Iran After Khamenei: Chaos and the Decline of Regional Influence

Despite the severe Israeli American airstrikes against Iran, it is still premature to speak of a fundamental change in the structure of the Iranian regime, which marked its 47th anniversary in February without any notable celebration. However, the regime witnessed its first major and decisive purge of senior leaders, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These events indicate significant signs of internal decay and chaos within the dictatorial and authoritarian governance system of a state that seeks entry into the nuclear club and has played an increasingly prominent role in the Middle East over the past four decades.
Added to this are the complexities of the internal challenges faced by the city of Qom in relation to the Iranian people. Here, we are not talking about organized political opposition, most of which exists abroad, but rather the recent popular uprising in December 2025, which spanned all Iranian cities and included all ethnic, religious, and sectarian components. These challenges are compounded by issues in security, defense, and foreign policy.
Developments and Indicators
These developments represent a significant event that could lead to a major change, marked by the end of Iran’s regional role, which has been in decline following the devastating strikes on Hezbollah and the elimination of its leaders in southern Lebanon, as well as efforts to-limit- its influence and confront the state’s initiative to prevent arms possession outside national control, under severe Israeli–American pressure. Consequently, Iran has lost one of its most important regional tools, leaving it incapable of exerting influence in the conflict with Israel.
The second major blow came with the significant fall of the Assad regime and the resulting humiliating exit from Syria and Lebanon. This represents a major strategic loss whose consequences are unfolding, leading to the contraction and weakening of Iran’s influence in the Arab region, with the exception of Iraq, for various reasons.
The Israeli Iranian war in the summer of 2025 presented Iran with a different challenge to test its military strength. While it was able to maintain a deterrence balance, it failed to reach the threshold of strategic equilibrium it had long claimed as a regional power capable of qualitative confrontation.
In reality, the “Epic Rage” operation revealed early on that American Israeli superiority is indisputable. Tehran has long spoken of strategic capabilities to face any aggression, but the reality differs sharply from its actions in Syria through -dir-ect military presence,´-or-in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen via proxies who subordinated national interests to Iranian ones. Its strikes were largely primitive despite their brutality, often targeting poorly trained fighters´-or-opposition groups lacking qualitative capabilities.
Until today, the consequences in Iran are catastrophic. The US–Israeli airstrikes not only neutralized first-tier leaders but also destroyed significant military infrastructure and missile stockpiles—the only weapon Tehran could use amid a paralyzed air and naval power and the absence of effective ground operations.
War and Chaos
Israel’s target bank is clear and declared. Netanyahu has repeatedly stated his goal of destroying Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and preventing it from acquiring any weapons that could threaten Israel. The United States, in addition to-limit-ing Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities and placing them under international oversight, aims to effect a qualitative change in the structure of the Iranian regime.
There is a difference of opinion regarding whether to overthrow´-or-reform the regime. The US administration prefers internal change leading to leadership aligned with American demands and committed to them through peaceful negotiation, whereas Israel seeks to undermine the entire regime and create chaos to render Iran powerless.
Iran: Blind Retaliation
So far, in this conflict—which could last weeks, according to President Trump—Tehran has failed to achieve any military´-or-security breakthrough against Israel´-or-the United States. Iranian missiles have not struck precise targets´-or-caused meaningful damage, despite hundreds of rockets fired at Israeli cities, US bases, and ships.
Iranian responses appeared retaliatory but were -dir-ected at Gulf states—Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Initially aimed at US bases, these attacks quickly became indiscriminate strikes on civilian targets, prompting these countries to condemn Iranian aggression, despite their efforts to maintain friendly relations and good neighborly ties. They also played a key role in preventing -dir-ect military strikes on Iran for several weeks, pushing for negotiations in which Muscat acted as a host and active participant.
Such reckless aggression pushes Gulf states to abandon neutrality in the ongoing US–Israeli conflict and to protect themselves according to the challenges imposed by regional war. This could open the door to a new dynamic in relations with Iran, and a potential political shift´-or-regime change might allow for strategic realignment in the Gulf and claims for Emirati islands´-or-autonomy for Khuzestan.
Nonetheless, Tehran continues to mobilize its regional instruments to expand the conflict, believing this may relieve pressure from airstrikes without seriously considering the changed dynamics´-or-balance of power and the resulting consequences.
Hezbollah’s rocket attacks toward northern occupied Palestine, lacking military value, provided Israel with a pretext to conduct punishing airstrikes in southern Lebanon, endangering tens of thousands of civilians, causing displacement, and destroying homes and infrastructure. This produces counterproductive outcomes, explaining Lebanon’s efforts to assert full territorial control and prevent unauthorized arms possession to protect its citizens.
What’s Next?
Despite the clarity of objectives, ambiguity dominates the official positions of all parties. To date, there is no evidence of the outcomes of airstrikes against Tehran, except for what the US Central Command released regarding targeting Khamenei’s headquarters shortly after his reported death. There is a clear secrecy regarding the results of the exchanges between Tel Aviv, Washington, and Tehran, compounded by internet outages and information blackouts concerning military operations.
What remains certain is that negotiation is not an option until there is a change in the stance of the Iranian leadership taking over after Khamenei’s assassination. Despite exchanged messages and subsequent denials, all parties await the results of airstrikes´-or-a decisive moment that compels negotiation for peace.
In any case, Iran’s policies have reduced the security threat to Israel, and it no longer possesses its political, security, and military leverage in the Middle East except in Iraq. Its aggressive policies toward regional peoples, coupled with repression and intimidation of the Iranian population, have weakened it. Today, the Iranian people aspire to comprehensive structural change leading to freedom, democracy, and peace.

Rate the article
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Very good
Result : 100%							Participated in the vote : 1