The Contest of Leadership and the Sword of Imprisonment: What Dawn Awaits Kurdistan?

On the stage of Turkish politics, Kurdish leadership is entangled in the threads of fate and imprisonment — an eternal tale titled struggle, centered around Ö-;-calan and Demirtaş-;-: two poles meant to complete a circle, yet now facing the winds of division and the games of power. While Selahattin Demirtaş-;- and Figen Yüksekdağ-;- gazed toward the horizon in hope of freedom, following the expiry of Turkey’s appeal period against the European Court of Human Rights ruling, the Ministry of Justice’s move to request a review reaffirmed the bitterness of reality: in Ankara’s lexicon, freedom is not the product of a judicial ruling but a political decision — much like what happened with Osman Kavala. This manipulation of law signals the ongoing use of the judiciary as a tool to restrain popular will and keep its symbols behind bars. The call for their immediate release, as affirmed by the İ-;-mralı-;- Commission of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), is a cornerstone of constitutional order and the rule of law — refuting any malicious rumors blaming either them´-or-Abdullah Ö-;-calan for the continuation of this unjust captivity.

The project of a “Terror-Free Turkey,” championed by the Nationalist Movement Party and its leader Devlet Bahçeli through his open call to dialogue with Ö-;-calan, reveals covert attempts to rearrange the political deck in the corridors of the capital. Yet this endeavor, despite its media fanfare, lacks popular legitimacy and wanders through a dark tunnel of suspicion. Many view it as a political maneuver designed to secure another term for the current president — so long as strong contenders like Ekrem İ-;-mamoğ-;-lu, who has proven his worth at the ballot box, and Demirtaş-;-, with his undeniable charisma, remain sidelined from the active political arena. The greater fear, perhaps, lies in Demirtaş-;-’s influence that transcends ideology: his famous words, “We will not let you become president,” still echo in the collective memory. His ability to attract a wide segment of Turkey’s social and leftist base — particularly among Kurdish and Turkish youth alike — makes him a formidable figure the authorities cannot afford to ignore, lest his potential alliance with figures like İ-;-mamoğ-;-lu ignite a wave of popular and political solidarity.

Here lies the very essence of the Kurdish leadership’s internal conflict. The current scene points to a dual leadership dilemma: the Turkish government seems to prefer engaging with the isolated Ö-;-calan, whose leadership remains politically contentious in some circles — perhaps because they perceive in him the more manageable key to controlling the trajectory of ending the armed struggle, especially amid continued U.S. support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) across the border. Whispers in political corridors even suggest that Ö-;-calan himself fears the unpredictable consequences of Demirtaş-;-’s return to active politics, worrying that it might obstruct ongoing negotiations — an assumption the DEM Party vehemently and thunderously denied, reaffirming the necessity of releasing all political prisoners, including Demirtaş-;- and Yüksekdağ-;-, as a matter of rights and justice.

The alleged discord among İ-;-mralı-;-, Qandil, and E-dir-ne — and the ensuing disputes — is not a recent development. It first surfaced when Ö-;-calan called for neutral voting in Istanbul’s rerun elections in 2019, a stance Demirtaş-;- openly rejected by supporting the opposition’s candidate. This exposed the fracture in Kurdish decision-making and highlighted the central struggle over who truly holds the reins of leadership within the movement: the armed wing´-or-the legitimate political arm? The deeper question confronting the Kurdish movement today is that of central leadership in this transitional phase toward legal political engagement and the end of armed struggle. While some argue that Ö-;-calan remains indispensable for declaring the final farewell to arms — especially concerning Syria and the SDF — Demirtaş-;-, despite his imprisonment, continues to be the most accepted voice among the grassroots and the broader Turkish public. This renders any peace narrative centered solely on Ö-;-calan unconvincing and lacking in public legitimacy, while Demirtaş-;- himself cannot issue a ceasefire order from within his cell.

It is, indeed, the dilemma of two captives — both indispensable to the realization of any just political solution. Yet the state’s calculations still favor the elder prisoner over the newer one, leaving the key to Demirtaş-;-’s freedom — and the safety of the political process — chained not to the letter of law, but to the will of the ruler.

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