Anas Nader
2025 / 7 / 28
The Syrian revolution, in its entirety and with the majority of its political, military, and popular components, called for international intervention under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to end the oppression of the Assad regime, which has committed massacres and imposed starvation upon its people, with the exception of the Coordination Committee and a few independent cultural elites. There is hardly a nationality on this planet that has not set foot on Syrian soil and participated in the killing of its people, all while cheering the bombing of Syrian cities.
Then came the peaceful movement in Suwayda, calling for a peaceful political transition of power as a culmination of the sacrifices made by the Syrian people across various regions. Today, the governorate of Suwayda is being condemned for appealing for foreign intervention to stop the massacre being carried out against it, under the pretext of "collaborating with foreign powers", as if the international community is taking orders from this small province.
In reality, external powers exploit extremism, tribal and sectarian divisions, and capitalize on a culture of exclusion and revenge. What is truly inviting foreign intervention is the incitement of regional, tribal, and sectarian strife, which lays the groundwork for social and popular fragmentation, and eventually, for actual territorial division. To prevent this, what is needed is a show of solidarity, mutual understanding, and grassroots reconciliation, alongside the reinforcement of ethical and national stances. not siege, starvation, subjugation, and humiliation.
It appears that the hidden policy behind these practices , and the excuse used to justify them , is a political approach that in reality promotes exclusion and division, under the guise of accusations of treason and exploitation of the victimhood that most Syrians feel due to the entrenched social and sectarian marginalization inherited from the legacy of the former regime.
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