Why Do Saudi Arabia and Other Gulf Countries Fear Change?

Observers of the Arab situation after the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions can determine the role of each Arab state in relation to these revolutions simply by monitoring their behavior towards the old versus the new ruling regimes and through their support or biases against these revolutions. Then one may wonder about the reasons for the support and the reasons for the bias and forsaking of assistance:

Have you ever wondered why Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states support the Egyptian presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik, the former prime minister during Hosni Mubarak’s regime, who is running against his opponent, the Muslim Brotherhood?
Or why Saudi Arabia today supports popular opposition to topple the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad?
Or why Saudi Arabia supported the Libyan opposition to topple Muammar Gaddafi’s regime?
Or why Saudi Arabia is so reluctant to aid and support the human rights of the people of Yemen—its neighbor?

It is clear that the behavior of Saudi Arabia, in particular, and the rest of the Gulf, in general, is reflected through Saudi Arabia’s consistent support of the former dictatorial regimes that were loyal to the Kingdom and through its fight against the new regimes that are likely to pose a threat to the Kingdom.
As a Kingdom, Saudi Arabia does not only represent its geopolitical sovereignty, but also seeks to represent and control the Islamic ideology. Therefore, it is not in the interest of Saudi Arabia as a “gatekeeper of the religion” to see other Islamic movements rise and offer religious reforms and solutions to issues, as this may undermine the Kingdom’s influence as the “police” of the Islamic world.

The same concerns invigorate the Saudis when it comes to the Islamic movements in Libya and Tunisia, as the Saudis fear the spread of Islamic movements and their appearance as competitors.

In addition to the strategic objectives of the Gulf states, there are Saudi-Gulf concerns about the spillover of Shiites throughout the Arab world, thus a Saudi priority was to halt this expansion by finding allies willing to service with them covertly.

While it must be admitted that any state has a legitimate right to exercise its policy to deter possible dangers, such a policy must be carried out by means of open diplomacy far away from intrigue.

The role and attitude of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states toward the Arab Spring revolutions is a well-studied strategic decision that emanates from the fear of spreading a “disease” (democracy) in the region, which could possibly sneak into their systems and overturn them some day. But more important is the loss of its cronies in the region, such as Mubarak, who represented the Kingdom in its conflict with Iran, despite the fact that the entry of Egypt into a conflict against Iran may not serve Egypt’s interests, but instead would be detrimental to its economical and political interests. This point was stressed repeatedly by the popular Egyptian thinker and writer Fahmi Howeidi, who argued that it would be wiser to befriend Iran.

For a long time, the Egyptian foreign policy mirrored Saudi interests in the region, as the regime of Mubarak imposed its influence on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and stood against Iran because it supported the Palestinian Hamas movement. Everybody knew that Egypt’s efforts to support the PLO against the Hamas during the siege of Gaza were in fact a Saudi enterprise. The Saudis also used the Mubarak regime in castigating and isolating the Syrian regime during the Hariri Tribunal and in supporting the UN resolution that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon in 2005.
This explains Saudi Arabia’s desire and pursuit of the removal of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, who is an obstacle to its Gulf policies, unlike its former ally Mubarak for whom the Saudis are actively seeking a good alternative for him in Egypt.

The recent visit of the Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa to deposed president Hosni Mubarak in the hospital has raised the ire of the Egyptians. Designating it as an official visit is a good sign of the Saudis’ determination to support their old associates. Apart from that, the visit disregarded the will of the Egyptian people and their elected government and was a clear message that the people of Egypt’s long-sought democracy means nothing to the rest of the Gulf.

One can argue that if Saudis wanted to sell themselves as promoters of democracy, why not support human rights within the Kingdom, or support the Libyan people after the fall of Gaddafi, or support human rights in neighboring Yemen?

Similarly, one could argue that if Saudi Arabia is the gatekeeper of the Islam religion, why do we see it indifferent on the subject of the Islamic Jihad in support of the Palestinian cause?

It is obvious that the Saudi/Gulf’s support for the Syrian opposition today is not support for democracy, but rather an attempt to remove another hurdle that stands in their way: Bashar al Assad of Syria.

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