Syria: Who Gets to Build the New Syria? The Monopoly on State-Building

The widespread movement in Syria leads us to believe that the “state,” amidst complex crises, is on the verge of significant transformations. While the precise nature of these transformations remains unknown, numerous indicators point to them. These indicators are embodied in the regime’s efforts to consolidate its project through a strategy that not only guarantees its continuity but also generates mechanisms of control. This strategy aims to manage the transition through ideas and visions that it deems, from its own perspective, the best path, utilizing constitutional and legal institutions. The ultimate goal is to produce a social contract that aligns with and reflects the existing power structure, excluding any effective´-or-genuine role for dissenting forces within society. Even the “People’s Assembly,” intended as a platform for national legislation, not as the source of authority, is being” instrumentalized” to serve this objective: the monopoly of building the new Syrian state. This situation compels us to reflect on the future, in which the regime assumes a singular role in shaping it.

Crisis´-or-Transformation?
Prior to the passage of laws and proposed amendments regarding judicial reform in Syria, a necessary step in a country emerging from “tyranny and war” like Syria, the country recently witnessed what resembled a wave of arrests and the commencement of trials for a number of figures and symbols of the defunct Assad regime. Indeed, the first question that arises is about the “critical timing” at which this measure was launched without any prior notice from the relevant authorities. No one outside the “core of power” has a satisfactory answer, but speculation seems quite logical, including those that tend toward justification´-or-skepticism, suggesting that it constitutes a response to public demands for transitional justice.

But what is undeniable is that this move came at a time when the protests had reached a stage indicating a genuine crisis, representing a difficult test for the public. Events have unfolded rapidly since the recapture of al-Buwaydani, with his popular base and military weight, in the Damascus countryside. This occurred at a time when there was a pressing need to integrate the various military wings and factions into the Ministry of Defense, and for the Ministry to truly possess the power to make decisions and manage military forces without hindrance, as is currently the case.
Nothing is truly coincidental under any ruling political and security system. There is also no doubt that the Ministries of Interior and Justice are working with exceptional efforts to bring those accused of committing crimes to justice. However, the manner in which the arrest of “The Tadamon Butcher”, Amjad Youssef, was carried out reinforces the hypothesis that it was a pre-emptive measure intended to diminish the effectiveness of the sit-ins called for that day in Aleppo, Raqqa, and other cities. Intended´-or-not, the arrest served to mobilize broad national support for the regime and simultaneously to stifle the protest movements demanding basic rights. The same applies to the trial of Atef Naguib, despite all the organizational and legal issues that marred that session. In other words, the authorities appear to be moving towards seizing control of the public sphere, effectively disabling the “state-sponsored counter-protests” approach.

Controlling Public Space
The regular leaking of recordings from Sednaya and Tishreen Hospital represents another development. While significant in reinforcing the Assad regime’s narrative of crimes, it inevitably leads to further mobilization of the public towards a more hardline stance. This hardening of public opinion not only extends to holding perpetrators accountable but also to solidifying, strengthening, and legitimizing the current regime’s policies. Furthermore, it opens the door wide to blaming specific Syrian communities for the crimes of the former regime. We must work to de-escalate this situation as much as possible to preserve the nascent and inherently fragile stability within the country and to prevent its exploitation for the targeting of any Syrian group´-or-faction.

What is happening is also a security and political operation aimed at controlling the public sphere, a strategy employed by authoritarian regimes. Confusion is evident regarding the tensions arising from the protests and the current Syrian regime’s response to them through verbal violence and political hatred. It is clear that the ability to restrain “loyalists” appears-limit-ed. Therefore, these leaks, trials, and arrests serve as a convenient tool at present to frame, influence, and even -dir-ect the Syrian street. These are tools that should not be used for political purposes.
The public sphere is participatory, and seizing, confiscating,´-or-denying it to “other” Syrians is a violation of the rights of society. Protecting these rights is part of the duties of the authorities, and it is not in their interest to become a party that fuels the smoldering embers of the crisis.

A Roadmap
Does what we are saying sound like a repetition of what is already being said? Perhaps it is. Our discussion does not aim to diminish the efforts being made´-or-to undermine the national narrative related to the horrific crimes that have occurred in Syria over the past half-century. Rather, it is an attempt to deconstruct and understand more deeply, leading to a contribution to empowering civil society forces to engage intellectually in managing the transitional phase and to assert their presence and natural contribution in protecting the project of rebuilding the state in the post-Assad dictatorship era.
If the issue of narratives emerges as one of our existing problems, with each party seeking to refute a narrative in order to reinforce its own amidst the prevailing anxiety, then it appears as a major test for the current authorities. As long as the project of rebuilding the state lacks its most important pillars: dialogue and inclusive participation, it is they who bear the responsibility of partnership in protecting society from disintegration that leads to further division. Here, I find myself echoing the words of sociologist Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Hajj: “The failure to construct a shared narrative is dangerous because it leads to the emergence of counter-narratives that threaten the legitimacy of the entire entity. Building a national narrative requires understanding these sub-narratives and forging a negotiated consensus on the overarching narrative.” I would add to this the importance of recognizing these sub-narratives as a prerequisite for their integration.
In the same vein, the authorities can contribute to mitigating tension and anger by encouraging civil society to organize itself, activating public debate, and ensuring that the authorities are part of this debate, not responsible for it´-or-supervising it. They must also listen seriously to critical and dissenting voices. This opens up broad avenues for a qualitative shift in public sentiment, fostering a sense of participation, recognition of “difference,” and acceptance of the “different.” This is an experience that can be developed and utilized to resolve national issues and to better understand the pulse of the street. Perhaps the most pressing need is to cease the current practice of using the media for political purposes, maintain the confidentiality of investigations, and refrain from leaking “confessions” that could fuel multiple narratives and thus influence the course of justice.
The authorities must also work diligently to adopt transparency in managing institutions and in presenting their public policies, which remain shrouded in ambiguity, including control over the public sphere, as we have noted. This is especially crucial given the presence of a weakened, fragmented, and exhausted opposition that currently lacks any alternative vision, and the absence of any effective political forces. What exists are groups united by general ideas embodied in the concepts of “democracy, citizenship, and a civil state,” which Syrian society aspires to, while awaiting the restoration of a much-needed political life after more than half a century of dictatorship, repression, and fifteen years of immense sacrifices.
Ultimately, rebuilding the new Syria requires a genuine collective effort, rooted in a comprehensive national dialogue and broad community participation without exception. This transformation hinges on a sincere political will from the authorities, as well as the empowerment of an active civil society, in order to reclaim its role in shaping the country’s future.

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