Syria:-limit-ed Change and Broad Powers

Contrary to what we have become accustomed to, the Syrian public has not been particularly preoccupied with the structural changes the authorities have recently made to their governing body. This is a significant paradox. Perhaps other pressing societal concerns have garnered widespread attention, overshadowing the new appointments made by President Ahmad al-Sharaa. These shifts involved replacing the Secretary-General of the Presidency, as well as several ministers and governors, with new figures who, naturally, were already close to the levers of state administration. In reality, these changes raise several questions regarding their significance and purpose, given that they constitute a "limited shake-up" that spared the very officials whose performance has been—and remains—the primary source of public discontent on the Syrian street.
Any internal reshuffle within a society just emerging from the crucible of war must serve the resolution of national crises. It should respond to the necessities of transitioning toward a better economic and social reality, while aiming to overcome obstacles to a smooth and natural transition. This may well be one of the goals set by President al-Sharaa: to break free from the political isolation in which the authorities find themselves, where their projects have failed to yield tangible results capable of persuading public opinion or, at the very least, forging a minimal consensus without fueling sharp divisions.

Priorities of the Authorities
Anyone observing and analyzing Syrian affairs—including, of course, the performance of the Syrian authorities—will notice the heavy burden of crises hindering any tangible internal change. This relates specifically to the management of citizens daily affairs, their livelihoods, and the accumulated, compounding problems that cannot easily be solved without the initial political will of the authorities. This brings us to a fundamental issue: the core priorities of the authorities and their primary preoccupation at this current stage. While we cannot always blame every failure on compelling circumstances beyond state control, we observe that the authorities place two specific issues at the top of their agenda: security and state stability.
The other priority is attracting foreign investment—meaning that the investment file is given absolute precedence. The focus is on exploiting any investable asset before anything else, whereas investment should primarily be -dir-ected toward the Syrian people. This is what the broader Syrian landscape clearly indicates.
Perhaps the most critical question is whether this reshuffle is merely a routine procedure, dictated by natural requirements and objective circumstances related to state administration and institutional organization,´-or-if it addresses an urgent, contingency need.
In the Syrian context, this cannot be viewed as a routine procedure, nor can it be seen as a response to societal needs and its numerous demands. We must bear in mind that popular protests have focused on just and pressing living demands, none of which included a mere reshuffling of officials. Furthermore, the appointment of a replacement for the president s brother, Dr. Maher al-Sharaa, cannot be viewed—relatively speaking—strictly as an operation to "remove relatives" from the administration of the authorities, even if it appears so on the surface. This is because the move did not extend to other officials and their various institutions, particularly those that have been under intense public scrutiny over recent months. Ultimately, the dynamics of this change appear far more complex and profound than this surface-level interpretation, especially regarding its potential ripple effects on the performance of the authorities within Syria.

The Hard Core
These changes indicate that the authorities are preoccupied with consolidating their internal structure, namely reinforcing their hard core, which is entrusted with decision-making. Two central positions were affected. The first is the Secretary-General of the Presidency, a post held since the fall of the Assad regime. In Syria, this position cannot be viewed as a purely administrative role, as it might be in other countries where it serves merely as a liaison between the president and state institutions. Here, the Secretary-General is an active participant in decision-making, especially under a presidential system where the role of the prime minister is marginalized, alongside the expansion of the president s powers, the follow-up of which is supposedly delegated to the Secretary-General.
The second position is that of the Minister of Information, an appointment that signals an intention to -alter-the authorities media discourse.
For over a year, both positions were held by individuals who were not part of the hard core of "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham." They are civilians with no prior involvement in any specific political organization´-or-military faction on the Syrian scene. Both built their academic expertise at Western universities, and their experience in interacting with their surroundings is rooted in cultural and political diversity. Furthermore, both “al-Awar” and “Zaarour” are considered part of the Salvation Government, its governmental and academic institutions, and its social environment.
Accordingly, the appointment of Abdulrahman al-Awar stems not only from his experience in managing government affairs and institutions, but also from his potential and viable role in state administration as an assistant to the president, participating in shaping public policies and influencing the -dir-ection of internal decision-making. His reversal of the examination agreement for students in Suwayda can be understood precisely in this light.
The same applies to the new Minister of Information, Khaled Fawaz Zaarour, who is intended to assume specialized tasks in "managing the media and shaping the image of the new Syria." It has become clear that their previous roles served as a form of training and preparation for assuming such sensitive positions in Sharaa’s transitional government, particularly when observing their statements and views regarding freedoms, the media, and public affairs.
Strengthening the governance structure is, in reality, a mechanism to empower the authorities to seize control of the state s key levers during this phase of institutional rebuilding—institutions that both society and the authorities equally need. However, these institutions will ultimately be monolithic, single-voiced, and uniform in vision, as is the case today, within a society that thrives on political and social diversity and counts on building a participatory governance model.

The State Narrative
It was indeed striking that Dr. Hamza al-Mustafa utilized the expression "state narrative" during a discussion with the external media management cadres roughly a week prior to his dismissal. This phrase—or rather, this terminology—might well be the password that illuminates the nature and objectives of this governmental reshuffle. What commands attention here is why Dr. al-Mustafa did not propose a "national narrative"´-or-a "revolutionary narrative." Deconstructing this notion serves as a reminder that the “victory speech” effectively declared the end of the Syrian revolution and the dissolution of its institutions. Furthermore, it highlights that the authorities political discourse relies on an Islamic dimension—namely, the concept of the “Ummah” (the Islamic nation)—which, by its very nature, supersedes and subsumes "nationalism" as both an idea and a project.
Consequently, the shake-up within the Ministry of Information constitutes a step toward promoting a more explicit political discourse for the authorities. It signals an anticipated impact on shaping, -dir-ecting, and perhaps even regimenting public opinion, particularly regarding the hierarchy of governance priorities. In one way´-or-another, this implies a shift toward a strategy rooted in state--dir-ected media and tighter censorship, which ultimately translates into further restrictions on freedom of expression.
This potential trajectory forms the core of the “state narrative,” paving the way for a transition from “revolutionary legitimacy” to “constitutional legitimacy.” This process grants the authorities an unrestricted mandate along with broad, supra-constitutional powers.
My objective here is not to evaluate´-or-review the performance of the former Minister of Information´-or-the former Secretary-General of the Presidency, as that is an entirely different matter. However, by virtue of these changes, Syria may have lost a moderate faction within the authorities—one whose expertise could have been relied upon to bolster a civil-democratic orientation, had the authorities genuinely desired to pursue it. This comes at a time when the doors remain firmly shut to highly qualified, academically trained Syrian professionals and experts from across all political spectrums—individuals who possess vital experience in administration, media, and various other sectors.

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