Iran’s ambiguous charm offensive masks enduring distrust of Saudi Arabia

Iran’s warm diplomatic language toward Saudi Arabia, most recently expressed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, who thanked Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for his “noble sentiments” and Riyadh’s firm condemnation of Israeli aggression, does not reflect the true nature of Tehran’s political thinking. There is far more at play behind the façade of goodwill.
Since the Beijing-brokered agreement with Riyadh in 2023, Iran has pursued a carefully-modulated approach to Saudi Arabia. This balancing act has taken on new urgency in the wake of recent Israeli strikes on Iranian territory, prompting Tehran to intensify efforts to avoid broader regional escalation.
Yet just one day before the Israeli attack, Iranian Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh issued a -dir-ect threat to regional states, including Saudi Arabia, warning that if nuclear negotiations with the United States collapsed and conflict ensued, Iran would target US bases across the region. “If conflict is forced upon us,” he said, “all American bases within range will be hit hard, even in their host countries.”
The message was unmistakable: Tehran’s regional policy is still shaped by coercion and deterrence. A day after the Israeli strike, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed the same posture, stating that Iran had no intention of expanding the conflict, “unless compelled to.” When, and by what measure, Iran might feel “compelled” remains unresolved.
Two months earlier, Saudi Arabia had tried to chart a different course. In a private meeting held in Tehran on April 17, King Salman bin Abdulaziz had dispatched his son, Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, to deliver what was described as a “golden piece of advice” to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: to seriously consider then-US President Donald Trump’s offer of renewed nuclear negotiations as a means to avert war with Israel.
The meeting, attended by President Pezeshkian, Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri, and Foreign Minister Araghchi, was seen by Riyadh as a critical opportunity to steer Iran away from escalation. But then Khamenei dismissed the overture, a decision that helped usher in the volatile moment the region now faces.
This rejection underlines a fundamental reality: Iran’s leadership has never fully trusted Saudi Arabia, and likely never will. That scepticism is deeply rooted in the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic. As Iranian-American scholar Vali Nasr notes in his recent book “Iran’s Grand Strategy,” published just weeks before the Israeli attack, Tehran’s approach is defined by tactical flexibility rather than strategic shift. Iran excels at presenting diplomatic openness and regional outreach as tools of strategic patience, not transformation.
Thus, the 2023 rapprochement with Saudi Arabia was never about reconciliation. It was a calculated move to buy time, ease economic pressure and consolidate Tehran’s posture without abandoning its resistance narrative nor relinquishing influence over its regional proxy network.
Iran’s current hedging behaviour, particularly after the Israeli strike, serves as a reminder that while history may teach valuable lessons, trust, especially with Tehran, remains more of a political fantasy than a reliable foundation.
Despite the Gulf states’ investment in US-backed military bases designed to deter Iran, fears persist that Tehran could miscalculate, targeting those very installations and drawing the United States into a wider regional conflict. Sanam Vakil, a senior researcher at Chatham House, cautions that Gulf states “face real risks and must play their cards carefully,” adding that any weakening of Iran, long at odds with its Arab neighbours, would not necessarily be unwelcome in Gulf capitals.
Yet many regional policymakers remain overly optimistic about Iran’s future behaviour, with some engaging in what could be described as premature image rehabilitation, despite a lack of concrete signs that Tehran has altered its long-term strategy.
While officials routinely speak of a “new regional order” built on economic integration and shared prosperity, few explain on what, if anything, such a vision is actually based. Before the Beijing agreement, a prominent Saudi media figure, close to the kingdom’s policy-making circles, told me that Iran’s “Qom as Umm al-Qura” doctrine remains permanently on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s radar. The idea that Iran seeks to supplant Mecca as the heart of the Islamic world is not dismissed lightly in Riyadh.
Even the Crown Prince’s headline-making interview with Fox News anchor Bret Baier, while notable in tone, did not resolve Saudi Arabia’s core security concerns vis-à-vis Iran. The nuclear issue, significant as it is, is only one part of a broader, more existential threat in Saudi eyes.
There remain a host of critical questions yet to be answered. It is not enough to trade in hopeful rhetoric-;- we must seek clear indicators of change. While no reasonable actor would oppose peaceful regional ties, we are still waiting for one rational voice to offer a convincing case that Iran has abandoned its regional domination project, before Tehran is rebranded as a peace-seeking neighbour.
As Firas Maksad, -dir-ector for the Middle East and North Africa at the Eurasia Group, told The New York Times, “If Israel and´-or-the United States can finish off the threat to the Gulf countries via military means, I don’t think that Arab leaders will be shedding tears.
“The great concern is a job half-done that then leaves them wide open to retaliation and undermines their national development projects in the process,” he added.

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