but rather a universal, a priori knowledge. "The apple" has a primary meaning because millions of early experiencers encountered it and stored "sweetness, roundness, edibility" as fixed attributes. This accumulation is what makes language possible, not the other way around.
Linking phenomenology to ethics:
Phenomenology focuses on the essential structures of intentionality, that is, orientation toward an object, with a clear distinction between different types of experience. Ethical phenomenology focuses on what is essential in the intentional orientation from the first-person perspective of ethical experiences and aims to formulate the essences of types of ethical experience. This is in the classical context. In the generative context, however, we extend intentionality to search for the ethical essence of consciousness itself and of knowledge itself, and within the structure of existential logic, employing a rigorous methodology to uncover the essence of the given in the list of a priori knowledge.
Ethical sensory perception essentially involves the use of sensory faculties such as sight, observation, and hearing, as well as the perception of the meaning of sound, in the individual experience. An example of visual ethics is watching a group of teenagers playfully tossing around a cane that one of them had taken from an elderly man, causing him to fall to the ground. The group derives pleasure from watching the old man wince and plead for the return of his cane, which has become a toy. The group is aware of what they are doing and enjoys it visually-;- there is no doubt that the action is immoral. Another example is auditory ethics, such as hearing a teacher s outburst of insults at a third-grade student, belittling and ridiculing a drawing the child had submitted to celebrate Mother s Day. These are experiences based on conscious sensory perception.
These -dir-ect examples are merely preliminary semiotic signs leading deeper into the world of phenomenological ethics, which will be a central focus of the theory of infinity.




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