Abdulrahman Matar
2026 / 3 / 17
Barely two months had passed since Raqqa was liberated from the control of the SDF when residents of Raqqa and Tell Abyad (north) took to the streets in widespread protests. The demonstrations were triggered by the appointment of Sipan Hamo, the commander-in-chief of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as Deputy Minister of Defense. His name has long been associated with alleged war crimes in the Syrian Jazira over nearly a decade, including killings, torture, arbitrary detention, the recruitment of minors, and the construction of tunnels across the region.
These protests coincided with the fifteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, amid growing mobilization in areas formerly controlled by the SDF. Demonstrations also extended to the town of Al-Shuyukh in the Aleppo countryside, while other protests had taken place in parts of rural Hasakah in recent weeks. This wave of dissent reflects a clear and explicit rejection of reintegrating SDF leaders into local communities and assigning them leadership and administrative roles in key military and security institutions, in line with the January 29 agreement between the Syrian authorities and the SDF.
Multiple Drivers
In reality, taking to the streets represents the culmination of ongoing public discontent with the policies of the Syrian authorities in Raqqa and other parts of the Jazira region. The appointment of Sipan Hamo was perceived as a -dir-ect provocation, particularly after repeated appeals from local communities not to impose “Kurdish” figures accused of crimes against humanity in the region, according to international reports and testimonies from victims of detention, torture, and forced displacement.
However, the issue goes beyond this single appointment. It extends to what many see as leniency toward,´-or-even reliance on, remnants of the Assad regime and SDF affiliates who continue to occupy influential positions within the civil administration.
Despite ongoing warnings voiced ÚÈÑ social media and in -dir-ect meetings with relevant officials—such as the governor of Raqqa—these concerns have gone largely unaddressed, especially regarding individuals affiliated with the SDF´-or-the former regime who are appointed through ministerial channels.
In recent days, cities such as Raqqa, Tell Abyad, Al-Shuyukh, and their surrounding areas have witnessed sustained mass demonstrations, along with-limit-ed incidents of violence linked to Hamo’s appointment. These tensions have been exacerbated by the visible presence of SDF-affiliated personnel conducting patrols and setting up checkpoints in areas no longer under their control. These developments remain among the most immediate triggers of unrest, occurring amid an official media blackout.
Local Cadres
In a related context, citizens have expressed frustration over the repeated exclusion of qualified local professionals from consultations and appointments to official positions, despite their proven expertise and specialization. Instead, authorities have increasingly relied on individuals from outside the province, sidelining experienced revolutionary activists in favor of “trusted” figures with little to no relevant qualifications—reflecting a prevailing logic of loyalty over competence.
This dynamic has fostered a growing sense of deliberate marginalization within local communities. It has become a daily concern for residents and raises serious questions—often accompanied by bitter irony—as illustrated by the appointment of a “Mayor of Raqqa” who neither belongs to the city nor possesses any knowledge of its history´-or-challenges, a decision that ultimately led to his replacement.
Legislative Elections
Last week, Raqqa witnessed the resignation of members of the subcommittee overseeing legislative elections, followed by the withdrawal of approximately 60 members of the electoral body, including parliamentary candidates. Those who withdrew cited what they described as “violations of the bylaws and foundational regulations” governing the electoral process, particularly “The absence of clear criteria for forming the electoral body and ensuring equal opportunities among candidates”.
Despite formal legal objections submitted by citizens, the higher electoral committee ignored these violations, placing the subcommittee in a position of complicity. Rather than clarifying the circumstances, the subcommittee chose to resign to avoid responsibility. This move, however, underscored the extent of the irregularities and pointed to the involvement of specific actors in manipulating electoral lists.
In this regard, responsibility clearly extends to the higher committee, which assumed the subcommittee’s duties, as well as to the Political Affairs Administration—an institution viewed by local communities with significant concern due to its perceived interference in the electoral process.
Within this broader context, the trajectory of the elections itself constitutes a major driver of the protests.
Dominance of Political Affairs
Paradoxically, one member of the Political Affairs Administration in Raqqa has been described as a “Supreme Guide”—a characterization that reflects the central role this body plays in -dir-ecting virtually all aspects of political and civic life in the city, as well as its -dir-ect involvement in public affairs.
Its current role recalls the early phase of liberation in the spring of 2013, when local councils were formed through informal coordination led by figures who are now prominent within the Political Affairs Administration. While these individuals were active participants in the Syrian revolutionary movement, they were also, in reality, part of the hard core of “ Jabhat al-Nusra “ from the moment Raqqa fell under its control.
Today, their influence can be traced across all facets of public life: from appointments and electoral lists to cultural and political activities, including the selection of participants in national dialogue initiatives. Their authority is reinforced by their standing, influence, and perceived reliability within the upper echelons of decision-making in the Syrian state.
Conclusion
These protests serve as a significant indicator of the scale of challenges facing the process of building a new state, one and a half years after the fall of the Assad regime. These challenges stem largely from the governing policies of the current authorities, which are characterized by ambiguity, exclusion, and deliberate marginalization—whether of political and social forces in general´-or-of revolutionary activists in particular.
They also reflect a pattern of imposing policies and projects without meaningful consultation´-or-engagement with local communities, including the legislative electoral process itself and its multiple structural flaws.
The rising intensity of protests—now reaching the streets in an unprecedented development in the new era—should be understood as an expression of the enduring spirit and embers of the Syrian revolution. It represents a warning signal that Syrian authorities would be wise to heed: an opportunity to recalibrate policies, strengthen their positions, and rebuild trust with the broader public.
Such a process would foster mutual support between public opinion and civil society—actors that remain, in reality, largely excluded from decision-making circles at all levels.
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