After Operation Hawk Eye Shifting U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy in Syria

Before the White House launched Operation Hawk Eye in northern and eastern Syria last Friday, perhaps the most pressing question concerned the future of the relationship between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as the deadline for implementing the March 10 agreement approaches at the end of this year. The key issue was whether a political settlement would prevail over the use of force to compel those obstructing the resolution of this sensitive and complex file within the current Syrian landscape.

The Operation: Scope and Objectives
The retaliatory operation carried out by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) against ISIS represents a qualitative action, not only from a military standpoint, but also in terms of the messages it sends and the lessons it conveys. While its tangible results on the ground may appear-limit-ed, the operation remains necessary. ISIS as an organized entity no longer exists-;- it has no fixed camps´-or-identifiable headquarters that can be -dir-ectly targeted and dismantled. What remains today are “remnants”, scattered elements of a terrorist organization that once terrorized civilians in Syria and Iraq and threatened regional stability and international strategic interests.
The significance of Operation Hawk Eye can be discerned through several key factors. Foremost among them is the continued determination of the U.S. administration to confront any possibility of ISIS being revived´-or-reconstituted, and to prevent attempts to undermine stabilization strategies in the region, especially following the collapse of the Iranian–Russian–Assad alliance, which fostered chaos under the pretext of filling a vacuum. In reality, the Syrian desert region (al-Badiya) remained beyond the control of any authority, except for the effective air power exclusively held by the International Coalition.
Across this vast desert expanse stretching between Homs, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, dormant cells operated independently within what remained of joint Iranian–Syrian military positions, without organizational networks and without effective oversight, an issue in itself.

Significance for U.S.–Syrian Cooperation
A second key point lies in the important indication this operation provides regarding security cooperation between the Syrian authorities and the United States in combating terrorism. This cooperation was recently underscored by the announcement of Damascus joining the International Coalition against ISIS. U.S. President Donald Trump stated that the terrorist attack targeted Syrian and American soldiers alike. In reality, this cooperation appears to have included intelligence sharing and operational coordination, as evidenced by Operation Hawk Eye. Notably, the U.S. State Department promptly referenced the Syrian Foreign Ministry’s position on the operation, interpreting it as “Syrian approval to pursue and dismantle terrorist activities on Syrian territory.” No subsequent statement was issued by Damascus to deny´-or-confirm this interpretation, implying tacit consent.

Within this context, two significant indicators stand out
First, Washington appears to be moving seriously toward cooperation with Damascus in counterterrorism efforts and in enforcing security stability across the region, recognizing that the Syrian state must be empowered to assert sovereignty and authority over all its territory in pursuit of shared interests.
Second, with regard to the Syrian Democratic Forces, long regarded as the International Coalition’s local instrument and its primary ground force in areas under its control, it has become evident that the SDF failed to protect U.S. forces from ISIS attacks, most notably the Palmyra operation on December 13. Initial assessments clearly indicate that the SDF has failed in its mission to track and eliminate dormant ISIS cells within its operational zones. This serves as a strong signal that the United States is moving toward establishing a strategic security partnership with Damascus, alongside a noticeable reduction in reliance on a militia whose role no longer appears effective.
In fact, during the week following the ISIS attack on the joint U.S.–Syrian patrol, numerous analyses suggested the possibility of some form of SDF involvement in that terrorist assault. The simple question, who benefits?, leads to one conclusion: the SDF, which has consistently claimed, “We have always warned of ISIS’s continued presence, and the SDF remains vigilant in combating terrorism.” This narrative has long been used by the SDF to justify its continued existence in the face of calls for its dissolution after the expiration of its -function-al role, especially as it increasingly transformed into an instrument of repression and intimidation against the people of the Jazira region.
The SDF has failed to track down any ISIS “remnants,” cells,´-or-individuals in recent years. On the contrary, it has carried out campaigns against civilians, conducting arbitrary arrests and killings without international accountability, all under the pretext of counterterrorism. It has used its security apparatus to silence dissent, forcibly recruit youth and minors, and dig tunnels inside cities, particularly Raqqa, while refusing to comply with the March 10, 2025 agreement with Damascus to end the abnormal state of occupation and resolve its status. This comes after the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) dissolved itself and renounced its armed “struggle.”
Operation Hawk Eye was a retaliatory action, a swift and -dir-ect response, yet a-limit-ed one. This-limit-ation signals a shift in vision and in security and military strategies, favoring cooperation with Damascus rather than with the SDF, which is now expected to pack up its equipment, abandon its ambitions, and return to where it came from, just as ISIS once did.

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