Botan Zębarî
2025 / 10 / 9
In the feverish expanse of politics—where Syria has become a millstone grinding upon the bodies of dreams—the Kurdish existence emerges as a canvas painted with stern defiance and enduring hope. The Syrian scene, burdened with false promises and broken pledges, stands as testimony to a game of nations that values neither the weak nor the sanctity of a vow. Within this turmoil, the calls for a Turkish–Kurdish–Arab alliance echo like a magical key to eternal peace. Yet this key refuses to turn in the locks of reality, for it requires the ink of trust long dried and the formula of partnership still unwritten. Ankara calls for full integration, sending forth its summons toward those who turn their faces to Damascus, proclaiming that those who return to her embrace—and to that of Syria—shall be the victors, while those who reject this vision are but dreamers chasing fleeting illusions and hollow ambitions.
Yet the language of the land—the tongue of Rojava—utters a different decree. To wade into the Syrian quagmire is no venture for easy withdrawal-;- it is a binding shackle, unfastened only by the concessions´-or-bitter understandings of the mighty. The Turkish entrenchment within Syrian geography, though it may yield temporary´-or-relative gains mistaken for triumph, remains hostage to complex international calculations. While Israel and the Gulf states are often cited as cunning players in this arena, Turkey too weaves its counterplots amid these intrigues—yet the greatest beneficiary remains the one who heeds Washington’s call and executes its -dir-ectives with the precision of an obedient subordinate. For unless the region’s grand issues—such as the Gaza question—are resolved, Syria will remain a theater of conflict, where Turkey’s role and the issue of Syrian Kurdistan form two inseparable dimensions of a single, inescapable dilemma.
At the heart of this entanglement stands the Kurdish leadership’s demands for self-administration and the search for a model akin to the federal system of northern Iraq. It is a quest for qualitative independence—one that refuses dissolution within the fabric of Damascus’s army, insisting instead on remaining a distinct political and military entity within a broader framework of understanding. This stance has been reaffirmed time and again, particularly in crucial meetings between the SDF leadership and American officials, where Washington’s position appears unmistakably inclined toward supporting Kurdish rights—even at the highest levels of decision-making. Indeed, the fate of eastern Euphrates and the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are not determined in regional offices but drafted in the corridors of the United States, within a narrow circle where American interests intersect with Israel’s regional vision—the axis around which the entire Western strategy in the Middle East revolves.
Within this context, Turkish calls for domestic reconciliation and the invocation of figures such as Abdullah Ö-;-calan appear as attempts to shuffle the deck. Yet such gestures remain hollow unless translated into genuine action on the ground—restoring the Kurds’ constitutional rights, reactivating suspended negotiation processes, and releasing political prisoners. The persistent denial of Kurdish demands and the disregard for their elected leaders—or even for the symbols of their struggle—only serve to complicate the scene further, unleashing waves of popular and regional anger that transcend national borders. This anger finds resonance among millions of Kurds worldwide, who follow the struggle through modern forms of resistance—from psychological warfare to media battles—aware that they are not mere gatherers of the harvest but an organized force with rightful aspirations.
In the end, the question of the eastern Euphrates and the fate of the SDF cannot be resolved according to Turkish wishes, but rather in accordance with international power balances—balances that favor those capable of imposing their will upon the raging Syrian stage.
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