Hemedti: The Rebranding of a Mercenary Warlord into a “Legitimate” Head of State

On the shores of Lake Victoria one of the principal sources of the Nile and in Kampala specifically, Sudan was dealt a calculated Ugandan blow aimed at legitimizing rule by force of arms. The visit of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) was not a mere diplomatic formality it was a clear declaration that a militia is being recast as a political façade, and that the blood of the nation is being traded at the tables of recognition.
This visit is not an isolated incident, but the opening move in a carefully engineered process designed to test both international and domestic reactions paving the way for the entrenchment of a parallel authority that threatens Sudan’s sovereignty and the future of its people. Every step, every reception, every statement conveys the same message: legitimacy is being manufactured beyond the soil devastated by betrayal, and the contest for power is far from over.
This visit cannot be dismissed as routine political protocol. The reception granted to Hemedti by Yoweri Museveni addressing him as President of the Sudanese Presidential Council was no ceremonial detail. It was a deliberate political characterization carrying the weight of a trial balloon for implicit recognition.
The accompanying delegation was not presented as a military entourage´-or-as representatives of a militia accused of grave violations it was carefully staged to resemble a -function-ing government. The presence of Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, the inclusion of figures introduced as regional governors and ministers, and the issuance of an official communiqué referring to relations between the two countries, a government vision, and a comprehensive settlement collectively point to the deliberate construction of a complete political tableau. The objective is clear: to shift the conflict from the category of rebellion to that of an alternative authority, to break regional and international isolation, and to open a gradual pathway toward recognition beginning within the region and expanding outward.
The message is unmistakable: if recognition cannot be secured through the main gate, it will enter through side doors until it solidifies as a fait accompli. Uganda appears to have been selected as a gateway to facilitate Hemedti’s entry into East Africa and the Nile Basin. Meanwhile, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan positions himself along the Red Sea axis, reflecting an intense contest over geopolitical space one seeking African depth, the other relying on coastal leverage and Arab alliances. Between them, Sudan risks becoming a chessboard upon which regional and international calculations intersect.
It would be simplistic to discuss major regional maneuvers in isolation from American influence. States such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Ethiopia do not engage in matters of this magnitude without at least tacit alignment with Washington. The formal use of the title President of the Presidential Council, alongside repeated references to the two countries, suggests at minimum a tolerance if not an early stage endorsement by influential international actors, serving as a preliminary test of reaction ahead of broader political normalization.
It is a deliberate test of resistance: measuring the strength of opposition, the-limits of rejection, and the extent to which a new political reality can be imposed incrementally. If the first step carries no meaningful political cost, it will be followed by more consequential moves additional visits, expanded engagements, and agreements that may extend beyond diplomatic courtesies into security and economic frameworks that strike at the very core of national sovereignty.
Since 2019, many observers have cautioned against accepting the narrative of a genuine binary struggle between Burhan and Hemedti. Both operate within overlapping networks of interest in which roles may shift, but strategic objectives remain constant. The international calculus has not favored the most nationally credible actor, but rather the most pliable and susceptible to pressure. Figures burdened by allegations of serious violations are often the easiest to contain and leverage. In this context, Hemedti is not being positioned as an independent statesman, but as a politically -function-al intermediary deployable and marketable when expedient.
The ongoing war itself appears less an aberration than a mechanism for recalibrating power balances on the ground, paving the way for a settlement that legitimizes those who impose effective control not necessarily those who command the consent of the governed.
The most consequential dimension of this visit may lie in what follows: security arrangements, economic understandings, and regional alignments framed under appealing titles such as stability, partnership,´-or-counterterrorism. Beneath such language, however, may rest the redistribution of influence and resources, and potentially long-term concessions within areas of de facto control granted absent popular mandate´-or-national oversight. Once legitimacy is normalized through practice, reversing it becomes politically and legally far more complex. The question would then cease to be whether such authority should be recognized, and instead become how to navigate a reality already acknowledged by external actors.
The broader picture reveals a Sudan increasingly managed through transactional logic rather than institutional statecraft: a struggle over geography, a race for recognition, and competition over the resources of an exhausted nation. The primary casualty remains the Sudanese people, who rose in December demanding not renewed tutelage nor the recycling of Compton´-or-episodic commentary on successive distractions will not -alter-unfolding trajectories. Political equations are being rewritten on the ground at a pace that outstrips reactive discourse. Each day that passes without coherent national alignment expands the maneuvering space for projects that risk further fragmentation.
In sum, the Uganda visit is not an endpoint but the beginning of a process that may accelerate in the weeks and months ahead. Unless met with a unified national vision and coordinated civic action capable of redefining legitimacy from within the popular will, a new political reality may take hold one difficult to reverse.
Sudan now stands before two stark choices: reclaim the initiative through genuine unity that transcends divisions,or acquiesce to a gradual erosion of statehood under polished labels whose long-term consequences may burden both present and future generations. History rarely shows leniency toward hesitation.

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