Islamic Philosophy: Realism versus Antirealism

Islamic Philosophy: Realism versus Antirealism


Hassan Ajami

One major topic in Islamic philosophy is the debate between realism and antirealism. Ibn Rushd defends realism and analyzes causal relationships, possibilities, and universals in light of his realist approach. But Al-Ghazali accepts antirealism, and analyzes causation, possibilities, and universals from the perspective of antirealism.

Ibn Rushd holds that causes necessarily lead to their effects. He provides two basic arguments for his position. The first is that if the causes do not necessarily lead to their effects, then knowledge will not be possible, given that we know things through their causal roles. But knowledge is possible, i.e. we can have knowledge. Therefore, causes necessitate the occurrence of their effects. The second argument is that if causes do not necessitate the occurrence of their effects, then our words and concepts will lose their meanings. Yet we want to preserve the meanings of our concepts and words in order to be successful in communicating with each other. Therefore, causes necessarily lead to their effects. Here, Ibn Rushd is articulating and defending the realist account of causation, according to which, causes necessitate the existence of their effects.

On the other hand, Al-Ghazali accepts an antirealist conception of causation. From the viewpoint of Al-Ghazali, causes do not necessarily cause their effects. Rather, God constantly interferes in the affairs of the world, such that only God enables the causes to lead to their effects. For instance, according to Al-Ghazali, a flame could touch a piece of cotton, yet this piece of cotton might not burn, although we usually observe that a piece of cotton actually burns whenever it is touched by a flame. Al-Ghazali’s main argument for his antirealist account of causation is the following: we do not have a reason to believe that causes necessarily lead to their effects except observation. But observation only shows that causes are followed by their effects, and it does not show that causes necessarily cause their effects. Therefore, from the perspective of Al-Ghazali, it is plausible to infer that causes do not necessarily lead to their effects.

One way of looking at this philosophical debate between Ibn Rushd and Al-Ghazali is through investigating their competing theories of meaning. From the viewpoint of Ibn Rushd, the causal role of the object referred to by a certain word is an essential part of the meaning of the word in question. This is why if we deny that causes necessarily cause their effects then we will lose the meanings of our words. And, of course, we do not want that to happen. Hence, for Ibn Rushd, there are causal relationships, such that causes necessarily cause their effects. All of this indicates that Ibn Rushd’s theory of meaning, namely that the meanings of words are determined by the causal roles of the objects which words refer to, plays a vital role in his development and acceptance of the realist conception of causation. For example, in the philosophical paradigm of Ibn Rushd, the fact that the sun necessarily causes light and heat is an essential part of the meaning of the word “sun”. And this is why if we deny the necessary relationship between causes and their effects, we will lose the meanings of our words.

Yet, according to Al-Ghazali, meanings are determined by the context of speech, and not necessarily by causal relationships. And this is why, from the perspective of Al-Ghazali, we could maintain that causes do not necessarily lead to their effects without losing the meanings of our words. All of this shows that Ibn Rushd and Al-Ghazali disagree on the analysis of causation because they disagree on the conception of meaning. Ibn Rushd’s view that causal roles are essential parts of the meanings of words led him to endorse the realist theory of causation, while Al-Ghazali’s view that causal roles are not necessarily parts of the meanings of words, but rather the context fixes the meanings of our concepts, led him to accept an antirealist account of causation.

Similarly, Ibn Rushd and Al-Ghazali disagree on the meanings of possibilities and universals. While Ibn Rushd articulates a realist position, Al-Ghazali provides an antirealist analysis of possibilities and universals. Ibn Rushd holds that possibilities presuppose the existence of matter because they require substances in order for them to be actualized. But possibilities are supposed to be eternal. Therefore, according to Ibn Rushd, the material world is eternal, exactly as the possibilities are. This shows that Ibn Rushd’s conception of possibilities inclined him to accept the view that the world is eternal. Now, the possibilities are supposed to be eternal because a possibility is that which is not self-contradictory, and what is not self-contradictory is always so.

Ibn Rushd analyzes the possibilities in terms of matter. And this is the basic reason behind his position that possibilities presuppose the existence of matter. For example, in his philosophical paradigm, it is possible that there are human beings if and only if there is a material substance capable of being formed as human beings. This is why Ibn Rushd concludes that possibilities necessarily require the existence of a material universe. In light of these considerations, Ibn Rushd defends a realist conception of possibilities, given that he maintains that there are no possibilities without an external and material reality, which enables the possibilities to be manifested in the actual world.

On the other hand, Al-Ghazali develops an antirealist conception of possibilities. According to Al-Ghazali, what is possible is that which is conceivable by the mind. And hence, from his point of view, the possibilities do not presuppose the existence of a material world. This ultimately led him to defend the view that the world is not eternal. All of this indicates that Al-Ghazali’s theory of possibilities participated in his endorsement of the philosophical theory that the world is not eternal, contrary to Ibn Rushd’s account of possibilities which led him to accept the view that the world is eternal. Therefore, their disagreement on the meaning of what is possible formed the foundation for their disagreement on other important philosophical topics, such as whether the world is eternal´-or-not. For Al-Ghazali, it is possible that there are human beings if and only if it is conceivable that there are humans. Thus, from his viewpoint, possibilities are mental constructions residing in the minds, and they are not necessarily related to the material world. In this sense, Al-Ghazali is an antirealist with regard to the analysis of possibilities.

From the same perspective, Ibn Rushd is a realist while Al-Ghazali is an antirealist with respect to the analysis of universals. Ibn Rushd says that universals, such as redness, exist potentially in the external and material world, although they exist actually in minds. In this sense, Ibn Rushd endorses a realist account of universals because he connects them to the actual and external world. For Ibn Rushd, when the universals, such as redness, are actualized, the objects of the universe gain their properties, such as the property of being red. Hence, from his point of view, the universals have a major role in the formation of the external and material world. From his perspective, the universals potentially exist in the external world otherwise there will not be a necessary relation between universals, such as redness, and their instantiations, such as red things. And hence, we will not be able to explain why things possess their properties, such as why red things are red. For Ibn Rushd, certain things become red because they are potentially red and their potentiality to be red is actualized for some reason´-or-another.

But Al-Ghazali defends the opposite position of Ibn Rushd with regard to analyzing universals. Al-Ghazali claims that universals exist only in the mind, and they do not exist in the material and external world. In this sense, for Al-Ghazali, the universals are mental constructions exactly as the possibilities are. Thus, Al-Ghazali accepts an antirealist theory of universals, given that he does not relate them to the actual and material world beyond human minds. And he presents a main argument for his position, namely that it is possible for us to think of universals, such as thinking of redness, without thinking of their instantiations, such as red things. This shows, for Al-Ghazali, that universals are mental constructions in our minds and not necessarily related to the external world.

The debate between realism and antirealism plays an important part in Islamic philosophy. While Ibn Rushd endorses realism, Al-Ghazali articulates the antirealist approach. And their philosophical disagreements heavily rely on their disagreement on the conception of meaning.

References

1- Al-Ghazali: Tahafut Al-Falasifah. (Arabic Edition). 2007. Beirut, Lebanon. Scientific Books Publishing House.
2- Al-Ghazali: Collection of Imam Al-Ghazali’s Letters. (Arabic Edition). 2013. Beirut, Lebanon. Scientific Books Publishing House.
3- Ibn Rushd: Tahafut Al-Tahafut. (Arabic Edition). 2014. Beirut, Lebanon. Scientific Books Publishing House.
4- Ibn Rushd: Fasl Al-Maqal. (Arabic Edition). 1986. Beirut, Lebanon. Arab Institution for Studies and Publishing.

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