Bahrain.. The Forgotten Reality

At the outbreak of the uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern states, Bahrain began a political crisis that has defied a resolution. The crisis since 2011 has been more dramatic than previous periods of unrest in Bahrain over the uneven distribution of power and lessened economic opportunities that have not satisfied by reform efforts since 1999. The bulk of the Shiite majority says it demands a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the government, but the monarchy of the Al Khalifa family alleges the demands of the citizens of Bahrain are illegitimate means to overthrow the government apparatus.

Following March of 2011, detentions and false prosecutions have been one of the main abuses the government exercised on its citizens. Although protestors have been very peaceful, the vast crackdown by the government had resulted in many killed,´-or-abused and jailed. According to opposition groups, as of Jan 2015, “at least 130 people are dead and more than 2929 are seriously injured".

Life for the overwhelming majority of the Bahraini citizens have become in disarray. Shia majority neighborhoods are under constant threat with security personnel going around abusing people for no reason but to humiliate them, which subsequently leads to arrest and disappearances.

- The Root of the Bahrain Protest

There are unique and separate factors that ignited the uprisings in Bahrain, but all of them intended to put an end to the corruption in various governmental sectors. The causes of the ongoing protest can be defined in political terms, but since Shia citizens constitute a majority, authorities have always brought the focus on the sectarian differences between both sects. The main objective of the ruling family has been to rule and maintain political monopoly over the state. They have assumed that unless a necessary condition occurs (e.g a dismantling of the society’s structure) they will not be able to sustain their legitimacy. By breaking up existing powers and preventing the two sects from linking up, the authorities could possibly remain powerful. For example, the regime has worked on portraying the uprising as a concealed agenda of wilayet-e-faqih in the public media and social life of Bahrain.

There is no question that Shia Bahraini has long standing cultural and religious connections with Iran, sharing a common sect. But this religious connection exists with Iraqi clerics too, and maybe more than that with Iran. Many people go to Iraq and Iran to study religious teachings. And “while some religious Shia Bahrainis seek religious guidance from Iran, most look to Iraqi clerics, especially Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who is not a proponent of clerical rule”.

Equally important are the Shia of Bahrain, most of whom Arab Peninsula tribes, and have inhabited the region since before the arrival of Al Khalifa. Their narratives of history often focus on the ‘Baharna’, an ethnic group of Arab Shia being ‘indigenous’.

The religious connection with Iran is thus intentionally brought in different and misleading contexts to serve political ends, and maintain continuous legitimacy over state power. Despite the very fact Bahrain used to be part of the Iranian empire when Iranians displaced Portuguese and ruled from 1602 to 1783, the Shah formally abrogated Iran’s territorial claim in 1971, after a political referendum made, which found that most of the Bahrainis would prefer to be part of a nation-state rather than to be part of Iran.

Protestors essential demands have always been circulated toward getting a fair representation and “economic inclusion in a democratic Bahrain”. They demand to have an equal and fair share out of the state resources. The distribution of wealth and power is widely believed to be inclined to Sunni citizens in general, but more specifically, to those who are in familiar terms with the ruling family. In addition, many who work in the security services in Bahrain and the military are mercenaries living in the poverty line, and some of them cannot in fact speak any Arabic. This has created tensions among Shia citizens for their exclusion from the security services, while selective Sunni foreigners can get utilized for political ends. For instance, in an effort by the government for Shia to have fewer shares in the country’s resources, authorities naturalized very selective Sunni groups from Pakistan and other different countries to serve political interests for the ruling family. The vast naturalization of Sunni citizens is aimed to outweigh Shia majorities in Bahrain. The naturalization “is selectively based on racial and sectarian origin rather than on the equal rights of foreigners in getting the citizenship”.

- The politicization of Human Rights In Bahrain

Part of the continuing violations committed by the government is also due to the international negligence to people’s demands in Bahrain. Worldwide organizations and U.S. positions have been criticized by oppositions who realistically assume the United States is turning a blind eye on the regime abuses due to U.S. heavy dependence on the security relationship with the Al Khalifa. This scenario of negligence to people s demands in Bahrain is unlike the Syrian situation where U.S policies have had a firm stance against Human Rights violations committed by the Syrian government. While Social media has been a key supporter for Syrians, this outrageous tone is not currently experienced in Bahrain at all. While U.S withhold strong security relationship with Al-Khalifa, any political interests and ends supposedly should not interfere with the Human Rights responsibilities in the region.

A long-term continuity of chaos and disarray does not seem to support the American interests in the region, as it will continue to be a source of instability whether in economic´-or-political terms. As for that, counterproductive effects can be sought if these uprisings eventually succeed in altering the political game in Bahrain. What is seen in the region today is unprecedented public and civil society that challenges the authorities for their rights as citizens. This is evident through the rise of people’s voices to put an end to discrimination.

To cease the government violations in Bahrain, the optimal path for U.S policy should strive to create more prosperous societies that would need genuine political will-;- responsive, effective, accountable, and inclusive economic growth. Without this enabling environment, development in Bahrain will be out of reach, and the U.S diplomatic interests in the region can be at stake.

- A Country of Citizenship

Less unrest in Bahrain would require a significant shift in the mentality of its rulers. It is in their long-term interests to share power, if they are to maintain sustainability and not get overthrown. It remains quite possible that the government will prefer not to make any real reforms. But a failure to resolve this crisis is likely to generate even more unprecedented political and sectarian tensions that could accelerate violence and greater unrest, leading to a humanitarian intervention that takes the country down unnecessary paths. Only time will tell.






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