Rebuilding a Nation One Year into Syria’s Post-Assad Future

A year filled with rapid developments and momentous events has passed in Syria since the fall of Assad’s rule and its notoriously brutal security apparatus, an apparatus whose crimes against humanity reached unimaginable levels over nearly half a century, beginning with Hafez al-Assad’s seizure of power in 1970 and the establishment of a regime that systematically violated public rights, freedoms, and international law.

December 8, 2024 marked a pivotal historic turning point—not only for Syria, but also for the regional and international landscape. The “Deterrence of Aggression” operation produced a fundamental shift in the alliances and regional balances that had long dominated Syria and its surroundings. It not only brought about the dramatic and humiliating downfall of one of the region’s most entrenched dictatorships, but also defeated and dismantled the Iranian project, pushed Russia out of influence, and neutralized its role in the balance-of-power equations in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, even if only temporarily.

One year after Syria without Assad, it is essential to seriously examine the repercussions of that event, both domestically and internationally, and to raise important questions about reclaiming Syria, building a new state, and achieving the long-awaited change after fourteen years of the Syrian revolution.

In truth, this assessment cannot be treated as a simple annual accounting of achievements´-or-fulfilled objectives. Rebuilding Syria and reconstructing national identity amid immense challenges facing both the new authorities and Syrian society is an entirely different matter.

It is no secret that Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership of the country during the transitional period is marked by two fundamental issues. First is its monopolization of governance without genuine, meaningful participation of Syria’s societal, political, social, and economic forces. Loyalists are favored over national expertise, accompanied by the deliberate and systematic exclusion of forces that formed a vital and active part of the Syrian revolution. This mirrors the long-standing marginalization faced by civil revolutionary forces since the rise of armed groups, who tirelessly worked to push civilians out of national political life.

The second issue relates to the duality of the authority’s discourse: one message for the outside world, and another for the domestic audience. Internationally, its performance has been notable and successful, largely due to the efforts led by Riyadh, Ankara, and Doha, coupled with Trump’s arrival at the White House with a new foreign-policy vision. These conditions enabled al-Sharaa to overcome many hurdles and advance Syria’s normalization with the West—chiefly with the United States.

Domestically, however, the authority faces different challenges stemming from its-limit-ed vision for governing a society as diverse, pluralistic, and unique as Syria. It relied heavily on revolutionary legitimacy to consolidate its presence and implement administrative and structural changes in a state emerging from a devastating, all-consuming war. These steps included the constitutional declaration, which faced widespread criticism—particularly from legal and human-rights experts—following a largely symbolic national dialogue conference that fell far short of the genuine national dialogue Syria still desperately needs. This was followed by People’s Assembly elections, widely seen as premature and incomplete, especially given the major unresolved issues in northeastern Syria under SDF control, and in the south following the massacres of last July.

It is undeniable that no one possesses a magic wand capable of transforming Syria within a single year. This is natural in any country under any authority. However, the slow activation of transitional justice programs is playing a harmful role today by diminishing the broad hopes held by Syrians who long to see justice served through the prosecution of war criminals and all perpetrators of crimes against humanity—including political, media, and criminal actors who supported the Assad regime and justified its extreme violence against civilians, enabling it to commit further systematic massacres. Instead, the new authorities opened the door to settlements that in effect offered refuge for those escaping accountability.

The new authority initially enjoyed broad popular support, especially during the first three months. But this support has since declined somewhat for understandable reasons. Internal challenges proved far more intense and consequential for al-Sharaa’s leadership than expected. The leadership believed it could secure the Syrian interior and prevent any security breaches amid the fragile relative stability, a crucial step, especially since weapons continue to exist outside state control.

Internal challenges manifested most clearly in the bloody events on the Syrian coast—massacres against civilians following an attempted armed revolt by remnants of the Assad regime last March. A similar scenario unfolded in Suwayda, where massacres were committed by all sides amid a prior rebellion led by Sheikh al-Hajri against the new Syrian authorities, backed by Israel.

The mobilization of minority groups in Syria poses a genuine threat to the country’s territorial unity. It has also opened the door to armed violence, the spread of hatred, and sectarian, ethnic, and religious retreat—developments that bode ill if the Syrian authorities do not successfully address this file, which has now become internationalized whether Syrians like it´-or-not.

By comparison, external challenges have been less severe than those within Syria. These include ongoing Israeli aggression and repeated violations of the 1974 disengagement agreement, as well as managing the Russian and Iranian files and rebuilding trust with international actors. Syria’s relationship with the White House now plays a notably positive role in this process, following the previously mentioned Saudi-Qatari-Turkish support for President al-Sharaa.

While we support the new authority in Syria and the democratic rise of the Islamic-leaning current to power, it remains our duty and responsibility as Syrian citizens to engage in continuous evaluation and constructive criticism motivated by genuine concern for Syria’s future—its society and its state. Such engagement is essential to advancing national reconstruction and meaningful change. Many issues demand open discussion, including freedom of expression, political freedoms, party organization, and—above all—transitional justice, liberty, and democracy, always and forever.

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