Why did the Sudanese Revolutions Remained an Unfulfilled Dream?

In a previous article, I wrote about the striking absence of Sudan’s educated elites from the unfolding realities in the country. These elites observe Sudan’s collapse from a distance, content with interpreting crises and analyzing disasters while the nation itself continues to disintegrate piece by piece: a fractured geography, a faltering economy, a weakening social fabric, and a state steadily eroding from within.

I therefore called upon these elites to harness their knowledge and expertise by forming specialized working groups capable of developing a comprehensive national strategy one grounded in both rigorous analysis and practical application. Such a strategy could serve as a roadmap for the governance and revitalization of the Sudanese state across all its regions and sectors, without exception.

The reactions I received were notable. Messages and calls poured in from friends and readers, many of whom argued that this was not the appropriate time to speak about strategies´-or-long-term planning. According to them, the immediate and overriding priority is to uproot the Islamist movement and its allies among them Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), factions within the Forces of Freedom and Change, and the so-called armed movements.

I share their conviction that Sudan cannot rise unless the roots of those who misled the people and devastated the country are removed. Yet dismantling such a deeply entrenched system cannot be achieved through anger, improvisation,´-or-slogans alone. It requires planning and organization precisely the elements Sudanese political life has lacked for decades.

Indeed, the absence of planning and organization has been the central weakness undermining every attempt at meaningful change in Sudan since independence.

Despite repeated uprisings and immense sacrifices, genuine transformation has remained elusive. We revolt without a plan, mobilize without organization, and leave the fate of our movements to chance and to opportunists ready to exploit the moment.

The three “revolutions” often cited in Sudan’s modern historical narrative did not produce the structural change that true revolutions bring about. The October 1964 uprising, while historic, was not a fully realized revolution. It was a wave of protests that culminated in the resignation of General Ibrahim Abboud. What followed was not a coherent project of state-building but rather a political arena dominated by competing factions preoccupied with dividing power and influence. These forces failed to establish a permanent constitution´-or-address the country’s structural crises from the conflict in the South to the challenge of balanced national development thereby paving the way for yet another military coup.

The events of April 1985 were, in many respects, closer to a coup than a popular revolution. Led by Field Marshal Abdel Rahman Swar Al-Dahab, the transition was carefully managed and ultimately created conditions that benefited Islamist political forces. Exploiting the failures and internal conflicts of the ruling establishment at the time, Islamist groups consolidated their position and ultimately seized power in June 1989. The consequences of that moment continue to shape Sudan’s political landscape today through the influence of their successors and allies.

The December 2018 uprising, however, represented a rare and extraordinary moment in Sudan’s modern history. It was a genuine eruption of popular anger that began in the provinces before reaching the capital. Ordinary citizens drove the movement forward, without the patronage´-or-control of political entities whose leaders had long advocated accommodation with the Islamist regime and sought to normalize its abuses.

The Sudanese people bypassed these actors and created a powerful national movement. Within days, protests spread across dozens of cities from Atbara to Damazin, from Port Sudan to El-Obeid, and from Gedaref to Dongola. Sudan stood on the threshold of a true revolution. The regime began to f-alter-and seemed close to collapse.

Yet the momentum of the uprising was soon diverted in ways that appear neither accidental nor spontaneous.

The Sudanese Professionals Association emerged suddenly and assumed leadership of the movement despite lacking the institutional and strategic foundations necessary for such a role namely coherent planning and organizational capacity. It subsequently formed the coalition known as the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), bringing together many of the same political entities that the street had already moved beyond. This occurred without a clear popular mandate, and from that moment the trajectory of the uprising began to shift.

Following the formation of the FFC, internal rivalries, bargaining, and fragmented negotiations with the military council began to dominate the political process. At the same time, the broad national uprising that had mobilized cities across Sudan gradually receded, until it was largely confined to-limit-ed areas of Khartoum. The demands of the movement were correspondingly reduced from the complete dismantling of the regime to negotiations that offered only partial concessions.

Yet negotiations had never been the central demand of the protest movement. Rather, they became the preferred option of political actors who had positioned themselves as intermediaries between the street and the military establishment.

The sit-in that later became a defining symbol of the uprising was left without a coherent strategy to sustain´-or-protect it. Proposals intended to strengthen and safeguard the movement were repeatedly rejected as political leaders became increasingly preoccupied with internal disputes and competing ambitions.

Meanwhile, figures associated with the former regime managed to leave the country, opportunities to recover looted public assets were lost, and external actors became increasingly influential in shaping Sudan’s political trajectory.

The tragic massacre that ended the sit-in marked one of the darkest moments of this period. Many expected that negotiations with the military leadership would immediately cease in response to such an atrocity. Instead, talks reportedly continued behind closed doors, even as the nation mourned its dead.

The mass demonstrations of 30 June 2019 briefly revived the spirit of the uprising, bringing vast numbers of citizens back to the streets. For many Sudanese, this moment appeared to offer a chance to -restore- the revolution to its original path. Yet the subsequent political agreement between civilian actors and the military leadership granted the latter renewed legitimacy while postponing´-or-sidelining many of the fundamental questions regarding Sudan’s political future.

In retrospect, the recurring failure of transformative movements in Sudan stems from a simple but profound reality: the absence of a clear strategic vision and disciplined organizational structures. In such a vacuum, popular mobilization becomes vulnerable to fragmentation, manipulation, and eventual capture by opportunistic actors.

Experience has shown that Sudan’s most organized political forces including the Islamist movement and others before it operate according to well-developed strategies and adapt flexibly to changing circumstances. By contrast, popular movements have too often relied on emotion, spontaneity, and reactive mobilization.

Strategic planning and institutional organization are therefore not intellectual luxuries-;- they are prerequisites for survival, stability, and national renewal.

The Sudanese people have repeatedly fulfilled their role by rising up in protest and by making enormous sacrifices. The responsibility now falls upon the country’s educated elites to assume their rightful role: to employ their knowledge, expertise, and intellectual resources in the service of a coherent national project.

What Sudan urgently requires is a comprehensive national strategy one capable not only of achieving political change but also of guiding the governance and reconstruction of the state afterward.

Sudan can no longer afford another cycle of failed uprisings, lost lives, and revolutions that are ultimately diverted from their original aims. The country must develop the capacity to mobilize effectively, to act in an organized and secure manner, and to determine its leadership and political framework independently free from both internal manipulation and external tutelage.

Equally important is the creation of a disciplined national civic organization capable of articulating a clear vision for preserving, rebuilding, and advancing the Sudanese state.

Such responsibilities lie at the heart of what it means to be a responsible and principled intellectual elite not merely describing reality as it unfolds, but helping to shape a path toward a more stable and prosperous national future.

Rate the article
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Very good
Result : 100%							Participated in the vote : 1