The ‘doves’ of Iraq’s Coordination Framework

You will find yourself in an analytical dilemma as soon as you use political science terms to describe what is happening in Iraq’s political process. You will need to provide justifications and footnotes to support the use of such terms because you are essentially dealing with a fabricated political invention in the region that is disguised under a fragile democratic veneer. History is being forced to document this as an ongoing reality regardless of its validity.
Today, terms such as ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ are used extensively to describe the factions within the Coordination Framework, which encompasses Iran’s political parties and militias in Iraq. The objective is to dismantle these militias while maintaining them under the pretext of striking a political deal that aligns with American-Iranian cooperation.
Those who use the terms ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ to describe the factions within Iran’s parties and militias in Iraq cannot provide a structured defence of the accuracy of such terminology. They do not have sufficient indicators to incorporate these terms within the framework of politically sound analysis.
I and others could readily use the term ‘Iranian parties and militias’ instead of ‘Coordination Framework’ without violating objectivity´-or-relinquishing sensitivity in political writing. Nevertheless, it is intriguing that the political reality of this so-called ‘political operetta’ is misleading and disconnected from the actual political events occurring in the Green Zone. The discussion about ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ within the Coordination Framework regarding relations with the United States and Iran is a farce-;- a fantasy´-or-wish being marketed to the public.
For example, categorising Ammar al-Hakim as one of the ‘doves’ does not take us into a surreal phase, but rather into tragicomedy when we consider the times Hakim has used the phrase ‘the largest component’ and claimed the right to rule Iraq! Sectarian rule and its relationship with Iran take precedence over any national Iraqi considerations.
The same can be said of other leaders within the framework, including Haider al-Abadi and Muhammad Shiaa al-Sudani, who are considered the calmer ones in the ‘component game’, not to mention Nouri al-Maliki, whose sectarian bias is evident whenever he speaks about the Shias of Syria! The same applies to Qais al-Khazali and other militia leaders.
If the ‘doves’ even exist, they are primarily concerned with maintaining sectarian rule in Iraq. According to this principle, the term ‘dove’ becomes meaningless, as anyone who seeks to elevate sectarianism over national identity cannot be a dove of political peace.

Sudani himself acknowledges this, despite being classified as a ‘dove’ of the Coordination Framework. During his first visit as prime minister to Tehran, when he met Khamenei, Sudani asked for Khamenei’s protection, not from the Americans, but from ‘our people’, as they posed a greater threat to sectarian rule in Iraq than the Americans themselves.
Sudani admits in his conversations with other leaders of the Coordination Framework that he cannot guarantee the continuation of Shia rule in Iraq, nor can any of the other leaders! Rather, the Americans are our last hope for remaining in power. The moment we lose them, we lose everything. At first glance, this seems like a pragmatic political philosophy aimed at preserving sectarian rule. However, this mindset entirely negates the existence of any classification that could be considered as belonging to ‘doves.’
The concept of ‘doves’ becomes meaningless in the face of Iran’s failures in the region, which inevitably leads to the collapse of the remaining pillars of the sectarian triangle that Tehran intended for the region. A more accurate term than ‘doves’ is the political bending in the face of the storm to dismantle Iran’s militias in Iraq.
This was clarified by one of Khamenei’s relatives in an interview with the Financial Times: ‘While we resist American pressure, we will also indicate our willingness to negotiate. Iran is working to reduce actions that may provoke Washington, even if no agreement is ultimately reached.’

Khamenei’s relative also admitted that Israeli attacks on Iran and the so-called Resistance Axis of Iran-backed militant groups, including Hezbollah, have caused Iranian leaders to reconsider their view of Iran’s power in the Middle East.
Alternatively, we can quote Jeremy Shapiro, an American researcher and -dir-ector of studies at the European Council on Foreign Relations, who coined the term ‘Geopolitical Manhood’, which has been crushed in Iran. It is only a matter of time before its militias in Iraq suffer the same fate.
Jonathan Schanzer, executive -dir-ector of the Foundation for Defence of Democracies, also echoed this sentiment, stating that the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was the critical moment for taking action against Iran’s militias in Iraq.
Schanzer said: “Right now, Iraqis are wondering if they are next, and everyone fears the toxic and corrosive nature of Iranian influence on the state.”
As for those who use the term ‘doves’ in the Coordination Framework, they are not only forcing history to accept an erroneous expression of reality, they are also piecing together the wrong puzzle. The political children in the Green Zone will abandon the sectarian weeping when faced with a choice between a council of continued weeping, hailed as the greatest achievement of sectarian politics, and Iraq’s open coffers! They will soon declare, ‘We will seize the money to perpetuate the council of weeping!’ Then try to reconcile the term ‘doves’ with their actions.

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